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ABSTRACT 
E-crimes continue to generate grave challenges to the ICT regulatory agenda. Because 
e-crimes involve a wrongful appropriation of information online, it is enquired whether 
information is property which is capable of being stolen. This then requires an 
investigation to be made of the law of property. The basis for this scrutiny is to 
establish if information is property for purposes of the law. Following a study of the 
Roman-Dutch law approach to property, it is argued that the emergence of an 
information society makes real rights in information possible. This is the position 
because information is one of the indispensable assets of an information society. Given 
the fact that information can be the object of property, its position in the law of theft is 
investigated. This study is followed by an examination of the conventional risks that 
ICTs generate. For example, a risk exists that ICTs may be used as the object of e-
crimes. Furthermore, there is a risk that ICTs may become a tool in order to 
appropriate information unlawfully. Accordingly, the scale and impact of e-crimes is 
more than those of the offline crimes, for example theft or fraud.  
The severe challenges that ICTs pose to an information society are likely to continue if 
clarity is not sought regarding: whether ICTs can be regulated or not, if ICTs can be 
regulated, how should an ICT regulatory framework be structured? A study of the law 
and regulation for regulatory purposes reveals that ICTs are spheres where regulations 
apply or should apply. However, better regulations are appropriate in dealing with the 
dynamics of these technologies. Smart-regulations, meta-regulations or reflexive 
regulations, self-regulations and co-regulations are concepts that support better 
regulations. Better regulations enjoin the regulatory industries, for example the state, 
businesses and computer users to be involved in establishing ICT regulations. These 
ICT regulations should specifically be in keeping with the existing e-authentication 
measures. Furthermore, the codes-based theory, the Danger or Artificial Immune 
Systems (the AIS) theory, the Systems theory and the Good Regulator Theorem ought 
to inform ICT regulations.  
The basis for all this should be to establish a holistic approach to e-authentication. This 
approach must conform to the Precautionary Approach to E-Authentication or PAEA. 
PAEA accepts the importance of legal rules in the ICT regulatory agenda. However, it 
argues that flexible regulations could provide a suitable framework within which ICTs 
iii 
 
and the ICT risks are controlled. In addition, PAEA submit that a state should not be 
the single role-player in ICT regulations. Social norms, the market and nature or 
architecture of the technology to be regulated are also fundamental to the ICT 
regulatory agenda. 
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KEY TERMS: Biometric characters, computer hacking, distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attacks, e-authentication, furtum, ICT regulation, 
ICTs, ID fraud, ID theft, information or computer systems, 
larceny, man-in-the-middle attacks, PAEAN, phishing, 
precautionary principle and user characters.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND  
Information and communication technologies1 have had a significant impact on society. 
These ICTs include technologies that facilitate the ‘application of scientific knowledge, 
materials, techniques, systems,2 methods of organisation and the use of electronic and 
mechanical devices’.3 ICTs can particularly be used to ‘manage and support the 
efficient gathering, processing, storing and dissemination of information (or data) as a 
strategic resource’.4 Both the terms information and data have relevance to a particular 
resource, for example ICTs. Despite this, the meaning of the terms differs. Diverse 
connotations are ascribed to the term information. There are some who define 
information as any ‘piece of news with a meaning for the recipient; its assimilation 
usually causes a change within the recipient’.5 There are also those who describe it as 
a resource in terms of which a message or instruction is conveyed.6 The word data is 
sometimes defined differently from the notion computer data. It refers to the electronic 
representation of information in any form.7 However, the concept computer data 
                                               
1   Hereinafter referred to as ICTs. Examples of the various forms of technologies that 
have an impact on society are the World-Wide-Web or the Web, the Internet, interactive 
and multimedia communications, video conferences, virtual realities, computer-aided 
design, the information superhighway, and technologies of electronic or e-surveillance 
and consumer profiling. See Woolger S (ed) Virtual society? technology, cyberbole, 
reality (Oxford University Press Oxford 2002) 1. 
2  Systems are referred to as the entities that are composed of related parts (sub-
systems) and are directed at a purposeful activity. They have inputs and outputs. See, 
Emery JC Management information systems: the critical strategic resource (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 1987) 240-243. 
3   Bowling B, Marks A and Murphy CC “Crime control technologies – towards an analytical 
framework and research agenda” in Brownsword R and Yeung K (eds) Regulating 
technologies: legal futures, regulatory frames and technological fixes (Hart Publishing 
Oxford 2008) 51-78 51. 
4   See, s 1 of the State Information Technology Agency Act 88 of 1998. 
5   Sieber U “The emergence of information law - object and characteristics of a new legal 
order” in Lederman E and Shapira R (eds) Law, information and information technology 
(Kluwer Law International The Hague 2001) 1-30 10-11. 
6   Kaken H Information and self-organisation: a macroscopic approach to complex 
systems 3rd ed (Springer Berlin 2006) 15.  
7   S 1 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (hereinafter 
referred to as the ECT Act). It is important to note that there is a proposed change in the 
definition of the term data. This change is contained in the Draft Cybercrime and 
Cybersecurity Bill of 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the CaC Bill). The CaC Bill defines 
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denotes ‘any representation of facts, information or concepts in a form (which is) 
suitable for processing in a computer system, including a program (which is) suitable to 
cause a computer system to perform a function’.8 Having examined these definitions, it 
would appear that the meaning of the word data is wider than that of the concept 
computer data. 
ICTs have been depended upon and used to carry out functions that are foreign to their 
traditional intended purposes. For example, the Internet, originally known as the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network,9 was designed subsequent to an 
assignment by the Advanced Research Project Agency.10 ARPANET was a military 
venture which was established in order to facilitate and conceal communication 
between the Marines of the United States of America immediately after the Second 
World War.11 Following its successes, the ARPANET Transmission Connection 
Protocols (TCPs) were rolled out to other organisations or institutions that were 
involved in information security, for example, the University of California.12 Soon 
thereafter, the Internet emerged.13 This emergence culminated in the Internet 
                                                                                                                                         
the word data as any representation of facts, information, concepts, elements, or 
instructions in a form suitable for communications, interpretation, or processing in a 
computer device, a computer network, a database, an electronic communications 
network or their accessories or components or any part thereof and includes a 
computer program and traffic data. See s 1 of the CaC Bill. 
8   Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime of 23 November 2001. In this research 
the difference between the terms information and data is acknowledged. However, the 
words are for purposes of this research used interchangeably. Thus, a reference to 
information shall, unless the context indicates otherwise, be construed as referring to 
data and vice versa. 
9   Hereinafter referred to as ARPANET.  
10   Castells M The internet galaxy: reflections on the internet, business, and society 
(Oxford University Press Oxford 2001) 10-11; Lloyd I Legal aspects of the information 
society (Butterworths London 2000) 26-28 and Wyatt S, Thomas G and Terranova T 
“They came, they surfed, they went back to the beach - conceptualising use and non-
use of the Internet” in Woolgar S (ed) Virtual society? technology, cyberbole, reality 
(Oxford University Press Oxford 2002) 23-40 23). 
11   Kidder DS and Oppenheim NO The intellectual devotional: American history (TID 
Volumes New York 2007) 354. 
12   Larson M, Liu C and Allen R Mastering the domain name system: DNS on windows 
server 2003 (O’Reilly Media Inc. Sebastopol 2004) 1-2. 
13   Larson, Liu and Allen Mastering 3. 
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becoming a major part of the ‘fabric of our (daily) lives’.14 The abovementioned was 
particularly compelled by the Internet’s nature as a network of computer15 networks.16  
The Internet is an interconnected system of networks that connects computers around 
the world using the Transmission Control Protocol Internet Protocol (TCP/IP).17 It is 
comprised of a mixture of infrastructures.18 These infrastructures are codes, 
architectures, hardware or software that facilitates communication by or between 
computer users.19 These infrastructures assist or enable computers to locate other 
computers, to communicate with one another and to transmit and receive information 
online.20 The examples of the aforementioned information are drawings, illustrations, 
sketches, models, formulae, engineering designs, specifications, manuals and other 
instructions. 
Recent technologies, for example the Internet, have become more essential in doing 
business online. Furthermore, these technologies are indispensable in exchanging 
information by or between governments, businesses or individual computer users. 
Consequently, they compel or facilitate the development of a new society. This society 
is referred to as the information society21 or knowledge society.22 An information 
                                               
14   Castells Internet galaxy 1. 
15   The term computer is derived from the Latin word compŭto, that is, to reckon together, 
calculate or compute. See Simpson DP Cassell’s new Latin-English English-Latin 
Dictionary (Cassell & Co London 1959) 125. With the emergence of new forms of 
technologies, the term computer has however been understood to mean an electronic 
or e-device that stores, retrieves and processes information. See Williams MR “A 
preview of things to come - some remarks on the first generation of computers” in Rojas 
R and Hashagen U (eds) The first computers: history and architectures (The MIT Press 
London 2002) 1-16 1-2. For further interesting reading of the description of a computer, 
see, s 1(1) of the Computer Evidence Act 57 of 1983. 
16   See Okin JR The internet revolution: the not-for-dummies guide to the history, 
technology, and use of the internet (Ironbound Press Winter Harbor 2005) 19 and Reed 
C Internet law: text and materials 2nd ed (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 
2004) 8. 
17  S 1 of the ECT Act. 
18   Okin Internet revolution 19.  
19   Papadopoulos S “An introduction to cyberlaw” in Papadopoulos S and Snail S (eds) 
Cyberlaw @SA III: The law of the internet in South Africa (Van Schaik Publishers 
Hatfield 2012) 1-8 2-3, Lee O and Lee W “Mobile commerce and national IT 
infrastructure” in Pour MK (ed) Information technology and organisations: trends, 
issues, challenges and solutions (Idea Group Publishing Hershey 2003) 352-354 352 
and Byrne http://edbyrne.me/what-is-internet-infrastructure/ (Date of use: 26 September 
2012). 
20   Okin Internet revolution 19.  
21   Webster F Theories of the information society 3rd ed (Routledge Abington 2006) 8-25.     
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society is generally the equivalence of what is sometimes known as the ‘virtual world’.23 
It may be described as follows: 
(It is) the society (which is) currently being put into place, where low-
cost information and data storage and transmission technologies are 
in general use. This generalisation of information or data use is being 
accompanied by organisational, commercial, social and legal 
innovations that will profoundly change life both in the world of work 
and in society generally.24  
Another definition is that an information society is where: 
A high level of information intensity (exists) in the everyday lives of 
most citizens, in most organisations and workplaces, by the use of 
common or compatible technology for a wide range of personal, 
social, educational or business activities, and by the ability to 
transmit, receive and exchange digital data rapidly between places 
irrespective of distance.25 
Lastly, this society enjoys the benefits of cheaper and faster access to ICTs, the 
provision of digital content for worldwide networks and the acceleration of electronic or 
                                                                                                                                         
22  See Mansell R and Wehn U Information technology for sustainable development 
(Oxford University Press Oxford 1998). 
23  Ross RA, Mortinger S, Christ R, Scelsi C and Alemi F (eds) Computer games and 
virtual worlds: a new frontier in intellectual property law (ABA Publishing Illinois 2010) 3-
4. 
24  Soete L Building the European information society for us all: final policy report of the 
high level expert group (European Communities Brussels 1997) 11. 
25   Durrani S Information and liberation: writings on the politics of information and 
librarianship (Library Juice Press Duluth 2008) 256 and Manning T Radical strategy: 
How South African companies can win against global competition (Zebra Press 
Sandton 1997) 134.    
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e-commerce.26 The aforementioned enables information to be processed and 
exchanged ad infinitum.27 
1.2 LEGAL CONTEXT 
The advent of contemporary forms of technologies has created innumerable drawbacks 
or limitations in the legal field. These shortcomings are for purposes of this research 
referred to as the risks or threats. Risks are generally old phenomena. They are 
practically as old as the human race itself.28 They draw their existence from the fact 
that human life is subject to a number of risks, one of which is death.29 A reference to a 
risk is here used to denote the existence of a likelihood that damage or an upsetting 
consequence will or is about to occur.30 A lack of trust or the desire to exercise caution 
(or precaution) often leads some to view risks in a negative way.31  
Customarily, the duty to identify and control technological risks was bestowed on 
scientists, the technologically brilliant and engineers of these ICTs. This was the case 
because it was felt that uncovering the proficiency of these technologies ‘requires long, 
tedious hours of solitary work in laboratories or in isolated rooms full of machines’.32 
However, the developments in ICTs necessitated that even those who formerly had 
nothing to do with the conceptualisation and commencement of ICTs, namely lawyers, 
become involved in the identification and control of the ICT risks. Consequently, it 
                                               
26   See generally, Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities (2000) 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2002/action_plan/pdf/actionplan_en.pdf 
(Date of use: 16 June 2012) (hereinafter referred to as the E-Europe Action Plan). 
27  Ross et al Computer Games 3-4. 
28  Beck U “From industrial society to the risk society – questions of survival, social 
structure and ecological enlightenment” 1992 (9) Theory, Culture and Society 97-123 
97. 
29  Beck 1992 Theory, Culture and Society 97. (Journal)  
30   World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST) 
The precautionary principle (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation Paris 2005) 28. See also Perez FX “Risk regulation, precaution and trade” 
in Wüger D and Cottier T (eds) Genetic engineering and the world trade system: World 
Trade Forum (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2008) 246-284 247. 
31   Lofstedt RE “The precautionary principle, risk, regulation and politics” 2003 (81) Trans 
IChemE 36-43 39. An elaborate study of risks or threats is made in Chapter 7 (The 
Precautionary Approach to E-Authentication) of this research. 
32  Tiagha E “Technology management and technology transfer in Africa” in Waiguchu JM, 
Tiagha E and Mwaura M (eds) Management of organisations in Africa: A handbook and 
reference (Quorum Books Westport 1999) 243-263 243. 
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became necessary to extend the ambit of the common law in order to deal with 
activities that traditionally were viewed to be irrelevant to law.33 
The risks that ICTs generate relate to the criminal exploitation of modern technologies 
to commit novel crimes or the use of ICTs to commit traditional crimes. The examples 
of the new crimes include computer cracking, distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) 
attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks and phishing.34 Conversely, the examples of the 
traditional crimes which are committed through the use of ICTs include theft or furtum 
(including theft of funds in bank accounts), trespassing, damage to or destruction of 
property, fraud and possession or distribution of child pornography. 
Technological crimes are sometimes referred to as Internet-related crimes, electronic 
or e-crimes, cybercrimes, computer crimes or net crimes.35 Although some illustrate the 
difference in the terminology used in these crimes,36 this difference is insignificant for 
purposes of this research. The important point, within the context of this research, is 
that the aggregation of modern forms of technologies has resulted in the 
aforementioned crimes (in this case, e-crimes) becoming a ‘constituent aspect of the 
wider political, social and economic restructuring’.37 Because of this, it is no longer 
satisfactory to only involve the engineers of these technologies in the process to 
prevent and curb e-crimes. More specifically, it has also become meaningful to 
                                               
33  See S v Mashiyi 2002 (2) SACR 387 (Tk) where it was held that a computer print-out 
does not constitute evidence in terms of s 34 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 
of 1965. The reason for the exclusion of computer print-out was that a computer is not a 
person. Consequently, a computer print-out does not amount to a statement that is a 
made by a person. See also S v Van den Berg 1991 (1) SACR 104 (T) where the 
common law principles of crime iniuria were applied to a case involving fraud committed 
online (cyber fraud or cyber smearing). See also S v Ndiki 2008 (2) SACR 252 (Ck), 
Ndlovu v Minister of Correctional Services 2006 (4) SA 165 (W) and S v Harper and 
another 1981 (1) SA 88 (D). 
34  Chapter 4 below provides a study of these novel crimes. 
35  Van der Merwe DP Information and communication technology law (LexisNexis Durban 
2008) 61 and Van der Merwe D “Criminal law – your partner in preventing information 
loss” (Paper presented at the Lex Informatica Conference on 23 May 2008). 
36   See Downing RW “Shoring up the weakest link – what lawmakers around the world 
need to consider in developing comprehensive laws to combat cybercrime” in Carr I 
(ed) Computer crime (Ashgate Publishing Limited Surrey 2009) 4-72 9. 
37   Savona EU and Mignone M “The fox and the hunters - how ICT technologies change 
the crime race” in Savona EU (ed) Crime and technology: new frontiers for regulation, 
law enforcement and research (Springer Dordrecht 2004) 7-28 8. 
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establish legal frameworks that assist in controlling or regulating the manner of 
processing information contained in these technologies.38 
The definition of e-crimes has been subject to academic debate for a number of years. 
More often than not, the definitions provided have been imprecise and disappointing.39 
There are some who suggest that e-crimes are crimes involving computers.40 In this 
sense, e-crimes are ‘any violation of criminal law that involves knowledge of computer 
technology by the perpetrator, investigator or prosecutor’.41 Therefore, it amounts to 
any form of dishonest conduct or act which is associated with the mechanical 
processing or transmission of information.42 There are also those who argue that e-
crimes ‘generally include(s) any crime carried out primarily by means of a computer or 
the Internet’.43 Watney supports the view that cybercrime may be committed on a 
computer or the Internet.44 The latter states that the example of a case where 
cybercrime is carried out on a computer is where an employee deletes information from 
a computer without authorisation.45 Furthermore, the example of a situation wherein it 
is committed on the Internet is the defacing of a website, that is, the so-called web 
graffiti.46 With this in mind, it would appear that a computer or the Internet fulfil two 
functions at once. It becomes an object of e-crimes, in cases where hardware or 
                                               
38  In South Africa, the processing of or the manner of processing information is dealt with 
in Chapter 3 of the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013. 
39  Sometimes, some elect not to define the term cybercrime for fear that, given the 
absence of academic consensus regarding the true meaning of the term, any such 
attempt will fall short of properly providing a meaningful description. See Brown I, 
Edwards L and Marsden C “Information security and cyberspace” in Edwards L and 
Waelde C (eds) Law and the internet (Hart Publishing Oxford 2009) 671-684 672-676. 
40   Franklin CJ The investigator’s guide to computer crime (Charles C Thomas Publisher 
Ltd Illinois 2006) 7 and Snail S “Cyber crime in South Africa - Hacking, cracking, and 
other unlawful online activities” 2009 (1) Journal of Information, Law & Technology 1-13 
1. 
41  Bazelon E et al “Computer crimes” 2006 (43) The American Criminal Law Review 260-
308 260. 
42   Franklin Investigator’s Guide 7-13. 
43  Berg T “The changing face of cybercrime – New Internet threats create challenges to 
law enforcement” 2007 (86) Michigan Bar Journal 18-22 18. 
44  Watney M “Cybercrime and the investigation of cybercrime” in Papadopoulos S and 
Snail S (eds) Cyberlaw @SA III: The law of the internet in South Africa (Van Schaik 
Publishers Hartfield 2012) 333-351 337. 
45  Watney “Cybercrime” 337. 
46  Watney “Cybercrime” 337. 
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software is appropriated illegally, and it becomes a tool used in order to appropriate 
information unlawfully.47  
The above-mentioned does not appear to be accurately dealt with by Chapter XIII 
(Cybercrime) of the ECT Act. More specifically, this chapter does not necessarily define 
e-crimes. It merely prohibits the actions of a person who, after taking note of any data, 
becomes aware of the fact that he or she is not authorised to access that data and, 
despite this awareness, still continues to access that data.48 Having ascertained the 
existence of this anomaly, the South African Department of Communications issued 
Notice 888 of 201249 proposing that a definition of e-crimes should be inserted in 
section 1 of the ECT Act. In terms of the proposed definition, e-crimes should mean the 
following: 
Any criminal or other offence that is facilitated by or involves the use 
of electronic communications or information systems, including any 
device or the Internet or any one or more of them.50 
It is argued that this definition confirms the point that ICTs can be used as an 
instrument to commit e-crimes. However, whether or not this description of e-crimes is 
enough is not clear. Furthermore, the proposed CaC Bill does not appear to be 
addressing this uncertainty. Instead, it encumbers regulators with more work by 
creating in its chapter 2 no less than fifty-nine e-crimes. 
Despite the aforementioned, Chapter XIII of the ECT Act established a number of e-
crimes. These e-crimes depend on whether the accessing of information is intentional 
and without authority.51 In particular, section 87 of the ECT Act extends the ambit of 
Chapter XIII to also include ‘attempt’, ‘aiding’ and ‘abetting’ as elements of e-crimes. 
Accordingly, it is enough for purposes of Chapter XIII to establish if the act or conduct 
                                               
47  Cassim F “Formulating specialised legislation to address the growing spectre of 
cybercrime – A comparative study” 2009 (12) PER 36-79 36. 
48  S 85 of the ECT Act. 
49  Hereinafter referred to as the Electronic Communications and Transactions Amendment 
Bill, 2012. 
50  S 1 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Amendment Bill, 2012. 
51  See section 86(1)-(4) of the ECT Act. 
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amounts to an unauthorised accessing of, interception of or interference with data;52 if 
the act or conduct is computer-related extortion, fraud and forgery;53 or if the act or 
conduct relates to an attempt, and aiding and abetting an unauthorised accessing of, 
interception of or interference with data; or computer-related extortion, fraud and 
forgery.54 
It is important to note that the methods or techniques that are used to commit e-crimes 
are generally different from those known to traditional societies.55 For example, 
dangerous codes,56 such as a virus,57 worm58 and Trojan horse,59 may be used in 
order to appropriate information without the required authority.60 Viewed in this manner, 
these codes transform the methods that are commonly used in order to commit 
conventional crimes.61 Furthermore, information may be appropriated online in 
circumstances where the lawful possessor is not actually dispossessed of the original 
information. For legal purposes, this modification generates challenges in relation to 
the regulation62 of the nefarious acts that are committed through the use of ICTs. This 
                                               
52  S 86 of the ECT Act. 
53  S 87 of the ECT Act. 
54  S 88 of the ECT Act.  
55   See UK Cabinet Office http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/uk-
cyber-security-strategy-final.pdf (Date of use: 10 May 2012). 
56  Snail 2009 Journal of Information, Law and Technology 4.  
57  A virus is a ‘piece of programming code (which is) usually disguised as something else 
that causes some unexpected, and for the victim (commonly a user of a computer) 
usually undesirable event and which is often designed so that it is automatically spread 
to other computer users’. See Henning JJ and Ebersöhn GJ “Insider trading, money 
laundering and computer crime” 2001 Transactions of the Centre for Business Law 105-
152 111. 
58  A worm is a particular type of virus that ‘situates itself in a computer system in a place 
where it can do harm’. See Henning and Ebersöhn 2001 Transactions of the Centre for 
Business Law 112. 
59  A Trojan horse is a ‘destructive computer program disguised as a game, a utility, or an 
application’. It does something ‘devious to the computer system while appearing to do 
something useful’. See Henning and Ebersöhn 2001 Transactions of the Centre for 
Business Law 112. 
60  Chapter 4 below delves into the workings and effects these codes to an information 
system. 
61   UK Cabinet Office http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/uk-cyber-
security-strategy-final.pdf (Date of use: 10 May 2012). 
62   It will be established from Chapter 5 of this research that no single description of the 
term regulation currently exists. Numerous descriptions of the term have been proposed 
over the years. See for example, Joskow PL and Rose NL “The effects of economic 
regulation” in Armstrong M and Porter RH (eds) Handbook of industrial organisation 
(Elsevier Amsterdam 1989) 1450-1506 and Mitnick BM Planning regulation: a 
framework for the analysis of regulatory possibilities (University of Pittsburgh Pittsburgh 
1979) 3-5. However, none of the proposed descriptions seem to capture the essence of 
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regulatory difficulty is acknowledged by Burchell63 and Cassim.64 Burchell submits that 
the criminal justice system in South Africa is at the ‘crossroads’.65 This is the case 
because offline rules have been found to be inadequate in dealing with the challenges 
that exist online.66 Given the aforesaid, it has become necessary to establish systems 
that assist in separating challenges or risks from opportunities or benefits.67 This could 
be achieved by discarding a particular legislative practice called the ‘blunderbuss 
option’. This is a term which Burchell has borrowed from Stuart.68 The word relates to 
the fact that technologies evolve almost daily. When these changes occur, new forms 
of e-crimes emerge. Therefore, the creation of new offences and harsher punishments 
in order to control emerging e-crimes may not be the best regulatory measure. Cassim 
follows Burchell’s reasoning by stating that the South African legal system is confronted 
with incalculable ICT regulatory challenges.69 According to Cassim, the challenges are 
twofold. On the one hand, there is a lack of precision in defining e-crimes.70 On the 
other hand, the challenges have something to do with the inadequate mechanisms 
employed in detecting cybercrime.71 Therefore, Cassim contends that an answer to 
these problems rests in ‘formulating specialised legislation to address the growing 
spectre of cybercrime’.72  
Against the background of the challenges posed by ICTs to an information society, this 
research examines the effect that e-crimes have for purposes of technology regulation. 
This is the case because e-crimes are or generally use conventional methods in order 
                                                                                                                                         
regulation. Therefore, in Chapter 5 of this research the term regulation is interpreted to 
mean a process or scheme that seeks to serve ‘diverse, even contradictory, ends, some 
economic, some political, some cultural, (and some technological)’. See McCraw TK 
Regulation in perspective: historical essays (Harvard University Press Boston 1981) 
196.   
63  Burchell J “Criminal justice at the crossroads” 2002 (119) South African Law Journal 
579-602. 
64  Cassim 2009 PER 36-79. 
65  Burchell 2002 South African Law Journal 579. 
66  Burchell 2002 South African Law Journal 579. 
67  Burchell 2002 South African Law Journal 579. 
68  Stuart D “An entrenched bill of rights best protects against law and order expediency” 
1998 (11) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 325-336 328. 
69  Cassim 2009 PER 36. 
70  Cassim 2009 PER 36-37. 
71  Cassim 2009 PER 37-42. 
72  Cassim 2009 PER 66-69. 
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to commit traditional crimes, for example theft. In this instance, recent technologies 
become a tool whereby e-crimes are commenced and dispatched. By so doing, they 
then become analogous to ordinary crimes, for example theft. In particular, they involve 
an interference with a particular type of property, that is, information. 
Because e-crimes involve an interference with a person’s information online, the 
principles of the law of property become relevant. The most important aspect in this 
research relates to those that have to do with the objects of property. Accordingly, it is 
inquired whether information can be the object of rights or not. This investigation is 
necessary because not all objects are property for purposes of the law of property.73 
Some things can be the objects of real rights and duties whereas others cannot. 
Furthermore, an inquiry regarding whether a property right to information exists or not 
is essential because this research uses as a point of departure the fact that e-crimes 
can sometimes be seen as the contemporary version of conventional crimes. E-crimes 
generally involve an interference with the property of another person. The example of 
furtum or theft best illustrates the aforementioned.74 When a study of theft is made the 
elements of for example the unauthorised appropriation of a thing or property of 
another with fraudulent (fraudulosa) intent can be abstracted.75 Similarly, when an 
examination of e-crimes, for example phishing is made elements such as online identity 
theft and online identity fraud are present.76 Because of this, it is hypothesised that e-
crimes, for example phishing, computer cracking, distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attacks and man in the middle attacks,77 are contemporary versions of the crime of 
theft. Following this, the crime of theft is first analysed in order to test this hypothesis. 
Thereafter, e-crimes are examined in more detail. Consequently, it is submitted that the 
complexity and extent of ICTs make e-crimes pervasive in an information society.78 
                                               
73  Van der Vyver JD “The doctrine of private law rights” in Straus SA (ed) Huldigingsbudel 
vir W.A. Joubert: aan hom aangebied by geleentheid van sy sewentigste verjaardag op 
27 Oktober 1988 (Butterworths Durban 1988) 201-246 231. 
74  A complete examination of the crime of furtum or theft is undertaken in Chapter 3 
below. 
75  See the Chapter 3 below. 
76  See Chapter 4 below. 
77  The meaning and pervasive nature of these e-crimes is discussed in Chapter 4 below. 
78   Costa Crime and technology 2-5.  
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This is particularly so given the global and borderless nature of recent technologies and 
the ease with which information is shared online.79  
Having studied the above-mentioned, it is argued that regulators are confronted with 
questions such as whether or not current technologies can be managed or regulated, 
and whether the challenges that are generated by contemporary technologies can be 
regulated or not. If so, how should such a technology management, controlling or 
regulatory framework be structured?  
This, in turn, raises questions regarding the nature of law and legal regulation. For 
example, if it is found that ICTs can be regulated, the question is or may be asked 
whether or not the law is the appropriate mechanism for such regulation. Given law's 
geographical constraints, as well as the more general limitations on legal regulation, 
that might not be the most appropriate method. For this reason, this research examines 
the various regulatory frameworks that are modelled from ICTs. However, such scrutiny 
is still made in full recognition of the importance of legal rules or principles to the overall 
scheme of regulation. This analysis is made with due regard to the essential fabric of 
an information society, namely the availability, reliability,80 confidentiality and security 
of information systems81 or networks. 
1.3 TOPICAL ISSUES 
It is conceded that various regulatory measures may be used in order to discourage or 
forbid e-crimes. In one case, firewalls may be built or engraved into a system or 
network. Firewalls monitor data which enter a system or network.82 They then block 
                                               
79  Cassim 2009 PER 66. 
80   The reliability of information may be linked to what Dutton and Shepherd refer to as 
cyber trust, namely a ‘confidential expectation in the reliability and value of the Internet 
and related ICTs’. See Dutton and Shepherd http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file15271.pdf 
(Date of use: 13 May 2013).  
81  An information system within the context of the ECT Act is a system for generating, 
sending, receiving, storing, displaying or processing data messages and includes the 
Internet. See s 1 of the ECT Act. See also the definition of an information system in 
terms of section 1 of the State Information Technology Agency Act 88 of 1998. 
82   Blöcher U “Network and system security” in Fumy W and Sauerbrey J (eds) Enterprise 
security -  IT solutions: concepts, practical experiences technologies (Publicis Corporate 
Publishing Erlangen 2006) 44-56 46.  
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unwanted information before it infiltrates a system or network.83 In other cases, 
programs (awareness programs) may be commenced that are aimed at teaching or 
alerting society about the risks of e-crimes. Notwithstanding these developments, it is 
hypothesised in this research that e-authentication measures may provide a possible 
solution to the question regarding the regulation of ICTs and their ensuing risks. This 
viewpoint is not aimed at rendering the other mechanisms of preventing e-crimes 
insignificant. It is intended to supplement or support them.  
E-authentication measures build on existing legal jurisprudence regarding the 
identification of a person and the verification, that is, the authentication, of his or her 
information. Traditionally, its significance within the context of the law is to be found in 
the law of testate succession and the law of contract. Quite recently, authentication 
mechanisms were found to be essential in preventing money-laundering84 and 
terrorism or terrorist-related activities.85 Within the context of FICA, the measures are 
contained in section 21 which deals with the identification and verification of the identity 
of a person. 
E-authentication can be defined in the following manner: 
(A) process by which a person or legal entity seeks to verify the 
validity or genuineness of a particular piece of information. 
Alternatively, it can mean the formal assertion of validity, such as the 
signing of a certificate: we authenticate what it certifies.86 
Identifying information is therefore indispensable in undertaking the e-authentication 
process. In particular, this information ensures that the e-authentication process has 
credibility and validity. The information includes, inter alia, PIN, username and 
                                               
83   Blöcher Network 46.  
84  See the definition of money laundering in section 1 of Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
38 of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as FICA). 
85  See the definition of terrorism or terrorist-related activities in section 1 of the Protection 
of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004. 
86   Mason S Electronic signatures in law 2nd ed (Tottel West Sussex 2007) 1. 
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password; credit card and bank ATM cards, bank statements, pre-approved credit 
offers or tax information.87   
This research submits that the e-authentication process needs to be controlled and 
regulated in order to ensure that it is effective. However, the extent and degree of such 
regulation should depend on the type of organisation or institution which undertakes 
the process and the person in respect of whom the e-authentication process is 
undertaken, the so-called risk-sensitive approach. 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
In recent times, technologies have adapted and continue to modify the manner in which 
society or people communicate and share information. Some of the methods that are 
used for this modification were traditionally only imagined in science fiction. For 
example, recent technologies may be used as a defence mechanism against crime; 
technologies may be used for surveillance purposes; technologies may be used to 
investigate crime; and technologies may assist a court in order to pass an appropriate 
sentence and punishment.88 These developments have implications not only for 
criminal law, but also for private and constitutional law. For example, they might entail 
invasions of privacy and other freedoms. Globalisation and the pervasive nature of 
these technologies exacerbate these adjustments.  
South Africa has so far taken measures to ensure its participation in the global village 
and information society. More specifically, South Africa is enthusiastically moving 
ahead to become the kind of information society where a free flow of information is the 
norm. Furthermore, South Africa acknowledges that ICTs have a significant role to play 
in issues related to trade, e-commerce and the prevention of e-crimes. However, it is 
argued that South Africa should recognise the dual shift which is generated by modern 
technologies. In particular, South Africa ought to be aware of the fact that the 
prevalence of and dependency on ICTs is likely to lead to an increase in e-crimes. 
                                               
87   Jasper MC Identity theft and how to protect yourself 2nd ed (Oceana Oxford 2006) 2-3 
and Granova P and Eloff JHP “A legal overview of phishing” 2005 Computer Fraud and 
Security 6-11 6. 
88   Bowling, Marks and Murphy Crime control 59-70. 
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Given this increase, this research seeks to address the legal challenges that are 
created by the illegal use of innovative technologies. In particular, it participates in the 
current scholarly debate regarding the proper methods to be used in order to control 
these new forms of technologies or the risks that are generated by these technologies. 
It also seeks to determine whether legal regulation is appropriate and effective or not. It 
is accepted that the debate as evidenced above is also relevant to South Africa. 
Consequently, this research presumes that a strong e-authentication paradigm is 
appropriate for South Africa. Such a structure should aim to re-establish the confidence 
and restore the integrity of computer or information systems or networks. 
1.5 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This research has identified the crimes that are associated with ICTs as a particular 
legal problem. It focuses on e-crimes as specific crimes related to the traditional crime 
of furtum or theft. The first objective of this research is to determine whether or not this 
assumption is correct. It particularly recognises that furtum or theft encompasses, 
amongst others, an unauthorised movement of property or a thing from the lawful 
possessor to the thief, that is, appropriation. Therefore, it scrutinises the meaning and 
importance of property to the law of theft. Thereafter, it examines the historical roots 
and contemporary incarnation of theft to test this assumption. It is also assumed that 
legal regulation is generally the appropriate mechanism to deal with e-crimes. Although 
it seems self-evident that the law should deal with e-crimes, the nature and extent of e-
crimes may sometimes make this problematic. This is particularly so given the fact that 
the law or legal rules operate within borders whereas e-crimes do not. The second 
objective is therefore to examine this hypothesis. 
It has also already been stated as a hypothesis that e-authentication can be seen as 
one of the solutions to the problem of e-crimes.  However, e-authentication must take 
place within a particular legal, regulatory framework. The latter subsequently leads to 
the posing of a question regarding what that framework should look like. This obviously 
has implications in terms of privacy concerns and the limits of legal regulation. Despite 
this, this research is limited only to the regulation of ICTs. It does not encompass a 
study of the principles related to privacy, the protection of data online (data protection 
principles) and the like. Neither does it examine the sufficiency or not of the rules of 
criminal law and the issues pertaining to the trans-border monitoring and detection of 
crime, for example e-crimes. Simply put, this research assumes that e-authentication is 
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particularly suited to this regulatory process. Although it accepts that different systems 
and subsystems are essential to e-authentication, it excludes a study of systems or 
subsystems. In other words, it is not aimed at establishing a particular systematic 
process, namely firewalls, that could prevent or seek to prevent user-to-user computer 
attacks. 
It should be understood that this research must be conducted within the confines and 
ambit of what is technologically possible. Technological constraints determine or 
should determine what kinds of e-authentication are possible, reliable and effective. 
Related technological developments therefore also need to be studied. 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research recognises that traditional legal research is almost always text-based. 
This implies that the study of authoritative sources, typically common law, legislation 
and case law, forms the backbone of such research. Distinct from the natural sciences, 
which emphasise empirical observation and experimentation, law is arguably not an 
empirical science.89 Put differently, the existence or not, and the sufficiency or not of 
legal rules or principles are not a matter of empirical study. Furthermore, this research 
is undertaken against the background of the divergent approaches relating to the 
nature of legal research and the question of what kind of science law (really) is.90 For 
example, academics like Ross, submit that legal research is the province of empirical 
social science.91 Therefore, the principles of verification that are found in legal research 
originate, according to Ross, from social facts.92 On the other, Van Hoecke and 
Samuel contend that law or legal research is not a social science.93 The 
                                               
89   See Van Hoecke M “Legal doctrine - which method(s) for what kind of discipline?” in 
Methodologies of legal research: what kind of methods for what kind of discipline (Hart 
Publishing Oxford 2011) 1-18 5-6.  
90   See in general Ross A On law and justice (The Law Book Exchange Ltd New Jersey 
2004), Samuel G “Is law really a social science? – a view from comparative law” 2008 
(67) The Cambridge Law Journal 288-321 and Vick DW “Interdisciplinarity and the 
discipline of law” 2004 (31) Journal of Law and Society 163-193.  
91   Ross Law and justice 40. 
92   Ross Law and justice 40. 
93   Van Hoecke Legal doctrine 5-6 and Samuel 2008 The Cambridge Law Journal 292-296. 
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abovementioned is gleaned from the fact that legal research scrutinises ‘normative 
judgments’ as opposed to ‘human interaction and behaviour’.94  
Given the discussion above, this research accepts that because legal research is text-
based, it is definitely a hermeneutic and argumentative science. In particular, legal 
research generally entails the development of solid arguments and interpretation of 
relevant texts and documents.95 Viewed broadly, legal research usually involves a 
historical component (because the basis of South African law is the common law) and 
a comparative component (in order to establish how other legal systems have dealt 
with the problem). Therefore, this research examines the development of the South 
African law of property and of theft. Such investigation is made in order to establish 
how the law of property and of theft has evolved when influenced by outside 
innovations, for example, agriculture and technology. Accordingly, this research 
identifies problems within the existing law in order to support the necessity for a 
regulatory framework.  
In this research it is averred that a scrutiny of the related structures dealing with e-
crimes has relevance to the study of the aforesaid regulatory framework. Therefore, the 
developments of the measures in various selected legal systems, for example, the 
United Kingdom, Canada and South Africa are investigated. 
Because e-crimes have to do with the appropriation of incorporeal property, for 
example information, the developments of the principles of property law are examined. 
These principles relate to property as an object of rights. The study of the latter 
principles then requires that an investigation should be made of the impact that 
concepts such as property and theft have or will have in dealing with some non-
traditional forms of property. These include computer or information programming tools, 
computer hardware or software, architectures, infrastructures, codes, data, metadata, 
flowcharts or tables. 
1.7 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
                                               
94   Samuel 2008 The Cambridge Law Journal 292. 
95   See Kroeze IJ “Legal research methodology and the dream of interdisciplinarity” 2013 
(16) PER 36-65 41-50. 
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In Chapter 2 certain selected aspects of property law are discussed. These are based 
on the Roman-Dutch, English and South African law. The discussion continues from 
the premise that ICTs are both essential and detrimental to the information society. 
Therefore, an answer is sought to the question whether or not the principles of property 
law can be stretched or are stretchable so as to render or allow information to be the 
object of property rights. 
In Chapter 3 the various developments in the law of furtum or theft are examined. The 
Roman-Dutch, English and South African law approaches to furtum or theft are 
investigated. The basis is to establish whether or not the principles of furtum or theft 
have reached such a stage of development where unlawful appropriation of incorporeal 
or intangible things, for example information, can be recognised as theft in South 
Africa.  
In Chapter 4 a study of e-crimes is made. It focuses on computer cracking, distributed-
denial of service (DDoS) attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks and phishing. Chapter 4 
particularly accepts that e-crimes are an extension of traditional crimes, for example, 
furtum or theft. Furthermore, Chapter 4 recognises that e-crimes are also novel crimes. 
However, the practices or activities that are involved in carrying out e-crimes are old 
occurrences. Dolus malus and crimen injuria are discussed in order to demonstrate the 
aforementioned. 
In Chapter 5 the nature and character of legal regulation is investigated. It is revealed 
that an approach that relies on the law as the only mechanism to model the regulation 
of e-crimes is doomed to fail. Put differently, Chapter 5 argues that regulations, as 
opposed to the law, can provide effective measures in order to control and prevent e-
crimes. Such regulations should consequently abandon, it is argued, a culture that 
encourages the re-invention of the ICT regulatory wheel. Therefore, Chapter 5 
examines the traditional theories or approaches to ICT regulation. The investigation of 
the theories or approaches leads to the discussion of the drawbacks or limitations of 
legal regulations in general.  
In Chapter 6 a theoretical and practical approach to the study of the measures against 
e-crimes is examined. As a starting point, it is argued that the measures are vast. 
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Some deal with the criminalisation of e-crimes. Others focus on preventing e-crimes. 
The measures to prevent e-crimes are thus selected. Following this selection, these 
measures are investigated as part of a System or Process of E-Authentication. 
Consequently, this selection leads to the scrutiny of the United Kingdom, Canadian and 
South African approaches to e-authentication. 
In Chapter 7 a system of e-authentication or an e-authentication framework is 
introduced. This system is referred to as the Precautionary Approach to E-
Authentication or PAEA. It accepts that every scheme that aims to regulate 
technologies and to subsequently prevent e-crimes should be founded on a risk-
sensitive based framework. This structure concedes that ICTs evolve almost on a daily 
basis, and with these evolutions come the risks (for example the suppression of the 
free-flow of information) to the information society. Therefore, the relevance which 
PAEA has to the general scheme or structure to regulate e-crimes is examined. 
In Chapter 8 an ICT regulatory approach which is founded on PAEA is proposed. The 
structure is not aimed at replacing the existing e-authentication measures. However, it 
intends to supplement them. It is then discussed, keeping in mind the study of the ICT 
regulatory theories that are examined in Chapter 5 of this research. Thereafter, 
Chapter 8 proposes the way forward for South Africa in regulating ICTs and controlling 
the scale of e-crimes.  
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CHAPTER 2 
INFORMATION – ASPECTS OF PROPERTY LAW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter 1 it was demonstrated that ICTs can be both beneficial and detrimental to 
society. In some cases, recent technologies are essential in doing business and 
exchanging information online. Accordingly, they compel the formation of a new 
society. This society is referred to as the information or knowledge society.1 Van Klink 
argues that technologies, for example the Web and the Internet, are interwoven with 
this information society.2 In other cases, ICTs are commonly used for nefarious 
purposes. E-crimes are particularly identified as a threat or risk to the information 
society. More specifically, it is revealed that information could be essential assets that 
are or can be used as a tool for these devious dealings.3 Insofar as information is 
indispensable to the information society, the law of property and the impact of 
information on the law of property are examined. In particular, it is enquired whether or 
not a computer user has a legally recognised and valid claim to a certain piece of 
information which he or she keeps or stores in his or her computer or someone else’s 
computer or database. Some of the important works undertaken by Erlank4 and 
Jankowich5 on virtual property helps in making the aforementioned investigation.    
The revision of the related principles of property law is not meant to re-invent the wheel 
or to re-write property law. Simply, it seeks to investigate the concept of property 
against the background assumption that all objects of property must or should be 
                                               
1   Webster F Theories of the information society 3rd ed (Routledge Abington 2006) 8-25.     
2   Van Klink BMJ and Prins JEJ Law and regulation: scenarios for the information age 
(IOS Press Amsterdam 2002) 5. 
3  For a study regarding the importance of information or data to the information society 
see Weinrib AS “Information and property” 1988 (38) The University of Toronto Law 
Journal 117-150 117-118.  
4  Erlank W Property in virtual worlds (LLD Thesis Stellenbosch University 2012). 
5  Jankowich AE “Property and democracy in virtual worlds” 2005 (11) Boston University 
Journal of Science and Technology Law 
http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/scitech/volume112/JankowichArt
icleWEB.pdf%3Fq%3Dproperty-and-democracy-in-virtual-worlds (Date of use: 04 
December 201). 
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corporeal or tangible.6 Therefore, the scope of this chapter is restricted merely to the 
discussion of property as a right or property as an object of rights. In other words, this 
chapter ascertains the meaning and nature of the legal entitlement which a person has 
over or in respect of his or her property. It also investigates whether this property must 
be corporeal or not. In discussing property as a right, the remarks by Tomkins and 
Jencken on the meaning of the term right provide a useful guide.7 Tomkins and 
Jencken argue that rights, in the subjective sense, denote ‘the power or dominion 
which a person is entitled to exercise over an object, in which exercise there is involved 
the freedom of the will’.8 
In view of the above-mentioned, the fact that this right to property is sometimes 
historically considered to be either absolute or composite (double ownership) falls 
outside the domain of this research. Consequently, the distinction between different 
kinds of dominium or ownership is irrelevant for purposes of this research. The most 
important aspect to be explored in this research is whether property as an object of a 
right depends on the needs of a particular society or not. The Roman-Dutch, English 
and South African law approaches to property assist in demonstrating the 
aforementioned. 
2.2 ROMAN LAW 
2.2.1 Old Roman Law (250 BC) 
In the main, old Roman law recognised the importance of the relationship between a 
person and a thing or property.9 Following this, the law of things was dealt with as the 
progression from the law of persons. For example, Table IV.V of the Twelve Tables 
regarded property as that which could be acquired by Roman citizens. Accordingly, 
                                               
6  Consolidated News Agency (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Mobile Telephone Networks 
(Pty) Ltd  2010 3 SA 382 (SCA) 29-32 and Cornelissen NO v Universal Caravan Sales 
(Pty) Ltd 1971 3 S 158 (A) 179D-E. See also Millar v Taylor (1769) 98 E.R. 201 232. 
7  Tomkins FJ and Jencken HD A compendium of the modern Roman law founded upon 
the treatises of Puchta, Von Vangerow, Arndts, Franz Moehler, and the Copus Juris 
Civilis (Butterworths London 1870) 40. 
8  Tomkins and Jencken A compendium of the modern Roman law 40. 
9  See Maine HS Ancient law: its connection with the early history of society and its 
relation to modern ideas (Spottiswoode London 1897) 258-259. 
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Roman citizens had an action against those who intruded on their property. The most 
notable were the actio in rem and actio in personam.10 The actio in rem was a 
protection that was afforded to a person in relation to the use and enjoyment of his 
corporeal and physical res.11 The actio in personam was a claim which a person had 
that others should acknowledge that the property is subject to his use and enjoyment.12 
The Twelve Tables did not particularly discriminate between things as such. All the 
Twelve Tables required was that a thing must be capable of being touched, that is, the 
so-called quae tangi possunt. Literally, this can be taken to refer to res corporales or 
corporeals. Van Warmelo supports this viewpoint.13 He states that ‘in an early and 
unsophisticated community, the interests of the person were centred on what he could 
see and touch and perceive with his senses’.14 Therefore, if a person could hold or 
possess a thing it was consequently said that such a thing served the interests of such 
a person.15 Van Warmelo then concludes that ‘in the early Roman community 
possession of objects was the centre of all interests’.16  
A reference to the term interest is of specific importance to an examination of property 
as an object of rights in old Roman law. This is the position because the Twelve Tables 
did not specifically refer to the notion of ownership. More specifically, the position in old 
Roman law regarding ownership can be summarised as follows:  
(The) technical word for ownership of things: it (ownership) was an 
element of the house-father’s manus. In time, although it is 
impossible to say when, the word dominium came into use; but, so far 
as can be discovered, it did not occur in the Tables, and must have 
been of later introduction. In those days, when a man asserted 
                                               
10  Nasmith D Outline of Roman history from Romulus to Justinian (including translation of 
the Twelve Tables, the Institutes of Gaius, and the Institutes of Justinian), with special 
reference to the growth, development and decay of Roman jurisprudence (The 
Lawbook Exchange New Jersey 2006) 327-328. 
11  Mousourakis G Fundamentals of Roman private law (Springer Berlin 2012) 312. 
12  Mousourakis Roman private law 312. 
13  Van Warmelo P An introduction to the principles of Roman civil law (Juta Cape Town 
1976) 63. 
14  Van Warmelo Roman civil law 63. 
15  Van Warmelo Roman civil law 63. 
16  Johnson D Roman law in context (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1999) 53. 
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ownership of a thing, he was content to say, - ‘It is mine,’ or ‘It is mine 
according to the law of Quirites’.17 
Therefore, it may be submitted that dominium was but ‘one manifestation of the 
comprehensive domestic powers which the paterfamilias wielded over certain persons 
(patria potestas over his children in power, manus over his wife) no less than over his 
property’.18  
In summary, old Roman law recognised that rights in property were only vested in 
corporeal things. The justification for this is that the Roman society around 250 BC was 
unsophisticated and simple.19 Thus, it was simply accepted that the objects of property 
rights were those objects that could be observed and touched.20 
2.2.2 Pre-Classical Roman Law 
Pre-classical Roman law marked a development of the law that was known and 
accepted in old Roman law. In this period, things were classified into things corporeal 
or res corporales and things incorporeal or res incoporales.21 Corporeal things were 
those objects that were by nature tangible.22 The examples of these were the land, a 
slave,23 a garment, gold and silver. Incorporeal things were those things that were not 
                                               
17  Muirhead J Historical introduction to the private law of Rome (Gaunt Inc. Florida 1998) 
126. See also, Bouckaert B “What is property?” 1990 (13) Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 775-816 781. 
18  Kaser M Roman private law (translated by Dannenbring R) (University of South Africa 
Pretoria 1980) 115-116. See also, Muirhead J Historical introduction to the private law 
of Rome 3rd ed (A & C Black Ltd London 1916) 120 and Bouckaert 1990 Harvard 
Journal of Law and Public Policy 781. 
19  Van Warmelo Roman civil law 63. 
20  Van Warmelo Roman civil law 63. 
21  Cairns JW “The definition of slavery in eighteenth-century thinking” in Allain J (ed) The 
legal understanding of slavery (Oxford University Press Oxford 2012) 61-84 61-62. 
22  Sohm R The institutes: a text-book of the history and systems of Roman private law 2nd 
ed (Gaunt Inc. Florida 1901) 320. 
23  In relation to a slave being an object of property in pre-classical Roman law, Buckland 
states that a slave ‘was the one human being who could be owned. There were men in 
many inferior positions which look almost like slavery: there were the nexus, the 
auctoratus, the addictus and others. But none of these was, like the slave, a Res’. See 
Buckland WW The Roman law of slavery: the condition of the slave in private law from 
Augustus to Justinian (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2010) 10. 
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tangible, for example an inheritance, usufruct, obligation or servitude.24 The last-
mentioned things had the quality of being rights over property.25 
The inclusion of slaves or slavery within the domain of res corporales is instructive. 
This is the position because pre-classical Romans accepted that, by virtue of the ius 
gentium or the laws common to all, certain human beings are free whereas others are 
not.26 Slaves represented the category of humans that lacked freedom. Nicholas 
summarises the position of slaves and slavery in pre-Roman law by stating the 
following: 
Being endowed with reason…he (slave) was inevitably a peculiar 
thing and could, for example, acquire rights for his master. But he 
himself had no rights: he was merely an object of rights, like an 
animal.27 
Given this, they (slaves) remained the property of the other person and were subject to 
the ownership of that other.28 Understandably, the aforementioned was consistent with 
the needs of this society at that point in time. 
In summary, pre-classical Roman law represented a departure from the old Roman law 
view in relation to property. In particular, this law accepted that rights in property vested 
not only in tangible things, for example land, garment, gold, silver and slaves, but also 
in intangible things. For this reason, things such as an inheritance, usufruct, obligation 
and servitude were regarded as the objects over which a person had an interest which 
deserved protection. This development of the objects of property reflected the 
particular needs of the pre-classical Roman law society. 
2.2.3 Classical Roman Law 
Classical Roman law represented an era which is essential to the history of the Roman 
law of property. Firstly, most of the ideas from this period continue to influence the 
modern understanding of property. Secondly, classical Roman law characterised a 
                                               
24  Sohm The institutes 320. 
25  De Zulueta F The Institutes of Gaius: part ii commentary (Oxford University Press 
London 1963) 62. 
26  Cairns “The definition of slavery in eighteenth-century thinking” 61-62. 
27  Nicholas B Introduction to Roman law (Oxford University Press Oxford 1987) 69. 
28  Cairns “The definition of slavery in eighteenth-century thinking” 61. 
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period wherein the notion of dominium or ownership of property, as opposed to the 
word belonging to, was expressly conceived.29 On the one hand, the owner of a thing 
was referred to as a dominus, proprietarius, or dominus proprietatis.30 On the other 
hand, the notion of esse alicuius was used in order to demonstrate that a thing was 
owned by another person.31 Given the aforesaid, ownership denoted a right which a 
person possessed to use, enjoy, destroy and transfer his property subject to certain 
limitations.32 These restrictions could be established by ‘rules of nuisance as well as 
the rules for the protection of slaves and the right to transfer limited rights to 
others….e.g. in the form of a user’s rights or servitudes’.33 
Furthermore, a broader approach was followed in relation to the meaning of the term 
property.34 Property signified the totality of the objects that were of economic value to a 
person.35 These things were regarded as res in commercio.36 The examples included a 
                                               
29  Schulz F Classical Roman law (Oxford University Press London 1961) 338-339. 
30  Schulz Classical Roman law 338-339. 
31  Schulz Classical Roman law 338-339. Roman law jurists differed as to the true nature of 
dominium. There are some who argue that ownership was the ‘most comprehensive 
private right to a thing’ which a private person could have. See Kaser M Roman private 
law (translated by Dannenbring R) 2nd ed (Butterworths Durban 1968) 92. See also 
Declareuil J Rome the law-giver (Greenwood Press Westport 1970) 158. It this sense, it 
amounted to a legal right over a thing which gave the holder the full power of enjoyment 
and use. See Sohm Roman private law 325. Accordingly, a Roman owner had 
unrestricted right of control over a thing, and could claim the thing he owned ‘wherever 
it is and no matter who possesses it’. Jolowicz HF and Nichols B Historical introduction 
to the study of Roman law 3rd ed (Cambridge University Press London 1972) 140. 
However, there are also those who question the reality of the aforementioned viewpoint. 
This opposition rests on the premise that it is illogical as a ‘proposition that the owner of 
a sword could do what he liked with it, including applying it to the neck of his 
neighbour’s slave’. See Birks P “The Roman law concept of dominium and the idea of 
absolute ownership” 1985 Acta Juridica 1-37 1 and Scott H “Absolute ownership and 
legal pluralism in Roman law – two arguments” 2011 Acta Juridica 23-34 24. It is 
particularly submitted that the view on the absolute nature of dominium was inconsistent 
with the earlier attempts in the old and pre-classical Roman law of property in relation to 
the control, use and enjoyment of property. See Table VII of the Twelve Tables and 
Gaius 4 (limitations on the control of salves). 
32  Garnsey P Thinking about property: from Antiquity to the Age of Revolution (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 2007) 177, Buckland WW A manual of Roman private law 
(Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1939) 111 and Buckland WW The main 
institutions of Roman private law (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1931) 93.  
33  Roby HJ Roman private law in the times of Cicero and of the Antonines (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 1902) 414.  
34  Buckland The main institutions 91. 
35  Kaser Roman private law 80. 
36  Kaser Roman private law 80. 
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building, land, animals, slaves, gold or silver.37 In addition, property denoted ‘any 
legally guaranteed economic interest having monetary value, that a person could hold 
in respect thereof’.38 In view of its monetary value, humans (Roman citizens) had an 
interest in property. This interest was protected by various laws, for example natural 
law or iure naturali, and civil law or ius civile.39  
Lastly, classical Roman law differentiated between corporeal and incorporeal things, 
res mobilis (movable things) and res immobilis (immovable things), res mancipi and res 
nec mancipi.40 Corporeals represented the original category of things that were 
recognised in classical Rome.41 They were one of the classical groups of things that 
were regarded as res in patrimonio.42 They included property that was perceptible 
through the senses.43 Examples of corporeals were the land, house, horse, slave, 
garment, gold or silver.44 Incorporeals, for example a right, servitude, inheritance, 
hereditas,45 were traditionally not regarded as res in the true sense of the word. This 
was because the latter things were considered to be interests or rights which accrue 
over res corporales. Therefore, to regard them as res in the stricter sense of the word 
could be taken to mean that a right (being the res incoporales) could have a ‘right (for 
example, ownership) to a right’.46 Over a passage of time, the strict meaning ascribed 
to incorporeals was discarded. Following this, a convenient mode of expressing these 
things was adopted. It became common to accept that a person could also have 
interest in particular abstract and non-physical entities.47 This interest did not 
                                               
37  Kaser Roman private law 80. 
38  Moussourakis Roman private law 119.   
39  Mommsen T The Digest of Justinian (University of Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia 
1985) 1.1.11. 
40   This research does not examine the difference between res mobilis  and res immobilis, 
res mancipi and res nec mancipi. It simply discusses the distinction between corporeals 
and incorporeals. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that other differences between 
properties or res were made. Examples of these included res divini iuris or things 
dedicated to the gods, res publicae or public properties, res omnium communes (air, 
water or the sea) and res in commercio (res nullius or ownerless things, consumable 
things and res fungibiles money, wine or grain and divisible things). See Sohm The 
Institutes 302-305. 
41   Thomas JAC The Institutes of Justinian: text, translation and commentary (Juta Cape 
Town 1975) 73. 
42  Van Warmelo Roman civil law 65-66. 
43   Moussourakis Roman private law 121. 
44   Moussourakis Roman private law 121. 
45   Sohm Roman private law 225. 
46  Van Warmelo Roman civil law 66. 
47  Van Warmelo Roman civil law 66. 
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necessarily amount to ownership. Simply, it was equated to a res quae tangi non 
possunt or a right to intangible things.48   
In summary, classical Roman law marked a development of the old and pre-classical 
Roman law ideas on the law of property. Firstly, this law recognised that rights in 
property vested in those things that were of economic value to a person. It then listed 
things, for example a building, land, slave, gold and silver as res in commercio. The 
understanding of property as that which bestowed on a person an economic interest 
marked a further development in the law of property. More specifically, it is unique to 
the classical Roman society in the sense that it was not known in old and pre-classical 
Roman law. Secondly, classical Roman law followed the pre-classical view on property 
by stating that the objects of rights were res corporales and res incorporales. The 
aforementioned classification of things was in keeping with the values and needs of the 
classical Roman society. 
2.2.4 Post-Classical Roman Law 
Two systems influenced the law of property in post-classical Roman law. These are the 
developments of the Roman vulgar law in the West and the Roman law under Justinian 
in the East.  
(a) Roman Law in the West 
Roman law in the West is the law which grew out of the practical consideration of old 
Roman law sources.49 This law was ‘averse to strict concepts and neither able nor 
inclined to live up to the standards of classical jurisprudence with regard to the artistic 
elaboration or logical construction’.50 It took place in the period between 350 AD until 
550 AD. It did not appear to distinguish between the terms ownership and possession, 
that is, the factual control of a thing. More often than not, the essence and clear 
                                               
48  Van Warmelo Roman civil law 65. 
49 Levy E West Roman vulgar law: the law of property (American Philosophical society 
Philadelphia 1951) 2. 
50  Berman HJ Law and revolution - the formation of the Western legal tradition (Harvard 
University Press Cambridge 1983) 53. 
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meaning of the notion of ownership as found in classical Roman law systems was 
diluted. Consequently, the concept of dominium: 
‘….once radiant with lucidity, appeared largely drained of substance 
and void of any precise meaning. Not only did it take in former iura in 
re aliena such as emphyteusis and superficies, ususfructus, and 
perhaps servitus; it was even interchangeably used with possessio’.51 
Concepts such as possidere, possessio and possessor were particularly applied as a 
replacement for the word ownership in order to illustrate the legal right to use and 
control a thing.52 Accordingly, the right to possess which was referred to as the 
inconcussum possessionis ius, ut dominus possidet or iure dominium possidere, as 
opposed to a dominium over a thing gained prominence.53 The above-mentioned 
reflected the needs of that society and had to do more with the protection of 
possession than for ownership. 
(b) Roman Law in the East 
The Roman law in the East was an additional development of pre-classical and 
classical Roman law. This law distinguished between things in general. There was 
property that was capable of being owned and that which could not be owned (de iure 
personarum exposuimus).54 The property that was capable of being owned was also 
referred to as the res nostro patrimonio.55 Furthermore, the things that were incapable 
of being owned were called res extra nostrum partimonium.56 Other divisions of 
property were also made possible, for example those things that were common to all,57 
public things,58 things belonging to the community59 and those that belonged to no 
one.60 In relation to res nostro patrimonio, it was stated that ownership in relation to 
these could be acquired either by natural law (law of nations) or civil law. Accordingly, 
                                               
51  Levy West Roman vulgar law 61. 
52  Levy West Roman vulgar law 26-27. 
53  Levy West Roman vulgar law 27. 
54  Institutes of Justinian 2.1. 
55  I.2.1. 
56  I.2.1. 
57  For example the air, running water, rivers, the sea and seashores. See I.2.1.1. 
58  The examples of these are the river banks, seashores, things lying under the sea, earth 
or sand. See I.2.1.4-5. 
59  For example cities, theatres and stadia. See I.2.1.6.  
60  I.2.1. Things belonging to no one were sacred things, religious things or those things 
that were placed under divine protection. See I.2.1.7. 
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animals,61 slaves,62 precious stones63 and buildings64 were categorised as things that 
were capable of being owned.  
In addition, a distinction was made between corporeal and incorporeal property.65 
Corporeals were defined as those things that, by nature, could be observed and 
touched.66 The list of examples included the land, a slave, garment, gold and silver.67 
Incorporeals were referred to as those things that were recognised by the law despite 
the fact that these things could not be observed and touched.68 The examples were an 
inheritance, usufruct and obligation.69 
In summary, the law of property in post-classical Rome was founded on two systems. 
There was the Roman law of property that was practiced in the West and the Roman 
law of property that was followed in the East. Roman law in the West was particularly 
an era wherein the Roman law of property as it was understood in the earlier periods 
lost meaning and relevance to society. It was then in the East that an attempt was 
made to recapture the ideas of property law of the old, pre-classical and classical 
periods. Specifically, it was accepted that rights in property vested in tangibles, for 
example land, slave, garment, gold or silver, and other rights, for example an 
inheritance, usufruct or obligation.  
The above-mentioned demonstrates how societies and the needs of societies differ. 
For example, the Roman law in the West was more concerned with protecting the 
possession of a thing.  However, the Roman law in the East sought to retain the 
meaning of property that was known in old, pre-classical and classical Roman 
societies. 
2.3 GERMANIC LAW 
                                               
61  I.2.1.12-16. 
62  I.2.1.17. 
63  I.2.1.18. 
64  I.2.1.29-35. 
65  I.2.2. 
66  I.2.2.1. 
67  I.2.2.1. 
68  I.2.2.2. 
69  I.2.2.2. 
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2.3.1 Old Germanic Law  
In old Germanic law, property or Sache, being the ‘impersonal corporeal pieces of the 
outer world’,70 was regarded as that which belonged to people collectively.71 For 
example, people would seize the land and such land would consequently belong to all 
of them as a unit. Because of this, rights in property were conceived ‘as belonging to 
families and kinship, not as absolute individual rights’.72 The term belong is 
indispensable to the study of the old Germanic private law. Words like ‘eigen’ or ‘eigan’ 
and ‘haben’, were frequently used in order to demonstrate who had ownership in each 
case.73  
Ownership denoted the fullest right that could be possessed over things.74 Hübner 
argues that this right was concentrated on the dominion in respect of property in its 
entirety.75 However, it appears from Calisse that it was not always necessary in old 
Germanic private law that ownership should be in respect of the whole property. 
Calisse submits that it was particularly possible to have a situation where one person 
was the owner of a house and the other of the land on which a house was built.76 With 
this in mind, the powers and rights to exercise ownership could be bestowed on a 
certain collective or ‘landholding corporate group’.77 This collective had to use these 
rights for the common benefit of all the members of the community. The manner of 
exercising this use depended on whether the property belonged to the tribe or to the 
family.78 
However, developments in the law of property necessitated that ownership of property 
should also be extended to other personal things, for example carts, flocks, fruits, 
clothes and weapons. According to Murray, these changes in the law of property were 
                                               
70  Hübner R A history of Germanic private law (Augustus M Kelly Publishers New York 
1968) 160. 
71  Murray AC Germanic kinship structure: studies in law and society in Antiquity and the 
early Middle ages (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies Toronto 1983) 18 and Calisse 
C A history of Italian law (Augustus M. Kelly Publishers New York 1969) 653. 
72  Bouckaert 1990 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 780. 
73  Hübner Germanic private law 227. 
74  Hübner Germanic private law 227. 
75  Hübner Germanic private law 227. 
76  Calisse Italian law 671.  
77  Murray Germanic kinship structure 19. 
78  See Calisse Italian law 657-664. See also, Vinogradoff P “The organisation of Kinship” 
in Krader L (ed) Anthropology and early law (Basic Books Inc. New York 1966) 57-74 
57. 
  
33 
 
compelled by the confrontation of old Germanic law with Roman law.79 Because of this, 
the nature of property was no longer only limited to that which a tribe or family could 
have dominium over. However, it also became conventional to refer to things as that 
which were or could be held or belonged to an individual (allodium).80 Consequently, 
the rights in (individual) things or Sachenrechte were recognised.81 These rights were 
separated into those attaching to corporeal and incorporeal things.82 An important point 
about all this is that a certain category of slaves (servi casati) could have dominium 
over land cultivated by them.83 Therefore, they could enjoy all the fruits of their labour.  
In relation to corporeals (land, animal, gold, silver and certain precious stones), old 
Germanic private law followed the Roman law approach to property. It stated that 
ownership was vested in these things by virtue of them being capable of being touched 
(res quae tangi possunt). However, a slightly different approach was followed. In 
particular, it was argued that corporeals were not naturally property for legal purposes. 
They only became property in the legal sense as soon as legal rights were attached to 
them.84 These rights were called dengliche or real rights. The aforesaid rights secured 
for the owner the direct control of a thing subject to certain legal limits.85 Other rights 
(including rights in property), inheritance and usufruct were regarded as incorporeal 
things.  
In summary, old Germanic law traditionally regarded property as that which belonged 
to a family or kinship. What this meant was that individual rights to property were 
impossible. However, the interaction between the old Germanic and Roman law of 
property resulted in the recognition of individual rights to property. Following this, it 
became common to recognise real rights in property. These rights were vested in 
                                               
79  Murray Germanic kinship structure 179-180. Vinogradoff refers to this confrontation as 
rather startling, in the sense that ‘it seemed at the outset as if there would not be much 
room for Roman doctrine in a country with a German-speaking population of Germanic 
stock’. See Vinogradoff P Roman law in medieval Europe 3rd ed (Oxford University 
Press Oxford 1929) 119. 
80  Calisse Italian law 665. 
81  Hübner Germanic private law 162. 
82  Hübner Germanic private law 162. 
83  Calisse Italian law 416. 
84  Hübner Germanic private law 161. 
85  Hübner Germanic private law 162. 
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corporeals and incorporeals. Despite the aforesaid, slaves were excluded from the 
category of corporeal property. In particular, it was acknowledged that a certain 
category of slaves could own property or could possess rights in property.   
Therefore, the aforementioned demonstrates that the objects of rights are not always 
limited to those that a particular legal system recognises and protects at a particular 
point in time. Specifically, it reveals that as the society changes, so does its needs. 
Because of these changes, variations in the law of property become necessary. 
2.3.2 Frankish Law 
Frankish law consisted of the practices which were followed by the West German tribes 
across the Rhine. Although Roman law had a strong influence on these usages,86 the 
law that was followed was far removed from its classical Roman law formulations.87 
The feudal system also provided a shift in the manner in which the relationship 
between a person and a thing (fief) could be understood.88 This system had its roots in 
feudal law. It marked a regime of underdevelopment89 and a system of exploitation.90 It 
reflected the ‘particular viewer’s biases, values and orientations’.91 The feudal system 
represented itself in situations where a weaker person, namely the peasants or vassal, 
would turn to a stronger man, that is the lord, in order to derive some forms of rights in 
property. In this sense, the vassal became a tenant over property held by the lord.92 
For purposes of studying the law of property, the lord (the king or the church) was at 
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the top of the property law chain while the peasants were at the bottom.93 Accordingly, 
the right (droit)94 to property did not bestow on the holder (peasant) ownership of the 
property.95 It only amounted to that which a king or church could grant to a vassal.96 
Because of this, the vassal was prevented from transferring the rights that flowed from 
this property.97  
It is indeed true that feudal law frustrated the proper development of the Roman law of 
property. It specifically treated the classical Roman law term dominium as denoting 
simply a beneficial right or usufructus.98 Thus, a vassal only had proprietas or right of 
control. This proprietas was limited in that it did not necessarily mean that the property 
could be alienated or inherited.99 It only meant that the vassal was a recipient or 
bucellarius.100 Given this, his right to control the property depended on the continuation 
of the relationship between himself and the dominus, namely the king or the church.101 
Besides all this confusion, a difference was created between corporeals or fief corporel 
and incorporeals or fief incorporel.102 Land, office and animals were regarded as fief 
corporel. Household goods were excluded from the definition of fief corporels.103 The 
reason for this was that these goods were perishable by nature.104 Fief incorporels 
included rights, usufructus, inheritance and income.105 
In summary, Frankish law was the law which was practiced by the West German tribes 
across the Rhine. This law did not necessarily embody the Roman law principles that 
were comparable to old, pre-classical and classical Rome. For purposes of studying 
                                               
93  Pejovich S The economics of property rights: towards a theory of comparative systems 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers Dordrecht 1990) 8-9. 
94  McSweeney TJ “Property before property – Romanising the English law of land” 2012 
(60) Buffalo Law Review 1139-1199 1147. 
95  Brissaud J A History of French public law (as translated by Garner JW) (Augustus M. 
Kelly Publishers New York 1969) 339-340. 
96  Anderson P Passages from antiquity to feudalism (Verso London 1974) 147-148. 
97  Anderson Passages from antiquity to feudalism 147-148. 
98  Brissaud French public law 260 and Levy West Roman vulgar law 88. 
99  Levy West Roman vulgar law 89-90. 
100  Levy West Roman vulgar law 89-90. 
101  Levy West Roman vulgar law 89-90. 
102  Brissaud French public law 265. 
103  Brissaud French public law 265. 
104  Brissaud French public law 265. 
105  Brissaud French public law 265. 
 36 
 
the law of property, a distinction was made between a person and a fief. Rights to a fief 
were bestowed on the superior persons in society, that is, the lord. The weaker 
persons, that is, the peasants, only had a right to use and possess a fief. This right was 
limited in that it could not be transferred to another person. The feudal system therefore 
created a society that had different needs from that of the Roman society and this is 
reflected in the different objects of property. 
2.4 MEDIEVAL LAW 
2.4.1 The Romanists 
The Glossators and Ultramontani are important to an investigation of Roman law during 
the Romanist period.  
(a) The Glossators 
The Glossators were the Roman law intellectuals who were located in Bologna, Italy 
between 1100 and 1250 AD.106 Samuel summarises the position of the Glossators in 
the law by stating the following: 
The Glossators and the Post-Glossators had an unsurpassed 
knowledge of the Roman source materials and for them law as a 
concept and legal science (scientia juris) was equivalent to Roman 
law. However, the society in which they lived was anything but 
Roman.107 
They commented on the phrases and texts that were contained in the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis by means of Glosses. However, the Glossators deviated from the old, pre-
classical and classical Roman law of property in relation to the wording to be preferred 
when referring to the legal right which a person had to property. In particular, they 
spoke about the ius in re as opposed to an actio in rem.108 In modern English, the tem 
ius in re is interpreted to mean a property right.109 It was then argued that this right to 
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property, of which dominium was the most important, amounted to an ius perfecte 
disponere.110 This ius pefecte disponere granted to the owner of an object the full or 
complete disposal over a corporeal thing.111 They then described these rights as either 
those that ‘belong as an individual possession to each person, assigned to him by law’ 
or those over which a person had ‘capacity and power assigned by law’.112 In more 
abstract terms, ius pefecte disponere bestowed on the dominus the ‘claim to total 
control against the entire world’.113 Despite the above-mentioned, the Glossators did 
not concern themselves with providing a definition of the term rights. Because of this, a 
clear line could not be drawn between ius in re and ius in personam (that is, personal 
rights).114 
Furthermore, the glossators recognised that the starting point to the study of property is 
the acceptance of the ‘exclusive bond between a person and a thing’.115 In so doing, 
they recognised the division between corporeals and incorporeals. Following this 
recognition, the rights in respect to corporeal and incorporeal things were referred to as 
the ius reale, that is, real rights.116 These rights did not necessarily translate to 
ownership. They merely denoted that, by reason of the close association between a 
person and a thing, a person had an interest over such a property.117 
In summary, the Glossators contributed much to the understanding of property as an 
object of right. Firstly, they recognised that property rights generally granted to a 
person the complete powers to use and dispose of the property. Secondly, they 
                                                                                                                                         
not found favour. See Feenstra “Dominium and ius in re aliena - the origins of a civil law 
distinction” in Birks P (ed) New perspectives in the Roman private law of property: 
essays for Barry Nicholas (Clarendon Press Oxford 1989) 111-122 113.  
110  Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1314-1357) spoke, for example of quid ergo est dominium? 
Responde est ius de re corporali perfecte disponendi, nisi lege prohibeatur. See 
Bartolus ad D 51.2.17.1. 
111  Garnsey Thinking about property 198 and Visser DP “The ‘absoluteness’ of ownership – 
the South African common law perspective” 1985 Acta Juridica 39-52 43. 
112  Garnsey Thinking about property 202. 
113  Tuck Natural rights theories 15. 
114  Feenstra “Dominium and ius in re aliena - the origins of a civil law distinction” 112. 
115  Samuel “The many dimensions of property” 47. 
116  Pottage A and Sherman B “On the prehistory of intellectual property” in Howe HR and 
Griffiths J (eds) Concepts of property in intellectual property law (Cambridge University 
Press Cambridge 2013) 11-28 22. 
117  Pottage and Sherman “On the prehistory of intellectual property” 22. 
 38 
 
introduced, for the first time in the history of the Roman law of property, the concept of 
ius reale. Having done all this, they argued that rights in property, corporeal or 
incorporeal, are to be referred to as the real rights.118 This development of the rights in 
property reflected the attitudes of the Glossators to Roman law principles.  
(b) The Ultramontani 
The word Ultramontani was used in reference to the French Romanists who resided in 
the North of Italy ‘across the mountains’.119 These scholars were mostly French-
speaking and belonged to the school of Orléans.120 The Ultramontani followed the work 
of the Glossators of Bologna. Despite this, their thinking was greatly influenced by the 
domestic French and Canon laws which existed at the time. In relation to the law of 
property, the Ultramontani provided a much more refined approach to property.121 The 
refinement of the Ultramontani’s view on property is furthermore made explicit by Du 
Plessis.122 Du Plessis states the ‘scientific approach of the school of Orleans 
(ultramontani), which influenced legal science during the thirteenth century, was not 
exactly revolutionary, but their approach towards textual analysis and textual authority 
was novel’.123 
The French Romanists accepted the separation between corporeals and incorporeals. 
Such acceptance can be extrapolated from one of the prominent French jurists by the 
name of Jacques de Revigny (1230-1296 AD). In his Lectura supra Codice Revigny 
spoke about certain tangibles such as agricultural land, cattle and house.124 In relation 
to incorporeal objects, especially those that are attached to land, Revigny mentioned a 
hypothec as an example.125 Furthermore, the Ultramontani accepted that usufructs, 
gains or profits from tangible property were the kinds of intangibles that should be 
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recognised and protected by the law of property.126 This recognition and protection did 
not necessarily exist because dominium over these things was possible. It existed 
because a person had an interest in the aforementioned property.127    
In summary, the Ultramontani had a sophisticated approach to property. On the one 
hand, these jurists followed the classical Roman law idea of the law of property. On the 
other hand, they acknowledged that property was no longer only limited to that which 
was known and accepted in classical Roman law.128 Therefore, the objects of property 
rights, but not ownership, could be extended to those things that were not recognised 
in classical Roman law. Some of the examples of these included certain incorporeal 
objects, such as fruits or gains from tangibles. So, as this society became more 
sophisticated, the specific needs of this society changed. 
2.4.2 Canon Law 
Canon law (and later, Church law) is the whole body of legal rules which was 
developed in order to deal with matters that fell within the domain of the Roman 
Catholic Church.129 This law also regulated the relationship between the Church and 
the secular sphere.130 Canon law developed separately from Roman law. This 
progression took place following the prevalence of the rules of Canon law, that is, the 
canones in medieval Rome. Besides this separation, Canon law relied heavily on 
certain principles of Roman law for its sustenance. One example of such is the 
principle that regulated the property of the Church. Accordingly, it is conceivable that 
the Roman law of property was applied by the Church only insofar as this law was not 
in conflict with Canon law.131  
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The acceptance of the notion of individual rights to property by Canon law is difficult to 
establish with precision. For example, the Canonists differentiated between the ius of a 
heavenly origin and those that were granted by human or positive law. In relation to the 
first-mentioned, reference was made to common property. This common property was 
regarded as the property of God. Being so, it was accepted that God had ascribed this 
property to humans for their common nourishment. The aforementioned view was held 
because the earth belonged to the Lord.132 Consequently, all earthly property was to be 
held in common in accordance with God’s wishes.133 As for the second-mentioned 
rights, the Canonists, for example Gratian, held that dominium over these objects 
rested or was ascribed to private individuals.134 However, the manner in which this 
ownership was exercised or operated was determined by the creator of this dominium 
that is the emperor.135  
A departure from the above-mentioned could be found in one of the most prominent 
jurists of Canon law, namely, Bonagratia of Bergamo.136 Bonagratia made reference to 
the term habere. Habere, in the sense in which Bonagratio used the term, could mean 
three things.137 Firstly, it could signify the actual dominium of the dominus.138 Secondly, 
it could be interpreted to mean the usus facti, that is, the usufructus without a legal title 
to the property itself.139 Thirdly, habere could denote the modern idea of possession.140 
Bonagratia’s narration above seems to have been followed by William of Ockham. 
Ockham initially defined property as a competence (facultas) to claim a good.141 He 
then referred to this good as the ius. The ius represented the unique power to deal with 
the good itself, that is, the facultas utendi.142 Following this, rights in property were 
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deemed to have vested in the dominium of the human person143 and the rights to the 
use of a thing belonging to another without prejudice to the substance of the thing 
itself.144 The aforementioned rights were vested in both res corporales and res 
incorporale.145  
In summary, Canon law recognised the fact that rights in property existed. In particular, 
there were some rights that originated from God, that is, the common rights and those 
that were derived from positive law, namely, the individual rights.146 As regards to 
property, Canon law accepted that rights in property were vested in both corporeal and 
incorporeal things. Thus, a use of thing or usus facti or usufruct were categorised as 
examples of incorporeal objects.147  So, the law around this time was changed in order 
to fit the needs of the church and thus making provision for the role of God. 
2.5 SIXTEENTH CENTURY 
2.5.1 Mos Italicus 
Mos italicus signified the Italian law which was followed and applied during the 
sixteenth century. For its existence, this law relied massively on Bartolus’ ideas on 
law.148 Bartolus’ influence on the mos italicus was by no mean accidental. It existed 
because Bartolus was the most famous jurist of the Middle Ages.149 His ideas on law 
were particularly authoritative in Italy for a long period of time. Because of this 
importance, the phrase nemo jurista nisi Bartolista (no one is a jurist who is not a 
Bartolist) was commonly used.150  
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Jacobus Menochius held the view that property meant that which belonged to a person 
and is in turn the object of his own.151 If this was established, Menochius argued that 
the latter could dispose freely of this property.152 However, Gomezius spoke of 
dominium as the right to a corporeal thing in terms of which a person had libere 
disponendi. To this end he accepted that only one form of dominium existed in law. 
This acceptance is made evident by the following passage: 
An sit autem duplex dominium directum et utile aut unum tantum sit, 
est controversum inter doctors et Batolum. Sed unicum tantum 
dominium esse in punto iuris posset defendi cum Duarenus. Alias dixi 
quod est detentatio, et illa nihil aliud est quam sole, nuda, et simplex 
insistetia rei quae consistit in facto, ex qua ne dominium nec 
possessio aliqua resultat propter qualitatem personae vel rei, vel ex 
ipsa natura actus: puta si traditur mihi aliqua res, vel ego eam accipio, 
et est actus per quem non potest causari possessio iuridica, certe 
tunc dico habere nudam detentationem: et illa dicitur nuda et simplex 
detentatio.153 
In the aforementioned passage, Gomezius acknowledged the challenges that were 
created by Bartolus’ theory of duplex dominium. He stated that the premise upon which 
the law - presumably, Gomezius was referring to the classical Roman law – was 
founded was that there is only one dominium.154 Having stated all this, Gomezius 
distinguished between dominium and what he referred to as detentatio, that is, 
discretion over the object of property as guaranteed and protected by law.155  
In summary, the jurists of the Mos italicus followed Bartolus’ idea of property as an 
object of right. More specifically, these jurists argued that property rights for purposes 
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of the law existed in respect of only one type of property, that is, corporeal property. 
So, the interpretation of Roman law in the context of this society meant that rules were 
interpreted differently. 
2.5.2 Mos Gallicus 
Mos gallicus was the humanist method of reasoning that was developed in Italy but had 
France as its centre.156 The contribution of this humanist model to law can be 
summarised as follows: 
The humanists wanted new source versions, ad fonts (back to the 
sources) was one of the catchphrases of the time. They read Greek - 
graeca leguntur - in contrast to the medieval jurists. Thus, they had a 
new independent access to the texts that did not require the use of a 
gloss as an authority. The actual teaching of law was also changed 
as the humanists emphasised the Institutiones as the introduction to 
the study of Roman law….the humanists were dissatisfied with the 
system of the digest and sought to resystematise it in new ways.157  
Jacques Cuiacius (1522-1590) was the most prominent jurist of this time. In relation to 
property, Cuiacius was confronted with the challenges of defining the ambit of the 
rights to property belonging to a vassal and those of a superior. His solution to this was 
simply that: ‘the nature of the vassal’s right to property was a usufruct with undivided 
dominium vesting in the superior’.158 By this, he sought to align his theory of property, 
especially ownership, with that of the classical Romans and with feudal law. 
In summary, the jurists of Mos gallicus were not satisfied with how the law of property 
had evolved in the periods before them. They then developed an independent idea of 
property. This was modelled from the classical Roman law approach to property. 
Specifically, they discarded the view that rights in property were only vested in 
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corporeal things. To them, the object of rights and not ownership were corporeals and 
incorporeals.159 Consequently, the amalgamation of Roman law with the needs of a 
feudal society created a different view of objects of rights. 
2.5.3 Moral Philosophers 
One of the most essential philosophers of this time is Aquinas. In his Summa 
Theologica, Aquinas differentiated between things by stating the following: 
We can consider a material object in two ways. One is with regard to 
its nature, and that does not lie within human power, but only divine 
power, to which all things are obedient. The other is with regard to its 
use. And here man does have natural dominium over material things, 
for through his reason and will he can use material objects for his own 
benefit.160 
He then referred to the first-mentioned property as those things that God gave to 
mankind in common.161 Consequently, the rights which flowed from this property were 
ascribed to the natural law.162  
In relation to the second-mentioned property, Aquinas submitted that God (the creator 
of all property) retained the absolute dominium over property. This meant that a person 
simply had an usufruct over property. Accordingly, a person merely had ‘the power and 
privilege of making a purposive use of things’.163 This power to use property had to be 
exercised within the limits as set out by natural law.164  
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Furthermore, Aquinas inquired whether ‘the possession of exterior things is natural to 
man’ or not.165 He also investigated whether or not ‘it is lawful that anyone should 
possess anything as his own’.166 In response to this, Aquinas argued that man had a 
natural dominion over private property. This ownership arose from human agreement 
which is the domain of positive law.167 More specifically, the private dominion simply 
amounted to a ‘super-addition or adinventio that is devised by human reason’.168  
In summary, the moral philosophers, for example Aquinas recognised the existence of 
a person’s right to property. They argued that this right is in respect of material objects. 
Things, such as slaves, were thus categorised as the material objects over which a 
person had property rights. However, these philosophers accepted that God retained 
the absolute ownership over property. Because of this, the principles of natural law 
dictated the manner in which property rights were to be dealt with. 
2.6 THE PANDECTISTS 
The Pandectists’ theory of law was based on a method of reasoning which was 
referred to as Private Law Dogma. This method was drawn from an idea which Georg 
Friedrich Puchta (1798-1846) developed called the Genealogy der Begriffe, that is, the 
genealogy of legal concepts.169 From this, a philosophical or systematic way of 
interpreting texts or documents was established. Accordingly, the law which was 
conventionally used was a product of rigorous scientific deductions and was thus more 
refined.170 In relation to ownership, Puchta referred to a thing as denoting the ‘exclusive 
authority to use and dispose of a thing’.171 Following this, he talked of an easement in 
the sense of ‘a property’s right to another property’. According to Puchta, rights either 
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belonged to an individual or a family.172 He then referred to these rights as the private 
rights. The latter rights were in Puchta’s view private in nature and were separated 
from public rights and ecclesiastical rights.173 Despite this, private rights were 
recognised as the most important of the rights.174 Heinrich Dernburg (1829-1907) 
referred to this as die wichtigste ist das Eigentumsrecht.175 
Furthermore, the Pandectists seemed to have a more grounded view of the notion of 
dominium. On the one hand, Thibaut developed an approach to ownership which was 
more aligned to that of the classical Roman law. He rejected the medieval idea of 
property as generating dual ownership.176 He stated that the separation between 
dominium directus and dominium utile had no place in the law of property.177 This 
rejection resulted in the acceptance of only one form of dominium over property, 
namely, direct ownership. Van der Walt finds justification for this viewpoint by saying 
that property rights insofar as they were understood during this time were seen to be 
part of the external sphere of the individual.178  
On the other hand, Bernhard Windscheid (1817-1892) provided a useful guide 
illuminating the rejection of duplex dominium.179 Firstly, Windscheid spoke of ownership 
as an exclusive or individualistic right.180 Secondly, he talked of ownership as an 
absolute right.181 He referred to ownership as an abstract right, in the sense that an 
owner possessed certain powers by virtue of having ownership of property.182  
Having examined the above-mentioned, it would appear that the Pandectists 
recognised that the objects of rights are corporeal and incorporeal things.183 These 
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rights do not necessarily translate to ownership. Accordingly, an interest in property 
was enough to justify the aforesaid rights to exist.184 
In summary, one of the most essential developments in this period was the acceptance 
of private rights. Property rights were regarded as the fundamental component of these 
private rights. In relation to the objects of rights, the Pandectists were of the view that 
corporeals and incorporeals were, insofar as they satisfy the needs and ambitions of a 
person, the objects of private rights but not necessarily ownership.185 This is an 
important period as it is where the idea of individual personal rights really came to the 
fore. The political or economic needs of that society therefore determined this 
development. 
2.7 DUTCH DEVELOPMENTS 
Some of the prominent jurists of the Dutch law of property were Hugo de Groot (1583-
1645)186 and Johannes Voet. Grotius dealt with private property in De Jure Belli ac 
Pacis.187 In this seminal work, Grotius spoke of property that God conferred on all 
humans.188 In relation to this property, he contended that humans had a general right, 
as opposed to a private right, to the use and control of this property. This general right 
related only to the right to use the property.189 For that reason, a human ‘could at once 
take whatever he wished for his own needs, and could consume whatever was capable 
of being consumed’.190 Lastly, Grotius retained the mediaeval Roman law approach to 
property. He equated property with gerechtigheid, that is, a right.191 Rights, in this 
sense, meant subjective rights. These rights came into being through a steady process 
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of individuals dealing with each other.192 The exercise of these rights had to be made in 
a manner which considered the property rights of ‘that which is another’s’.193  
On the other hand, Voet stated that there were certain things over which private 
ownership was impossible.194 He then followed the Roman law approach to property by 
calling these objects the res nullius and res derelictae.195 The examples of these things 
included wild animals, birds, fish, shells, the sea, rain-water and abandoned 
property.196 He also stated that some things can be owned. In this respect, they can be 
the object of rights.197 He gave as an example corporeal and incorporeal property. In 
relation to incorporeals, Voet argued that these things did not possess a tangible 
existence.198 However, they were still property for purposes of the law.199 This 
recognition existed because incorporeals had an inherent value to the person who had 
an interest in them.200 This value was attributable to ownership and was not only 
equated to monetary value. 
In summary, the works of Grotius and Voet are fundamental to the study of the Dutch 
approach to property. In relation to property as an object of rights, Grotius introduced, 
amongst others, the concept of subjective rights. This right, Grotius argued, arose 
through human dealings with each other. However, Voet stated that things generally 
become the object of rights if they are capable of being owned. In other words, the 
objects must be of some value to a person. Accordingly, he submitted that res 
corporeal and res incorporeal were the objects of rights. The aforementioned 
demonstrates the link between individualism or capitalism and ownership. This was 
done in order to fit in with the commercial goals of Holland, especially overseas. 
2.8 ENGLISH LAW 
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English law illustrates a strong separation between the study of property law and that of 
the law of persons.201 Within the context of the English law of property, the term 
‘ownership’ denotes a ‘particular relationship which exists between a person and 
certain rights which are vested in him’.202 It is classified as the ‘greatest right or 
collection of rights – the ultimate right – which a person can have over a thing’.203 
Accordingly, it can be acquired either by original or derivative means.204  
Property in England encompasses those objects that are considered to be 
inanimate.205 Inanimate has to do with the inorganic objects that are permanent.206 The 
requirement of permanency is satisfied in cases where the property can be sensed or 
observed over a period of time.207 Therefore, a property attachment or its physical 
component assists in determining the permanency of the object.208 Most importantly, 
the English law of property distinguishes between real and personal property (things 
real and things personal).209  
2.8.1 Real Property 
Blackstone argues that the equivalent term for real property is corporeal 
hereditaments.210 By this Blackstone means such things ‘as may be seen and handled 
by the body’.211 Real properties are permanent, stationary and immovable objects.212 It 
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is necessary that this property be such that it cannot be carried or moved from one 
place to the other.213 Examples of things real are the land and a dwelling.214  
The inclusion of the land as one of the examples of things real is very interesting. This 
interest is drawn from the fact that the term land in English law denotes the ‘works of 
nature and of humans within a particular space on the earth’.215 It also consists of ‘any 
definite portion of the planet’s surface with the natural resources on or under the 
surface’.216 Consequently, all other things, for example, plants, woods, moors, water 
and seeds are regarded as part of the land.217 
2.8.2 Things Personal 
Personal property refers to movable objects.218 Examples of these are money 
excluding its value, goods, and other movables, for example, animals, plants and 
seeds. Things personal are subdivided into choses in possession and choses in 
actions.219 The term chose is a French word which literally means a thing.220 This word 
was borrowed by Blackstone in order to discuss the various types of property which he 
deemed personal.  
Choses in possession denote tangible or corporeal things.221 Jewellery and furniture 
are examples of choses in possession.222 Accordingly, a possession in respect of these 
things is physical.223 However, chooses in action are classes of intangible or 
incorporeal objects that are incapable of physical possession.224 Examples of choses in 
action are debts, patents, copyrights, trademarks, shares and negotiable 
instruments.225 Therefore, it is required of a property owner to bring an action (actio in 
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personam) if the latter wishes to enforce his or her right over choses in action.226 The 
incorporeal hereditaments of Blackstone are equivalent to the form of property referred 
to as the choses in action.227 He argues that incorporeal hereditaments include the 
rights that accrue out of things real.228 They are annexed to and exercisable within 
corporeal hereditaments.229 Their examples include contributions, commons, offices, 
dignities, franchises, pensions, annuities and rents.230  
The term possession in English law is sometimes used interchangeably with the word 
ownership.231 The word possession is derived from the concepts of corpus (actual 
physical detention) and animus (mental state to possess).232 It means a physical 
control of property with the intention to exclude all others in society.233 Furthermore, it 
presupposes the existence of dominium over a particular property.234 This dominium 
amounts to the assumption of control of or over property. 
In summary, English law deviates markedly from the property law viewpoints that are 
found in Roman-Dutch law. Instead of dealing with corporeal and incorporeal things, it 
states that the objects of property rights vest in corporeal hereditaments and 
incorporeal hereditaments. Corporeal hereditaments are real property. The equivalent 
term which is used for corporeal hereditaments is choses in possession. These objects 
are permanent, stationary and physical. The examples include land, house, jewellery 
and furniture. Incorporeal hereditaments refer to the intangible things. These things 
have no physical presence and are not capable of physical possession. The examples 
of these objects include debts, patents, copyrights, shares, contributions, pensions, 
annuities and rents. Consequently, the law of property in England differs from the 
Roman-Dutch law and is geared towards meeting the requirements or needs of the 
English society. 
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2.9 SOUTH AFRICAN LAW  
2.9.1 Background 
The law of property in South Africa regulates the relationship between legal subjects 
(humans) and legal objects.235 In this relationship, four kinds of rights are distinguished. 
The rights in property are referred to as the real rights. The other rights are personality 
rights, immaterial property rights and personal rights or claims. Debates relating to the 
need to classify rights have a long history in the South African law of property.236 
However, the prevailing view is that the above-mentioned distinction is essential 
because rights are generally ‘exercised, protected and acquired differently’ in law.237  
Real rights are absolute.238 This implies that a holder of a real right possesses wide 
powers in relation to or over a thing. Thus, he or she has what is referred to as ius in 
rem suam and can within the confines of the law do with the thing as he or she 
pleases.239 In addition, real rights establish a legal relationship between a person and a 
thing, may be enforced against anyone else in the society,240 and are ‘maintainable 
against the whole world’.241 Consequently, where the object of right is a thing (res) it is 
presumed that real rights accrue to the property.242 Ownership, servitude, mortgage 
and pledge are examples of real rights. Personality rights refer to the rights which a 
person has to his or her physical or psychological wellbeing. In most cases these rights 
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are claimed in delict where damage or harm was caused to a person. Immaterial 
property rights relate to the rights in respect of certain intangibles.243 These include 
those which are a creation of a person’s mind, for example an invention or symbol.244 
The object of right in the case of personal rights is a claim for specific performance.245 
These rights are referred to as patrimonial rights.246  
In South Africa, the notion of rights or property rights is essential to the overall study of 
the law of property. A right in property means a legally justified entitlement or 
interest.247 It gives a person (legal person) a valid claim to or over property (a legal 
object) as against other persons.248 Most importantly, it refers to the ‘classical triad of 
liberal entitlements’ that usually has connection with property.249 These are possession, 
use and disposal of property.250 Rights are generally subjective or objective in nature. 
Subjective rights relates to the relationship between the bearer of rights (legal subject) 
and other legal subjects.251 Objective rights have to do with the relationship between a 
legal subject and the object of the right, that is, the legal object.252 Accordingly, 
although all material objects qualify as property in an informal sense,253 not all objects 
can be regarded as the objects of private property rights. The examples of the latter 
objects are the sun or a grain of sand.254 Consequently, in order for an object to be 
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regarded as property for juridical purposes they must result in the establishment of a 
legal relationship between persons.255 The objects must be such that a person will be 
able to ‘acquire and hold a (subjective) right’.256  
The association of property with a right is sometimes also described as a truncated 
right.257 It is not property per se. It is rather a guarantee that the entitlement to property 
will not be tampered with otherwise than in accordance with the law.258 Different tests 
or requirements are commonly applied in order to determine whether or not an object is 
indeed a thing for purposes of the law. These tests are that the object must be capable 
of human control, it must be of some value or valuable to a person, and it must be the 
object of rights and duties.259 The attribution of value to the concept of property needs 
additional clarification. More specifically, a reference to value does not only or 
necessarily imply an economic or market value. Objects that are of value to a person, 
for example, a family photograph, are also regarded as object of property rights in 
South Africa. Therefore, it does not matter whether the value is sentimental or not.  
It is necessary at this stage to describe some of the concepts which have relations to 
the law of property in South Africa. These are things, ownership and possession. A 
single approach regarding the true meaning of the concept of property cannot be found 
in South African law. Maasdorp provides that this concept amounts to anything which 
can be the object of a right.260 In other words, property establishes a relationship 
whereby one person is entitled to a right and another person is subject to a duty.261 
Maasdorp’s view is followed by Schoeman.262 Schoeman argues that property implies 
a legal relationship between a person and an object.263 From this relationship it may be 
inferred that such a person is the owner or lawful possessor of property.264 This 
determines whether a person has exclusive control of or over an object which he or she 
                                               
255   Oosthuizen AJ The law of property (Juta Cape Town 1981) 3. 
256   Van der Walt AJ and Pienaar GJ Introduction to the law of property 2nd ed (Juta Kenwyn 
1997) 11. 
257   Roux T “Property” in Cheadle MH, Davis DM and Hayson NRL (eds) South African 
constitutional law: the Bill of Rights (Butterworths Durban 2002) 429-472 440. 
258   Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (Juta Cape Town 2005) 63. 
259   Van der Merwe and de Waal Things and servitudes 12.  
260   Maasdorp AFS The Institutes of Cape Town: being a compendium of the common law, 
decided cases and statute law of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope (Juta Cape 
Town 1923) 1. 
261   Maasdorp Institutes of Cape Town 1.  
262  See generally Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The law of property. 
263   Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The law of property 1. 
264   Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert The law of property 1. 
  
55 
 
can enforce against anyone in society.265 However, other authors (for example Hahlo 
and Kahn) oppose the aforementioned description.266 They contend that property 
amounts to everything which has a monetary value.267 The description of property can 
be summarised by providing that the notion amounts to ‘everything which can form part 
of a person’s estate'.268 
For a study of the word ownership, it is necessary to examine the term by looking at 
what it means in general terms and for legal purposes. This investigation also helps in 
the discussion regarding the position of information below. In laymen’s terms the word 
ownership applies to everything that belongs to a person or a person’s estate. 
Therefore, it does not matter whether the object is corporeal or incorporeal. However, 
in a legal sense ownership is the ‘sum-total of all the real rights which a person can 
possibly have to and over a….thing, subject to the legal maxim: Sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas (So use your own that you do not do injury to that which is 
another)’.269 It includes the ‘power (or right) to use, alter, destroy or alienate the thing 
concerned and to enjoy the fruits thereof, to prevent others from using it and to transfer 
rights to the thing’.270  Possession or to possess has to do with the physical (that is, to 
physically hold) and mental (that is, the desire to actually hold) situations of a person 
towards property.271 It is simply a restricted right to property to use and possess 
property. This right does not amount to ownership. 
2.9.2 Property as a Right 
Insofar as the meaning of the term property vary in South Africa, it is inevitable that the 
definitions of the laws that regulate this institution will also diverge. For example, one 
viewpoint regards the law of property as a body of legal rules and principles that 
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regulate the use and control of commercial resources.272 In view of that, the law of 
property aims to safeguard the foundation for the ‘acquisition, enjoyment and disposal 
of wealth’.273 Another perspective maintains that the law of property is that fragment of 
private law which governs ‘the nature, content, acquisition, protection, transfer or loss 
and other implications of the different real relationships that may exist between a legal 
subject and a thing and the rights, entitlements, obligations and remedies that may 
accompany it’.274   
As regards things that can be owned, South Africa follows more of the classical Roman 
law approach to property. In particular, property is classified according to its relation to 
people and according to its nature.275 In relation to its relationship with people, a 
difference is made between res in commercium and res extra commercium.276 Res in 
commercium refer to the objects that can be owned or can be the object of rights.277 
Conversely, res extra commercium are the objects that cannot be owned or can never 
be the object of a right.278 Examples of res extra commercium are res communes 
(property common to all people) and res publicae (property held by the state). With 
regard to its nature, a difference is made between corporeal and incorporeal, movable 
and immovable, divisible and indivisible, consumable and inconsumable, fungible and 
non-fungible, and single and complex properties.279 For purposes of this research a 
revision of corporeal and incorporeal property is made. 
(a) Corporeal property 
Corporeal property refers to physical objects. These are objects that are part of a 
tangible reality.280 A tangible reality can be interpreted to mean an object which is 
perceptible through sight and touch.281 The object must occupy some space. It must 
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also be capable of being sensed by means of any of the five traditional senses.282 
These may be movables, for example horses, furniture, motor bikes, a cylinder with 
oxygen or ships, or immovables, for example landed property, fruits that still hang on 
the tree, etc.283  
There are some who criticises the present-day description of corporeal property.284 
They argue that a reliance on the tangibility of an object as one of the criteria for 
determining its corporeality can generate challenges.285 In particular, such reliance can 
lead to objects, for example, various gases, that naturally are excluded in the 
description of corporeal property being recognised as such.286 For example, gasses 
can, despite the fact that they cannot be touched, be perceived by some of the external 
factors.287  The other criticism is levelled against the exclusion of natural forces and 
energies, for example gravity, heat, sound and electricity, as property. It is averred that 
such exclusion relies on an ancient description of property.288 Heat, sound and 
electricity are so analogous to traditional corporeal property that they should be 
regarded as having corporeal existence.289 This can be illustrated by examining the 
example of electricity. Electricity can be touched, although this may result to injury or 
death. As a result, it may be said that electricity meets the requirement of tangibility. 
This position seems to have been followed in BonQuelle (Edms) Bpk v Munisipalitet 
van Otavi,290 Froman v Herbmore Timber and Hardware (Pty) Ltd 291 and Naidoo v 
Moodley.292 
Tindall AJP argued in the case of Liebenberg v Koster Village Council that it does not 
seem possible to adapt the language which is used in describing corporeal things in a 
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way that also incorporates objects such as natural gases, electricity or sound.293  This 
view seems to be supported by some English authors, for example Glanville.294 
Glanville states in relation to electricity that it is not ‘scientifically regarded as a physical 
thing…..but is (only) a form of energy.295 
(b) Incorporeal property  
Traditionally, scepticism existed as to whether or not ownership should also exist in 
respect of incorporeal things. Ex parte Eloff296 is an example of a case where this doubt 
was illustrated. This was the case because it was deemed to be legally illogical to 
define property as the object of a right and then submit that a right is also the object of 
a right. However, it was soon realised that ownership should generally not be limited to 
tangible and physical objects. The cases of Cooper v Boyes No and Another297 and S v 
Kotze298 can be mentioned as examples where this was made. In the first-mentioned 
case the court concluded that although incorporeal property (a share) cannot be 
compared to corporeal property, however, they sometimes generate interest or value to 
an owner.299 This interest thus gives an owner a reasonable expectation that this 
interest or value will be recognised as property by the law.300 Furthermore, in S v Kotze 
the court conceded that a bank retains ownership of the funds or credits which are kept 
in an account holder’s bank account.301  
Incorporeal things are the artificial or fictitious objects.302 Traditionally, these were 
objects that were neither visible nor tangible.303 They were considered to be incapable 
of being owned.304 Accordingly, it was argued that a possession of these things in the 
sense of a factual or physical control or corpus or an intention to possess or animus 
                                               
293  Liebenberg v Koster Village Council 1935 TPD 413 417-418. 
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295  Glanville Criminal law 736. 
296  See Ex parte Eloff 1953 1 SA 617 (T). 
297  See Cooper v Boyes No and Another 1994 4 SA 521 (CPD). 
298  See S v Kotze 1961 1 SA 118 (SCA). 
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304   Nathan M The common law of South Africa: a treatise based on Voet’s commentaries 
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possidendi was impossible.305 The most obvious examples of incorporeal property 
were a right and duty.306 Incorporeal property in the form of rights and duties operates 
exactly like objects of limited real rights.307 
In addition, South Africa has enacted statutes and the courts have been pivotal in 
supporting the ideal of developing the realm of incorporeal property. The 
aforementioned improvements have resulted in the vesting of ownership over things 
where the object of rights is not a corporeal thing but another subjective right. These 
are real rights, personality rights, intellectual property rights and personal rights. The 
aforementioned is associated with the phenomenon of dephysicalisation of property.308 
More specifically, it is compelled by the fact that ‘complex social, economic and legal 
processes by which incorporeal or intangible property are becoming increasingly 
important for personal wealth and security and for social welfare, while the importance 
of traditional tangible property such as land declines’.309 
Having studied everything as evidenced above, it is important to note that the 
distinction between corporeal and incorporeal property is central to the study to 
determine the position of information in the law of property. It particularly helps in 
establishing whether or not the principles of property law are so flexible that information 
can be the object of rights. In other words, an inquiry is undertaken regarding whether 
ownership could be vested in information or not. 
The distinction between corporeals and incorporeals has to be examined against the 
background of section 25 of the Constitution (the property clause).310 The property 
clause has far-reaching provisions in relation to the protection of property. It deals with 
                                               
305   Van der Merwe CG “Law of property” in Van der Merwe CG, Du Plessis JE and 
Zimmermann R (eds) Introduction to the law of South Africa (Kluwer Law International 
The Hague 2004) 201-242 203-204. 
306   Chauvier v Pelican Pools (Pty) Ltd 1992 (2) SA 39 (T) 41G. 
307   See the criticism regarding the corporeality of such things in Oosthuizen Law of 
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308   Vandevelde KJ “The new property of the nineteenth century – the development of the 
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309   Van der Walt Constitutional property law 66. 
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the protection of property against arbitrary deprivation and expropriation of property.311 
Furthermore, it covers such wide-ranging factors as the right to property and property 
as a constitutional right.312 The concept of property within the framework of section 25 
refers to both private and public property.313 The effect of this discussion in the overall 
approach to property – more specifically, with regard to corporeals and incorporeals – 
is that it requires a balancing act to be commenced which examines the interests of an 
individual owner and those of the general public.314 Public interests includes: ‘the 
nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to 
all South Africa’s natural resources’.315 Consequently, the private-law views on property 
as the solitary object under the dominium of an individual owner should be reconciled 
with what the public views as property.316  
In summary, different rights are recognised in South Africa. These are referred to as 
the real, personal, personality and immaterial property rights. The rights in property are 
referred to as the real rights. These rights establish a legal relationship between a 
person and a thing. A distinction is made between corporeals and incorporeals. 
Corporeals are tangible objects that occupy some space and are capable of being 
sensed. The examples include a house, furniture, motorbike, cylinder with oxygen and 
fruits that hangs in a tree. Incorporeals are the intangible things. Generally, a factual or 
physical control over incorporeals is impossible. Furthermore, South Africa has 
adopted an approach for the dephysicalisation of property. In this respect, rights in 
property have become vested in things that were traditionally not recognised as 
property for legal purposes.  
The above-mentioned developments reflect the needs of the South African society. 
They found their basis from classical Roman law and the expansions and changes 
which occurred in the Dutch law of property. The most significant of these are those 
relating to property as an object of real rights. According to this, a thing becomes a 
property if it can be shown that a person has a legal interest in the thing. The aforesaid 
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interest does not necessarily have to translate to the actual dominium over the thing 
itself. 
2.10 SUMMARY 
Property is generally a vibrant idea. It evolves with the times and is adaptable to 
societal developments and challenges. For example, old Roman law only knew of 
property as denoting that which served a person’s interest.317 This property was 
corporeal in nature and amounted to that which was referred to as quae tangi possunt. 
During this time, there was no specific mention of the term dominium. Dominium was 
simply inferred from the interest which a person had to property. Furthermore, old 
Roman law spoke of actions, that is, actio in rem and actio in personam, as opposed to 
rights in property. The idea of property as a right is only conceivable when a study is 
made of the classical Roman law of property. In classical times, the person who had an 
interest (economic or pecuniary), that is, dominium, in property was referred to as a 
dominus, proprietaries or domonus proprietatis. It was then argued that this dominium 
bestowed to the dominus a legal right to a thing in relation to its control, use and 
enjoyment. In addition, dominium did not vest only in corporeal things, for example 
buildings, land, animals, slaves, gold or silver. It was also possible that a dominus 
could have an interest or a right over those things which were not necessarily quae 
tangi possunt. These were referred to as incorporeal things, for example rights, 
servitudes, inheritance and hereditas.318 
These classical developments were essential in shaping the approaches to the law of 
property that succeeded it. In particular, the period between 350 AD until 550 AD 
(Vulgar law in the West of Rome) was an era where the meaning attached to the notion 
of dominium lost its classical radiance and lucidity.319 More specifically, dominium was 
replaced with concepts such as possidere and possessio. The effect of this was to 
render the dominus a mere possessor with the rights similar to those of a usufructus.320 
However, duplex dominium does not appear in the English and South African property 
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law approaches. More specifically, South Africa follows more or less the Pandectists’ 
idea of property and rights in property. The latter view is to the effect that an object is 
property for legal purposes if certain rights can be abstracted from the object itself. 
Real, personality, immaterial and personal rights are distinguished. These rights may 
be subjective (between a legal subject and another legal subject) or objective (between 
a legal subject and legal object).  
Having ascertained that the understanding and meaning of rights in property depend 
on the structure of a particular society, the section below discusses the position of 
information in the law of property. This argument is made having in mind the fact that 
information is nowadays kept and stored online. Therefore, a challenge may exist in 
accepting and recognising this information as property for purposes of the law. More 
specifically, it may be cumbersome to establish property rights to information kept and 
stored in computer systems. However, the fact that the principles of property law vary 
according to the needs of a particular society may assist in shaping the discussion on 
the position of information in the law of property. One may be tempted to deduce that a 
computer which stores information is analogous to a container which stores the gas. By 
reason of the aforesaid, if property rights do not only vest in the container but also to 
the gas, then it should also be possible for a person to have real rights over information 
kept in a computer. These rights do not essentially translate to the ownership of 
information. Simply, they signify that a person has an interest in information stored or 
kept online. 
2.11 POSITION OF INFORMATION 
2.11.1 Background  
The law of property is clear in relation to the objects of real rights. Property rights, but 
not ownership, vest in corporeal and incorporeal objects. The position in relation to 
information does not appear to be properly examined. Although Cooper v Boyes No 
and Another recognises that the law of property should be developed so as to regard 
shares as property for legal purposes, it does not indicate, expressly or implicitly, that 
the information contained in those shares is also property in South Africa.321 By way of 
illustration, a document can be owned in terms of the principles of the law of property. 
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However, the information which is contained in such document is not property for legal 
purposes. In other words, a person may, in law, have a real right over information 
stored or kept in his computer. But, this right does not mean that such a person owns 
the information. Consequently, the view that every object of property rights must have 
corporeal subsistence seems to prevail.322 The fact that South Africa refers to principal, 
accessory or auxiliary property is immaterial in the aforementioned regard. The 
question is or should be whether or not information can be the object of ownership. In 
order to examine this question, the developments of the principles of property law in 
South Africa, insofar as they relate to corporeal and incorporeal property, are 
paramount.  
In the recent past, attempts have been made to study the legal significance of property 
in online environments, that is, virtual property. This examination has occurred both in 
South Africa and abroad. Erlank323 and Jankowich324 generally lead the scrutiny 
regarding whether information could be the object of ownership. On the one hand, 
Erlank examines virtual property as represented by animated characters (avatars)325 
and virtual worlds. He relies for his study on Lastowka and Hunter.326 Lastowka and 
Hunter argue that virtual worlds replicate real, physical worlds.327 More specifically, the 
social interactions that occur in these worlds marks a new development which legal 
subjects (namely, computer users) consider as being important.328 Given the 
aforementioned, Erlank states that virtual property is scarce and some form of 
economic connotation can be attached to it. Because of its scarcity and commercial 
success rate, there is ‘justification’ for virtual property to be recognised as property that 
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is capable of being owned.329 On the other hand, Jankowich submits that there is 
indeed something called ‘property in virtual worlds’.330 However, this property does not 
appear to meet the traditional legal description of property. In other words, it does not 
fit the requirement of corporeality which is required by the law of property. Jankowich 
uses the science-fiction movie ‘The Matrix’ in order to demonstrate the aforesaid 
view.331 In that movie, computer-generated simulations or characters are used, in a 
fictitious manner, as a form of communication in a computer-generated setting.332 It is 
demonstrated in that movie that this method of communication is of interest to the 
users of this computer-generated world. This is the case because this method is 
deemed to be effective. Similarly, virtual property, Jankowich argues, is of interest to 
the users in virtual worlds.333 Therefore, it is worthy of protection and recognition by the 
law.334 However, Jankowich concedes that, perhaps, it may be challenging to find a 
description of virtual property which suitably conforms to the one that is found in the 
law. 335 
In this section the approaches by Erlank and Jankowich are followed. However, the 
discussion diverges, albeit slightly, from those of the aforementioned authors in that it 
deals with the position of information (as opposed to games or avatars) in the law of 
property. The cases discussed here highlight the fact that ancient measures are usually 
not well suited to address modern, or even post-modern, occurrences. With regard to 
the law of property, it may be necessary to modify the traditional maxims or practices 
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relating to its principles.336 This could be the case because property is generally not an 
immutable concept and does not always remain the same.337 As Macpherson puts it: 
When the theory of property is examined, (whether) historically and 
logically, it turns out to be more flexible than the classical liberals or 
their twentieth-century followers have allowed for. The concept of 
property has changed more than once, and in more than one way, in 
the past few centuries. It changed in discernible ways with the rise of 
modern capitalism, and it is again now with the maturation of 
capitalism.338 
As a result of this, it may be necessary to establish a framework which recognises that 
the concept property evolves and can be adapted to accommodate developments that 
take place external to it.339 
2.11.2 Information 
Information or data is an essential asset of an information society. Westbrook,340 
Horowitz,341 Vacca,342 and Koster343 illustrate this significance.344 On the one hand, 
Horowitz and Vacca agree that information has characteristic traits that mirror or mimic 
real property.345 Accordingly, holders of information are or should be entitled to 
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protection.346 If this protection is granted it should then lead to information being 
granted legal recognition as the object over which ownership exists.347 On the other 
hand, Koster relies on two theories of (property) rights in order to establish whether or 
not property rights in information are possible.348 The one theory argues that rights are 
granted to people by virtue of them being part of a particular populace.349 The other 
theory submits that rights are inherent to people. 350 Thus, they are not bestowed to 
people following them becoming a member of a particular community. Having 
examined all this, Koster then states the following: 
That avatars are the manifestation of actual people in an online 
medium, and that their utterances, actions, thoughts, and emotions 
should be considered to be as valid as the utterances, actions, 
thoughts, and emotions of people in any other forum, venue, location, 
or space…. That by the act of affirming membership in the community 
within the virtual space, the avatars form a social contract with the 
community, forming a populace which may and must self-affirm and 
self-impose rights and concomitant restrictions upon their 
behaviour.351  
The emergence of an information society has resulted in information becoming a public 
good.352 Institutions, governments, businesses and individuals expend time, effort and 
money in gathering information.353 Following these efforts, they then (reasonably) 
expect that they have real rights in or over this information.354 Furthermore, information 
or other data has become essential in discouraging other crimes, for example, money 
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laundering and terrorism or terrorist financing.355 This is normally done by encouraging 
or compelling certain information to be furnished or disclosed.356 This revelation 
generally enables and assists institution (Accountable Institutions)357 in order to 
establish whether or not a person or funds are or can be linked to a crime.358 
It is acknowledged that developments have occurred in South Africa wherein the ambit 
of the law of property had been expanded to also give legal recognition and protection 
to certain intangibles, such as electricity.359 For example, in Froman v Herbmore 
Timber and Hardware (Pty) Ltd the issue to be decided by the court was whether 
electricity is res incorporales or not. The court acknowledged that incorporeals, in this 
case, electricity, deserves protection.360 This protection does not per se arise by virtue 
of the incorporeals being seen as analogous with corporeals. However, it exists 
because there is merit or legal justification to recognise the rights but not ownership 
that flow from these properties.361 These expansions of the law of property thus 
demonstrate that the law of property is not founded on inflexible principles. More 
specifically, the principles may be developed in order to respond to emerging societal 
challenges.  
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned, the question regarding whether real rights in 
information exist or not in South Africa is not specifically dealt with. South African 
courts do not appear to have pronounced on the aforementioned. Given this 
uncertainty, a revision of certain English and Canadian cases is made. These cases 
reveal that information may in certain circumstances be protected and granted legal 
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recognition in private law. The most important of these are the Exchange Telegraph Co 
Ltd v Gregory & Co,362 Oxford v Moss,363 Stewart case and R v Offley.364  
(a)   Moss Case 
In this case, the defendant (namely, Moss) was a student in the Faculty of Engineering 
at the University of London. It was alleged that the defendant dishonestly took 
possession of certain confidential information. The information was contained in 
examination question papers (questions) for a Civil Engineering examination.365 It was 
contended and not disputed that the defendant did not intend to deprive the university 
or the senate permanently of the exam paper.366 The defendant simply wished to 
memorise the questions in order to prepare for the exams. The court, per Smith J, 
conceded that the defendant’s conduct amounted to cheating.367 Given this dishonesty, 
society condemns or should condemn such conduct.368 Despite this, the court 
concluded however that information, and not the exam question paper, was not 
property in terms of the existing principles of property law.369 In other words, there was 
no ownership which was vested in this information. Consequently, the defendant did 
not assume ownership of the information following the taking of the exam question 
paper.370 
(b) Offley Case 
In the Offley case, the court followed the wording in the Moss case.371 In this case, 
Offley had a security firm. Part of his duties was to do security checks for employers of 
job applicants. On one reported occasion, Offley needed detailed information belonging 
to various persons. The information was stored at the Canadian Police Information 
Centre (C.P.I.C.).372 It was contained in a ‘pool of computer stored information’. Offley 
then requested the Chief of the Edmonton City Police Department (Edmonton City 
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Police) to check those details for him. However, he was advised that the information 
was only available to law enforcement agencies. Out of desperation, Offley promised to 
pay a Constable (Brown) of the Edmonton City Police a sum of $2 in relation to each 
piece of information supplied.373 Brown reported the promise to his superiors who then 
devised a plan (set-up) to catch Offley. Offley was subsequently captured and criminal 
charges were commenced against him.374 During the hearing, the court had to 
determine whether or not the information can be the object of rights. In its attempt to 
answer this question, the court stated that the intrinsic nature of a thing (not its quality) 
is essential in determining whether such a thing is property in the legal sense or not.375 
Accordingly, the court concluded that the inherent nature of information is such that it, 
whether confidential or not, is incapable in law of being the object of property rights.376 
(c) Gregory Case 
This case represented a departure from the view that was held in both the Moss and 
Offley cases. This case dealt with an action to prevent the defendant (Gregory) from 
publishing certain information.377 The information was contained in various tapes that 
the defendant had earlier obtained.378 The court examined the tapes and consequently 
concluded that the information in those tapes was valuable to the plaintiff. This 
importance, the court stated, was demonstrated by the fact that the plaintiff incurred 
time and money to collect such information.379 Furthermore, although the defendant 
was allowed to furnish the information to its subscribers these subscribers were entitled 
to pay the plaintiff for the information. In view of the aforesaid, the court held the view 
that this information is property. Consequently, its dishonest taking and obtaining 
should entitle the plaintiff to enforce its rights in terms of the principles of the law of 
property.380  
(d)  Stewart Case 
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The court in the Stewart case was divided in relation to the question regarding whether 
or not information is property within the purview of the law of property. The minority 
view, as per Lacourcière J.A., was that information cannot be regarded as property.381 
Accordingly, property rights to information, it was concluded, are not possible in terms 
of the law of property.382 
However, the majority, as per Houlden J.A. and Cory J.A., held that contemporary 
societal developments require that information should be the object of property 
rights.383 In particular, Cory J.A. emphasised the importance of information by saying 
that ‘information and its collection, collation and interpretation are vital to most modern 
commercial enterprises. Compilations of information are often of such importance to 
the business community that they are securely kept to ensure their confidentiality’.384 
Information of the nature as aforesaid above attracts or should attract all the protection 
which the law attaches to property.385 
2.11.3 Summary  
It is illustrated in the sections above that information is central to the information 
society. Because of this, it has become a ‘public good’.386 It can be used as a tool to 
establish and develop a business.387 Furthermore, it can be utilised in order to control 
certain economic crimes.388 Consequently, users of information have an interest in it 
and they regard this interest to be important enough to warrant protection and 
recognition by the law. From Cooper v Boyes No and Another389 it is established that 
an interest or value indicates whether or not property status should be granted to an 
object. This value or interest does not necessarily imply an economic or market value 
                                               
381   Stewart case 594. 
382   Stewart case 594. 
383   Stewart case 598-604. 
384   Stewart case 599. 
385   Stewart case 600-604. See also Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 A.C. 46 107. 
386   Elkin-Koren and Salzberger Effects of Cyberspace 49-50. 
387   Regina v Stewart 598, Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle 209-210 and Samuelson 
1991 Communications of the ACM 15. 
388   FICA, the Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996, and the Drugs and Drugs Trafficking Act 
140 of 1992. 
389  Cooper v Boyes No and Another 1994 4 SA 521 (CPD). 
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or interest. It is only important that the object could form part of a person’s estate.390 It 
should be useful and valuable objects and those that are regarded as in commercio.391  
The fact that courts differ on the question regarding whether or not information is 
property is problematic. On the one hand, there is a view which encourages an 
examination of information according to its intrinsic nature. It concludes that because 
information cannot be physically or actually possessed or owned, then, it fails to be 
property that could be owned. On the other hand, there are some who attack the latter 
view and says that that it is out-dated and out of touch with the current realities of 
information flows or overflows.392 The basis for this is that information is of value to 
humans and that there is a general expectation that it should be the object of property 
rights.393 
2.12 CONCLUSION 
The law of property is dynamic and flexible. Its meaning and essence varies depending 
on the needs of a particular society. This flexibility is also inimical to the discussion of 
property as a right or an object of rights. For example, the object rights theory is found 
in old Roman law of the 250 BC. More specifically, the Romans of this time only spoke 
of actions (actio in rem and actio in personam) as means of protecting the interest 
which a person had over property. Exactly when these actions became rights cannot 
be ascertained with precision. Suffice to say that dominium was viewed as the most 
comprehensive of the rights to property. This completeness varied from society to 
society. Accordingly, its meaning was usually derived from the circumstances that were 
relevant to a specific society.  
It is conceivable that the approach by the Pandectists had an influence on South 
Africa’s understanding of property as a right. South Africa creates a clear distinction 
between objects in the conventional and legal senses. To be regarded as property in 
                                               
390   Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of property 3rd ed 8. 
391   Kleyn, Boraine and Du Plessis Silberberg and Schoeman’s law of property 19. See also 
Nigri DF “Theft of information and the concept of property in the information age” in 
Harris JW (ed) Property problems: from genes to pension funds (Kluwer Law 
International London 1997) 48-60 48-50. 
392   Nigri Property problems 48-50. 
393   Gregory case 155-156 and Stewart case 600-604. 
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the legal sense, an object must generate legal relationships.394 It must be capable of 
human control, be of some value to humans and be the object of rights and duties.395 
Four categories of rights are differentiated for purposes of the law of property. These 
are real rights, personality rights, immaterial property rights and personal rights.396 
Furthermore, ownership is characterised according to its nature and the relations it has 
with people. With regard to the former, a distinction is made between res in 
commercium and res extra commercium. In relation to the latter, it is differentiated 
between corporeal and incorporeal, movable and immovable, divisible and indivisible, 
consumable and inconsumable, fungible and non-fungible and single and complex 
properties.397 Corporeal property refers to physical objects. These objects must occupy 
some space, and be capable of being seen and touched.398 Incorporeal property is 
‘artificial or fictitious’ objects.399  
From the developments in the law of property above, the position of information is not 
entirely clear. It is not clear whether information is or can be regarded as property for 
purposes of law. Despite this, it is evident that as people migrate into the virtual world; 
a need arises to recognise property in online settings. In this chapter, this argument for 
virtual property in virtual worlds is taken into account. This is the case because a 
person may have an interest or right to information. Although this interest may not 
necessarily translate to dominium, however, it may be such that it requires protection 
and recognition in terms of the law. In view of this, it is argued that a more balanced 
argument for the recognition of information as an object of rights should be placed on 
the fact that the principles of property law are not rigid and inflexible. Therefore, the 
principles could be developed in a manner that considers the progressions of recent 
technologies. More specifically, it is essential to accept that a society is not necessarily 
a stationed or offline society. The term society also refers to an information society. An 
information society evolves and cannot be sensed using the traditional sensing 
techniques or methods. Accordingly, the property rights that are derived from this 
society are vested in non-physical objects, namely information. The character of these 
rights usually differs with those that are found in offline societies. However, the 
                                               
394   Oosthuizen Law of property 3. 
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398   Maasdorp Institutes of South Africa 1. 
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importance of these rights to the dominus does not depend on whether the society is 
offline or online. 
Therefore, because information is an object over which property rights or interests are 
possible, it now becomes essential to investigate whether or not this property can be 
the object of theft. In other words, is information property that is capable of being 
stolen? The scrutiny of this question is made in chapter 3 below. The discussion leads 
to the study of the various e-crimes in chapter 4 below. It is important to note that 
chapter 3 is limited only to the Roman-Dutch, English and South African law 
approaches to theft.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE LAW OF THEFT – HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter 2 property as a right or as an object of rights was discussed. Particular 
periods in the jurisprudence of property law were examined. It was revealed that the 
rights in property are called real rights. These rights bestow on the dominus wide 
powers in relation to or over property. In general, the objects of rights are corporeal and 
incorporeal things. Following the above-mentioned, it was then argued in chapter 2 that 
recent developments in ICTs necessitate that information should be regarded as an 
object of real rights. This is the case because information has nowadays become 
valuable to modern society, namely an information society. Governments, 
organisations and computer users collect, gather and process information on a daily 
basis. Furthermore, information is essential in concluding transactions and preventing 
e-crime.  
This chapter builds from the discussion in chapter 2. Specifically, it examines whether 
or not the law of theft has reached a stage of development where other forms of 
intangibles or incorporeal things, for example information, could be regarded as 
capable of being stolen. It may be stated from the outset that a similar question was 
discussed by the South African Law Commission1 in the late 1990s.2 In seeking to 
answer this question, the SALC relied on two propositions. Firstly, it recognised the 
benefits and detriments that modern technologies generate for the information society. 
More specifically, the SALC commented that current technologies encourage and can 
be used as instruments or tools to commit e-crimes.3 Secondly, it stated that e-crimes 
are usually carried out through the accessing of information or computer systems or 
networks.4 Thereafter, it concluded that an endeavour to develop the principles of theft 
                                               
1  Hereinafter referred to as the SALC. 
2   See The SALC, Discussion Paper 99, Project 108 of 2 July 2001 (hereinafter referred to 
as SALC Project 108. To be accessed at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp99_prj108_comp_2001jul.pdf. 
3   SALC Project 108. 
4   SALC Project 108. 
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in order to deal with the developments in ICTs would be pointless.5 To the SALC, it was 
sufficient to simply criminalise the unauthorised accessing of, interception of or 
interference with particular information. The aforesaid criminalisation can be deduced 
from Chapter XIII of the ECT Act. 
Despite the arguments or conclusions by the SALC, it is submitted that the principles of 
theft are not founded on stationary or inflexible systems of rules. In particular, the 
principles on which the law of theft is built change and are able to respond to emerging 
societal developments. This move or adaptability was witnessed in the past when 
external factors, for example, agriculture and industrialisation, necessitated the 
transformation of the principles with the aim of addressing new challenges.6 The 
Roman-Dutch, English and South African law approaches to theft reveal these 
modifications. More specifically, it is acknowledged that what amounted to theft or the 
objects of theft in a certain period of time is bound to change in another. This change is 
sometimes attributed to the fact that the principles of theft are part of an evolving legal 
system.  
3.2 ROMAN LAW  
3.2.1 Old Roman Law 
The idea of theft or furtum was captured in Table VIII of the Twelve Tables. This Table 
provided: 
A thief taken in the act, if a freeman, shall be scourged and made 
over by addictio to the person robbed; if a slave, shall be scourged 
and thrown from the Tarpeian rock; but those under the age of 
puberty shall, at the discretion of the magistrate, be scourged and 
condemned to repair the damage.7 
                                               
5   SALC Project 108. 
6   Hall J Theft, law and society 2nd ed (Bobbs-Merrill Indianapolis 1952) 14-33. See also 
Fletcher GP Rethinking criminal law (Little Brown Boston 1978) 59-60 and Fletcher GP 
“The metamorphosis of larceny” 1976 (89) Harvard Law Review 469-530 469-471. 
7  See Ortolan J The history of Roman law from the text of Ortolan's histoire de la 
legislation Romaine et généralisation du droit (Butterworths London 1871)116. The 
Tarpeian rock was an execution site or place for criminals in the early Roman Republic. 
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However, it does not appear from Table VIII that the meaning and nature of furtum was 
specifically provided for in the Twelve Tables. It is only evident that all Table VIII of the 
Twelve Tables did was to demonstrate that particular forms of theft were manifest 
(furtum manifestum) whereas others were non-manifest (furtum nec manifestum).8 
Moyle concedes that this classification of theft in early Roman law originated from 
Greece.9 In Greece, the term ‘δεδέσθαι άν τιϛ άλώ ποιώ’ denoted theft that was 
detected in the place where the theft was committed.10 Sometimes, the term ‘έπ 
αύτοϕώρώ’ (or ep’autophoro) was used in order to demonstrate cases of manifest 
theft.11 This word literally meant ‘in self-detection’ or ‘during the undeniable act’.12 It 
presupposed a situation where a thief was ‘caught in highly incriminating 
circumstances’.13 In other words, the thief must have been caught in possession of the 
physical thing or corpus delicti.14 
Furtum manifestum was dealt with in table VIII.15 of the Twelve Tables. It amounted to 
theft where the stolen property was discovered in the possession of a thief.15 As 
regards non-manifest theft the position was not quite clear. More specifically, the 
Twelve Tables did not particularly define furtum nec manifestum. Despite this, a holistic 
reading of the Table VIII of the Twelve Tables suggests that non-manifest theft could 
have included the theft of a physical thing where the requirements of manifest theft 
were not present. 
In summary, old Roman law did not specifically describe the term theft. All this law did 
was to recognise that certain forms of theft were manifest, whereas others were non-
manifest. Thus, a theft could be committed in situations where a thief was found in 
                                                                                                                                         
See Smith M “Capital punishment and burial in the Roman empire” in Ellens J H (ed) 
Bethsaida in archaeology, history and ancient culture: a festschrift in honour of J.T 
Greene (Cambridge Scholars Publishing Newcastle 2014) 395 436 402. 
8  Watson A The spirit of Roman law (The University of Georgia Press Athens 1995) 30. 
9  Moyle JB The Institutes of Justinian 5th ed (Clarendon Press Oxford 1913) 159. See 
also Cohen D Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung Heft 74: Theft in Athenian 
Law (C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung München 1983) 52-54. 
10  Cohen D Theft in Athenian law (C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung Müchen 1983) 
58-593. 
11  Bryant BH and Krause MS John (College Press Publishing Missouri 1998) 196. 
12  Bryant and Krause John 196. 
13  Harris EM The rule of law in action in democratic Athens (Oxford University Press 
Oxford 2013) 167. 
14  Harris The rule of law 167. 
15  See Table VIII. 15 of the Twelve Tables. 
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possession of the physical thing or in cases where the requirements of manifest theft 
were not present. 
3.2.2 Pre-Classical Roman Law 
In pre-classical Roman law, furtum was theoretically understood to have originated 
from the Latin expression furvus.16 In English the phrase furvus denotes dusky, 
swarthy, dark or darkness.17 From this, a suggestion was made that furtum could be 
understood by examining the method or methods that were used to perpetrate theft. A 
further scrutiny of the concept of furtum illustrates that this notion shared particular 
resemblance with the Greek concept of ‘φέρω’. The term ‘φέρω’ literally meant to move 
or propel by bearing; move or, to be conveyed or borne, with the suggestion of force or 
speed.18 
Given the above-mentioned, furtum was referred to as the crime of ‘swindling’ or 
stellionatus.19 It involved the surreptitious carrying away or auferre of a thing with 
fraudulent intention.20 The required auferre had to be physical or tangible. Particularly, 
it had to translate to the tangible removal of a thing.21 However, gain was not 
necessarily a prerequisite for the carrying away of property. Because rights in property 
over slaves existed during this period, it was possible for the slaves to be the object of 
theft. Watson argues that ‘to take away another’s female slave to gratify one’s lust’ was 
in pre-classical Roman law regarded as theft.22  
A question existed regarding whether or not the required auferre had to be in respect of 
a part or whole of the thing. Specifically, did a person commit theft of the heap of grain 
in situations where he or she only carried out the auferre in relation to ‘a small quantity 
                                               
16   Colquhoun PMC A summary of the Roman civil law, illustrated by commentaries on and 
parallels for the Mosaic, Canon, Mohammedan, English and Foreign Law (William 
Benning London 1860) 206. 
17   Valpy FEJ An etymological dictionary of the Latin language (Baldwin London 1828) 169. 
18   Luschnig CAE An introduction to ancient Greek: a literary approach 2nd ed (Hackett 
Publishing Indianapolis 2007) 22. 
19  Von Bar L A history of continental criminal law (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers New 
York 1968) 40. 
20  Du Plessis P Borkowski’s textbook on Roman law 5th ed (Oxford University Press 
Oxford 2015) 338. 
21  Du Plessis Roman law 338. 
22  Watson Roman law 101. 
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from the heap of grain’?23 Although this question was acknowledged in pre-classical 
Roman law, it was however left open for determination by the jurists in the later Roman 
law periods.24 
In summary, an attempt was made in pre-classical Roman law to define theft. It was 
submitted that theft has to do with the unlawful and fraudulent carrying away of a 
corporeal thing. It was not necessary that the auferre should be made with the aim of 
making a profit out of the thing. Thus, theft could arise in situations where a person 
carried away property of another to the point where the lawful owner could not find it. 
However, pre-classical Roman law omitted to examine whether or not the auferre 
should be in respect of the whole or part of the property. 
3.2.3 Classical Roman Law 
Classical Roman law regarded furtum as a private wrong or delict.25 Accordingly, theft 
was one of the four (4) pillars of delicts that formed the basis of the Roman law of 
obligations.26 The other categories of wrongs were iniuria, for example convicium, 
adtemptata puditia and ne quid infamandi causa fiat; damage to property (excluding 
violence), and rapina or violent damage to property.27 Collectively, the delicts were 
referred to as the crimen.28  
Classical Roman law jurists developed the pre-classical Roman law idea of theft or 
furtum. They argued that furtum was the contrectatio rei fraudulosa lucri faciendi gratia 
vel ipsius rei vel usus eius possessionisve quod lege naturali prohibitum est 
admittere.29 In English this may be translated to mean the ‘dishonest handling of a 
thing (or property) in order to make a gain either out of the thing (or property) itself or 
                                               
23  See Watson A Roman law and comparative law (The University of Georgia Press 
Athens 1991) 69. 
24  Watson Roman law and comparative law 69. 
25  Institutes of Gaius III.182. 
26   Watson A The evolution of western private law (Johns Hopkins University Press 
Baltimore 2001) 124. 
27   Watson The evolution of western private law 124. 
28   Smith W and Anthon C (eds) A dictionary of Greek and Roman antiquities (American 
Book New York 1843) 463. 
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else out of the use or possession thereof. From such conduct natural law commands 
us to abstain’.30 
Having examined the definition of furtum above, certain elements of this wrong could 
be deduced. These are contrectatio, rei fraudulosa or fraud, lucri faciendi gratia and 
ipsius rei vel usus eius possessionisve. The aforementioned elements are discussed in 
the sections below. 
(a) Contrectatio 
Contrectatio was sometimes referred to as adtrectatio.31 It meant a ‘touching, handling, 
fondling, pawing or interfering with’ the object of property.32 Some academics challenge 
the suggestion that contrectatio connotes the touching or handling of property.33 They 
submit that contrectatio encompassed a definite meddling with the property.34 Meddling 
in the former sense translates to any dishonest taking and carrying away of property.35 
However, other Roman law jurists denounce the introduction of meddling to the study 
of contrectatio. Watson particularly argues that the view regarding the meddling with 
the property is not founded on and does not represent the traditional Roman law 
description of furtum.36  
Classical Roman law jurists disagreed in relation to the scale and extent of the handling 
or touching. Paulus argued that liability should ensue as if the contrectatio was in 
respect of the whole property.37 In this instance, a touching or handling of a part or 
portion of property could be equated to the touching or handling of the entire 
property.38 However, Ulpian provided that contrectatio should only be limited to the part 
                                               
30   Jolowicz HF Digest XLVII.2 de furtis (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1940) 1-2. 
31   See Aulus Gellius, Noctes atticae 11.18.20.22.23. 
32   Zimmerman R The law of obligations: Roman foundations of the civilian tradition (Juta 
Cape Town 1990) 924-925.  
33   Buckland WW A textbook of Roman law: from Augustus to Justinian 3rd ed (Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 1963) 557. 
34   Buckland Roman law 557. 
35   Buckland Roman law 557. 
36   Watson Studies 269. 
37   D. 47. 2. 21.  
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of the property that was touched or handled.39 Accordingly, a partial contrectatio was 
necessary in order to establish whether or not a touching or handling of property 
existed in each case.40 
(b) Rei Fraudulosa 
Scott provides an explanation of the classical Roman law approach to fraud.41 He does 
this by referring to Paulus’ Book I.VIII.I.42 According to Scott, fraud took place ‘when 
one (thing) was done, and another (thing) was presented’.43 It was required that there 
should be an unacceptable or dishonest act or conduct which accompanied the 
touching or handling. This inappropriate and fraudulent conduct must have amounted 
to an ‘unlawful or fraudulent’ touching or handling of the property.44 Consequently, the 
contrectatio must have been invito domino. Wicked intention or dolus malus was 
required to be alleged and proved.45 This dolus malus related to an intention to commit 
furtum.46 In other words, contrectatio should have been committed with the necessary 
fraudulent intention.47 Consent to the touching or handling of the property thus 
excluded the fraudulent intention.48  
To classical Romans, furtum did not arise in cases where a person broke into a house 
with the intention to injure the owner of a house, and thereafter another person entered 
the house, while still broken into, with the intention to touch or handle property 
belonging to the owner.49 Furthermore, the fact that a person changed his (or her) mind 
                                               
39   D. 47. 2. 21, Honoré T Justinian’s Digest: character and compilation (Oxford University 
Press Oxford 2010) 138 and Duff PW “Furtum and Larceny” 1954 (12) The Cambridge 
Law Journal 86-88 87. 
40   D. 47. 2. 21, Honoré Justinian’s Digest 138 and Duff 1954 The Cambridge Law Journal 
87. 
41   See Scott SP The civil law including the Twelve Tables, the Institutes of Gaius, the 
Rules of Ulpian, the Opinions of Paulus, the Enactments of Justinian, and the 
Constitutions of Leo Vol 1 (AMS Press New York 1973). 
42   Scott Civil law 262. 
43   Scott Civil law 262. 
44   Burdick WL The principles of Roman law and their relation to modern law (The Lawbook 
Exchange New Jersey 2004) 487. 
45   Jolowicz De furtis lv and Burdick Principles 487. 
46   Burdick Principles 487. 
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and decided to restore the property to the owner did not release or exonerate him (or 
her) from liability.50 Lastly, furtum was deemed to arise in circumstances where a 
person recognised that what he or she committed was theft.51 It was essential that 
‘some object on which the guilty mind can operate’52 must be or have been present. 
This intention must have led such a person to touch or handle the property in cases 
where he or she knew that consent would not be granted or given.53 In this instance, an 
intention to touch or handle the property in order to deprive the other of ownership did 
not suffice.54  
(c) Lucri Faciendi Gratia 
Lucri faciendi gratia primarily appeared in the work that was prepared by Gellius called 
the Noctes Atticae.55 It was from the Noctes Atticae, it is argued, that a passage which 
resembled lucri faciendi gratia was borrowed. The passage read as follows: Qui 
alienum iacens lucri faciendi causa sustulit, furti obstringitur....56 In English this meant 
that: a person who ‘silently carries off another’s property for the sake of gain is guilty of 
theft’.57 Subsequent to this development, the Digest followed more or less the particular 
wording of the passage which was contained in the Noctes Atticae. More specifically, 
the Digest affirmed that: Qui alienum quid iacens lucri faciendi causa sustulit furti 
obstringitur, sive scit cuius sit sive ignoravit; nihil enim ad furtum minuendum facit quod 
cuius sit ignoret.58 This meant that a touching or handling of property which belongs to 
another person, that is, the owner, with intent to make a gain amounts to furtum.59 The 
aforementioned theft occurs even in situations where a person found the property lying 
about.60  
                                               
50   D XLVII.2.66. 
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52   Jolowicz De Furtis lvii. 
53   Burdick Principles 487-488. 
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In classical Rome, lucri faciendi gratia referred to any benefit, increase or satisfaction.61 
This benefit, increase or satisfaction was not restricted or translated to mean a financial 
or pecuniary profit.62 In other words, a benefit, increase or satisfaction, for purposes of 
furtum, was not circumscribed or measured by the presence or not of a financial or 
monetary loss or reward.63 Important for the law of theft is that this interpretation of lucri 
faciendi gratia made it possible to differentiate between furtum and cases involving 
damnum iniuria datum.64  
(d) Ipsius Rei Vel Usus Eius Possessionisve 
The ipsius element revealed three (3) separate categories of furtum. These groupings 
were furtum rei, furtum usus and furtum possessionis.65 To begin with, furtum rei 
denoted the actual stealing of property (furtum rei ipsius). In this instance, a physical 
touching and handling of property was necessary. Secondly, furtum usus basically 
meant the ‘theft of use’.66 It occurred in cases where the property was used unlawfully 
or improperly, or the property was obtained without the consent of the owner, or the 
property was obtained from an owner for an unambiguous purpose and the use of it 
was beyond the limits that were imposed by an owner.67 Consequently, it follows from 
the above that et si quis utendam rem acceperit eamque in alium usum transtulerit, furti 
obligatur.68 This meant that a person who received property to be used from the other 
and converted it to another use was guilty of furtum usus.69  
Thirdly, furtum possessionis signified ‘theft of possession’.70 It was in line with the 
principle that furtum can be committed against a person who had an interest in the 
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property.71 These persons were bona fide or legitimate possessors of property.72 
Aggrieved persons could re-claim the property in terms of the Roman law actio furti.73 
Actio furti was instituted in cases where there had been a theft of possession from a 
lawful possessor.  
In summary, classical Roman law expanded the pre-classical Roman law idea of theft. 
This law categorised theft as a private wrong. It consisted of at least four elements. 
These included contrectatio, rei fraudulosa or fraud, lucri faciendi gratia and ipsius rei 
vel usus eius possessionisve. Firstly, contrectatio did not necessarily mean the carrying 
away of the physical property. It only denoted the touching, handling, fondling or 
interfering with the property. However, there was disagreement in relation to the degree 
of the required contrectatio. Some jurists were of the view that a touching or handling of 
the part of the property was enough,74 whereas others argued that contrectatio should 
be in respect of the whole property.75 Secondly, rei fraudulosa related to the fact that 
the contrectatio must be or had been fraudulent. Thus, dolus malus was indicative of 
the rei fraudulosa. Thirdly, lucri faciendi gratia had to do with the fact that the fraudulent 
touching or handling of property should be made for the sake of gain. This profit did not 
necessarily mean a pecuniary gain. Fourthly, ipsius rei vel usus eius possessionisve 
evidenced about three separate categories. These were the furtum rei or the actual 
theft of property, furtum usus or the theft of use and furtum possessionis or the theft of 
possession. 
3.2.4 Post-Classical Roman Law  
The Institutes of Justinian are central to the discussion of theft in post-classical Rome. 
In terms of the Institutes, furtum was the contrectatio rei fraudulosa vel ipsius rei vel 
etiam usus eius possessionisve: quod lege naturali prohibitum est admittere.76 In this 
respect, theft meant a fraudulent and deceitful appropriation of property in its entirety, 
for purposes of either making use of property or of attaining possession over 
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property.77 It is submitted that the fact that the contrectatio must be or have been in 
respect of the entire property is fundamental. In particular, the inclusion of the notion ‘in 
its entirety’ remedied the uncertainty or confusion that existed in classical Roman law 
regarding whether or not the contrectatio should be in respect of the part or whole of 
the property.78  
Furthermore, the definition that was contained in the Institutes of Justinian required that 
a wrong must exist or have existed. In other words, the touching or handling must have 
been against the law (that is, fraudulent) and intentional.79 Mackenzie particularly 
favours this post-classical description of furtum.80 Mackenzie describes furtum as the 
‘felonious taking or carrying away of property of another’ in order to make a profit.81 
Mackenzie also argues that the taking or carrying away must be made or have been 
made with the intention to steal property.82 Therefore, furtum was deemed to have 
been committed in circumstances where a person handled or removed property without 
the lawful and required consent of the lawful possessor of the property.83 In addition, a 
person or borrower committed theft if he (or she) had put another’s property to the use 
other than that for which it was lent.84  
Another departure from the classical Roman law formulation of furtum could be found 
in two separate situations. The first related to the omission of lucri faciendi gratia. The 
second had to do with the revision of the element of ipsius rei vel etiam usus eius 
possessionisve. In relation to lucri faciendi gratia, there are some scholars who 
supported its exclusion.85 They submitted that there was no basis in law for including 
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Institutes of Justinian, with explanatory notes, for the use of students (Juta Cape Town 
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lucri faciendi gratia in the definition of furtum.86 However, there are those academics 
who condemned such exclusion.87 They argued that the definition contained in the 
Institutes of Justinian relied on a non-classical formulation of the meaning of furtum.88 
With regard to ipsius rei vel etiam usus eius possessionisve, it is argued that this 
revision is prima facie outlandish.89 In particular, it is strange and bizarre insofar as it 
suggested or demonstrated that a ‘touching or handling of the use or possession’ of 
property was impossible.90  
In summary, the meaning of theft as it was known and accepted in classical Roman law 
was altered in post-classical Roman law. Firstly, it was stated that only a fraudulent 
touching or handling of the entire property was required. Secondly, the element of lucri 
faciendi gratia was omitted from the definition of theft. The foundation for this was that 
there was no basis in including the element of gain or profit as the pre-condition for 
theft. Thirdly, post-classical Roman law revised the element of ipsius rei vel etiam usus 
eius possessionisve. The effect of this revision was to render a theft of use and 
possession impossible in post classical Roman law. 
3.3 GERMANIC LAW 
In Germanic law, the principles of theft or diefstal were contained in specific legal 
records. These records were called the leges barbarorum. Leges barbarorum is a Latin 
term which is translated to mean the laws of the barbarians91 or barbaric laws.92 The 
laws of the barbarians were generally the unwritten customary laws of the various 
Germanic tribes.93 These laws were a combination of Roman and old German law.94 
Barbaric laws were embodied in different codes. The codes were referred to as the Lex 
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87   Watson Studies 269. 
88   Watson Studies 269. 
89   Watson Studies 272. 
90   Watson Studies 272. 
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Publishers New Brunswick 1996) 139. 
92  Shaffern RW Law and justice form antiquity to enlightenment (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers Lanham 2009) 103. 
93  Green DH Language and history in the early Germanic world (Cambridge University 
Press New York 1998) 31. 
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Germanic law, see Drew KF The laws of the Salian Franks (University of Pennsylvania 
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Salica or laws of the Salian Franks95 and the Lex Ripuaria or law of the Ripuarian 
Franks.96 
The laws which were included in these codes did not specifically regard theft as a 
public wrong or wrong against society or social order.97 Simply, theft was deemed to be 
one of the private wrongs.98 The other private wrongs included ‘homicide, personal 
injuries short of death, rape, adultery and seduction’.99 Theft was a private wrong 
because it was considered to have been directed against a person, that is, the owner of 
private property.100 Given the above-mentioned, it was equated with the hlafordsearu or 
deceitfulness against the king.101  
Theft took place in situations where a person held in his possession a thing or property 
which belonged to someone else or which a person knew was not his without lawful or 
justifiable reasons.102 Holmes argues that this possession of property was an essential 
ingredient for theft.103 The above-mentioned was the position because ‘only he who 
was in possession could say that he had lost the property against his will’.104 
Zimmermann is of the view that before a person could have gained possession of 
property wrongfully he must have actually removed the property from the custody of 
another person.105  
In summary, Germanic law regarded theft as a private wrong. Theft took place in cases 
where a person had physical possession of property which belonged to someone else. 
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This possession must have arisen in situations where a person had physically removed 
the property from the custody of the lawful owner.106 
3.4 MEDIEVAL LAW 
The Romanists had a slightly different approach to theft. On the one hand, they used 
the definition of theft that was contained in the Digest. The latter is to the effect that 
furtum est contrectatio re fraudulosa lucrifaciendi gratia vel ipsius rei vel etium usus 
eius possessionisve.107 On the other hand, they modified this description of furtum by 
saying that theft occurred in cases where a person to whom the property belonged was 
unlawfully deprived of the full possession of such property.108 Raymund of Peǹafort 
(1175-1275 AD) provided justification for this view. In one of his seminal works titled 
Summa de poenitentia et matrimonio cum glossis loannis de Friburge, Raymund 
submitted that furtum est contrectatio re aliena, mobilis, corporalis, fraudulosa, invito 
domino, lucrifaciendi gratia, vel ipsius rei, vel etiam usus eius, possesseonisve.109 In 
English, this means that theft is: 
The fraudulent seizure of a thing that belongs to another, movable 
and corporeal, against the will of the dominus, for the sake of making 
profit, either of the thing itself, or of its use or its possession.110 
It is deduced from the aforementioned paragraph that only the theft of movables or 
corporeals was regarded as legally possible.111 This theft had to be effected for 
purposes of making gain out of the property or the use or possession of the property.112 
The aforementioned view seemed to be the most welcomed by the glossators and the 
post-glossators. Specifically, Angelus Carletus de Clavasio (1411-1495 AD) affirmed 
                                               
106  Zimmermann The law of obligations 946. 
107  See D 47.2.1.3. 
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the understanding that there could never be a theft of immovables and incorporeals for 
legal purposes.113 
In summary, the jurists of the medieval period accepted the classical Roman law 
approach to theft. However, they argued that theft presupposed a situation wherein the 
owner of property was fraudulently disposed of the full rights to his property. They 
submitted that only movables and corporeals were or could be the objects of theft in 
law. Furthermore, theft was not only limited to property. It was also extended to the use 
and possession of the thing. 
3.5 CANON LAW 
Canonists distinguished between two forms of theft. These were called the sacrilegious 
theft and theft in a general sense. The first-mentioned theft related to the appropriation 
of ecclesiastical property or property of the church.114 This property referred to those 
things that were reserved for the ‘furtherance of the Christian religion’.115 A theft of 
these things was considered to be an atrocious wrong. The aforementioned was 
attributed to the fact that church property belonged to God as the father of the church. 
Therefore, a theft of church property amounted to stealing from God.116 To this end, 
Proverbs 28: 24 (those who steal from their father and mother, and say, ‘it’s not a 
crime’, are friends of vandals) was invoked in order to condemn this form of theft. The 
second-mentioned theft was in regard to the stealing of any other property not 
belonging to the church.117 
A more acceptable definition of theft, either of church or private property, by the 
canonists appeared in Gratian’s Decretum.118 Gratian stated that theft had similar 
connotations as the term raptus or rape.119 Therefore, theft was, in the same way as 
raptus was corruption through illicit intercourse, a corruption through the appropriation 
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or seizure of property.120 The association between theft and rape was also followed by 
other jurists of canon law, for example Bernardus Papiensis (1150-1213 AD). Papiensis 
created a separation between theft of persons and things by stating that raptor dicitur 
duobus modis; dicitur enim raptor rerum et raptor hominum, et praecipue foeminarum; 
dicitur autem proprie rapina rerum, et raptus mulierum.121 This means that a person 
could be a thief in two separate ways. He could be a thief of property or a thief of other 
persons, for example women.122 This theft had to be effected for purposes of making 
gain out of the property or the use or possession of the property.123 
In summary, canonists differentiated between theft of church property and theft in 
general. They defined theft as a corrupt act which led to the unlawful appropriation of 
property. Accordingly, theft of property and theft of the use and possession of the 
property were recognised. This idea of theft was then accepted and developed by the 
moral philosophers during the sixteenth century. 
3.6 MORAL PHILOSOPHERS 
These philosophers adopted the moralistic viewpoint on theft. This view was based on 
the understanding that the notion of private property or private ownership was generally 
the result of sin.124 For example, Singer quotes one of the moral philosophers, Rufinus 
(1160 AD), as saying that immediately after the fall of Adam a state of lawlessness 
ensued in society.125 Particularly, humans conducted themselves like ‘brute beasts’.126 
This, according to Tierney, resulted in the acceptance of private property and private 
rights.127   
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To the moral philosophers, God vested all the rights in property to all the people for 
their common nourishment. Given this, any appropriation of property outside this 
common enjoyment was against the law of nature as dictated by God.128 This view 
seemed to have been followed by Aquinas. Aquinas relied on the precept peccatum 
non dimititur, nisi restituatur ablatum.129 Accordingly, he stated that theft was a moral 
sin.130 Being so, it was more perverse than other crimes, for example robbery. It was 
deemed to arise in situations where there was a fraudulent taking away of property 
which belonged to someone else.131 The Corpus Iuris Canonici used the phrase furti 
enim nomine bene intelligitur omnis illicita usurpatio rei alienae in order to demonstrate 
this fraud.132 This phrase means that the taking away or appropriation of property for 
gain had to be against the wishes of the lawful owner of property.133 However, the 
appropriation did not have to be in respect of the whole thing. It was satisfactory if the 
thief was simply in possession or had dispossessed the owner of the rights of 
ownership in relation to the property.134 
In summary, the moral philosophers accepted the moralistic view to the idea of theft 
that was developed by the canonist. They regarded theft as a moral sin. It arose in 
situations where property was fraudulently taken away from the owner. This taking 
away did not necessarily have to be in respect of the whole thing. It was enough if the 
taking away had subsequently resulted in the owner being dispossessed of the rights of 
ownership which he had to the property. This moralistic idea of theft was also adopted 
and followed in the Dutch law of theft. 
3.7 DUTCH DEVELOPMENTS 
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In Dutch law, theft was regarded as a wrong which impinged upon or was against 
natural and divine law.135 Against this background, it was placed in the same category 
as homicide and was referred to as a ‘moral wrong’.136 Theft was a wrong because it 
was carried out in secret and with a fraudulent intent. In committing theft, a thief 
physically deprived the other person of his property. This deprivation was against the 
will of the person, in the sense that a thief had fraudulently retained the property and 
taken it away from the lawful possessor.137 Following this deprivation, the thief derived 
some benefit or gain from the thing.138 This gain did not necessarily translate to a 
monetary advantage.139 Therefore, it was comparable to the lucri faciendi gratia that 
formed the basis of the classical Roman law approach to theft.140  
Furthermore, two points are significant in the discussion of theft in Dutch legal 
jurisprudence. The first point has to do with the fact that theft was treated as a 
continuous moral wrong.141 This meant that a thing remained stolen for as long as it 
was still in possession of the thief.142 Accordingly, the fact that a thief relocated to 
another state or country with the stolen thing did not exonerate him from legal liability. 
The second point related to the fact that the Dutch law of theft recognised the so-called 
furtum usus or theft of use.143 In this instance, the thief did not necessarily have to 
permanently deprive a person of the property. Instead, it was enough or adequate if the 
fraudulent retention and the subsequent taking away of property of another was made 
for a particular purpose, that is, the use of the property.144 
In summary, the Dutch law of theft followed the moralistic idea of theft that originated 
from the moral philosophers. Specifically, this law regarded theft as a wrong which 
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impinged upon natural and divine law.145 Despite the aforesaid, the formulation of the 
Dutch law of theft is similar to that which is traceable from classical Roman law. In 
particular, this law recognised the cases where a contrectatio was in respect of the 
whole property and those where it was only partial. The latter category of contrectatio 
was referred to as the theft of use.146 Therefore, it was conceded that theft could arise 
in instances where the property was simply touched and handled with a view to 
achieve a particular result. In this instance, a temporary deprivation of property as 
opposed to a permanent deprivation of property was also possible.147  
3.8 ENGLISH LAW 
3.8.1 Background  
The English law of theft has undergone a number of changes and modifications over 
the years. For example, early English law merely recognised violent and forceful 
appropriations148 and dispossessions of property.149 However, it was later felt that a 
more relaxed and less forceful description of theft was necessary. Consequently, the 
capacity of the English criminal law was developed to also encompass non-violent and 
non-forceful appropriations or dispossessions of property.150 Following this, a 
distinction was made between robbery and theft. On the one hand, robbery was 
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defined as an aggravated theft as it involved violence.151 It was treated as an open and 
less dishonourable offence than theft.152 On the other hand, theft encompassed a 
surreptitious (or stealthy)153 and dishonourable appropriation of another person’s 
personal property.154 Dishonesty was deemed to exist if the possession of property was 
obtained by trick, intimidation or it was known that an owner did not consent or could 
not have consented to the appropriation.155 Also included in the definition of theft was a 
‘fraudulent meddling’ with another’s private property.156  
There are two periods that influenced the manner in which the notion of property within 
the context of the law of theft was understood in early England. On the one hand, there 
is a period before 1968. On the other hand, there is one after 1968. The Larceny Act 
represents the era before 1968 and the Theft Act characterises the period after 1968. 
Before 1968, property included real and personal property, money (for example coins), 
debts, legacies, deeds and instruments relating to the title or right to property.157 
Accordingly, incorporeal or intangible property was not expressly mentioned before 
1968. However, it is conceded that section 46(1) of the Larceny Act was capable of 
being interpreted broadly.158 Such interpretation led or could lead to that section being 
read to mean that property also encompassed incorporeal things.159 After 1968, 
property also referred to intangibles.160 These intangibles were a debt, a right under a 
trust, an obligation which was created by the law and property capable of enforcement, 
for example, credit or benefit.161  
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In addition, two wrongs constitute theft in England. These are larceny162 and receiving 
stolen property.163 In this chapter the principles of larceny are discussed. These 
principles are distinguished from those that are related to the crime of receiving stolen 
properties.164  This is the case because larceny has everything to do with the actual 
stealing of property.165 Receiving stolen property relates to the incidents that follow the 
fact of stealing. In this instance, a person must knowingly receive possession and 
control of property.166 This receiving and control should subsequently be intended to 
permanently deprive the other of such property.167  
3.8.2 Larceny  
There is no single and concise description of larceny in English law.  There are some 
who define larceny as the contrectatio rei alienae fraudulenta, cum animo furandi, invito 
illo domino, cujus rei illa fuerit.168 In this instance, it is submitted that a physical and 
actual removal of property is essential.169 This removal is or should be made with the 
intention to permanently deprive the other person of his or her property.170 Others 
describe larceny in the following manner: 
The dealing, from any motive whatever (or whatsoever), unlawfully 
and without claim of right with anything capable of being stolen, in 
any of the ways in which theft can be committed, with the intention of 
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permanently converting that thing to the use of any person other than 
the general or special owner thereof.171 
Lastly, there are those who argue that larceny is a ‘felonious intent’ which excludes any 
claim of right. This view initially appeared in an early English case of R v Holloway.172 It 
continues from the basis that in order for larceny to arise there must be or have been a 
taking and carrying away of property; the taking or carrying away of property must be 
or have been trespassory in nature, that is, it must amount to a meddling; the meddling 
must be against the will of the other person (owner), and the meddling must be or have 
been made with a felonious intent.173 
This last-mentioned viewpoint on larceny seems to be the most welcomed in England. 
Given this, its meaning within the context of the English law of theft is investigated in 
the sections below. 
(a)  Trespassory Taking and Carrying Away of Property 
The trespassory taking of property is also referred to as the ‘caption’ and the 
trespassory carrying away of property is known as the ‘asportation’.174 Caption is the 
actual or physical capturing of property. It entails a substantial taking or severance of 
property from the possession of an owner or a lawful possessor. Furthermore, it 
represents the existence of control over property. Asportation implies the physical 
carrying away of property.175 The carrying away of property does not need to be 
distant.176 In other words, asportation is presumed to have ensued in cases where: 
 (Every part) of it (the property) is moved from that specific portion of 
space which it occupied before it was moved.....and when it is severed 
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from any person or thing to which it was attached in such a manner that 
the taker has, for however short a time, complete control of it.177 
Consequently, it is submitted that even a carrying away of property to a distance of 
‘hair’s breadth’ is satisfactory.178 By way of illustration, asportation is required to follow 
the taking of property. For example, larceny does not arise and is not deemed to arise 
in circumstances where a thief is found guilty of caption but not asportation.179 By 
reason of the aforementioned, both the caption and asportation must be alleged and 
proved independently.180 
The trespassory nature of the caption and asportation is deduced from the (wrongful or 
unlawful) manner in which a property is acquired.181 The fact that the caption and 
asportation have the effect of depriving a possessor of possession demonstrates the 
existence or not of the trespassory taking and carrying away.182 This view is particularly 
followed by Pollock and Maitland.183 They state that larceny involves ‘a violation of 
possession; it is an offence against a possessor and therefore can never be committed 
by a possessor’.184 Given the aforementioned, an objective or purposeful inquisition is 
undertaken. This investigation assists in determining whether or not there is a caption 
and asportation; the caption and asportation deprives the owner of ownership of the 
property; and the caption and asportation is contrary to the wishes of an owner.185  
 (b)  Absence of Consent or Invito Domino 
Originally, uncertainty existed regarding the relevance of invito domino to the English 
law of larceny. However, it appears that the study of invito domino in Roman law might 
have motivated its adoption in England. It can be deduced from the works of Bracton 
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that invito domino is essential to the English law of larceny.186 In particular, Bracton 
mentions and discusses the concept of invito illo domino to his definition of larceny.187 
Therefore, it is argued that Bracton’s insistence on invito domino influenced the 
addition of this notion as one of the elements of larceny.  
However, the position relating to invito domino seems to have changed after 1968. 
More specifically, section 1 of the Theft Act excludes the fact that the caption and 
asportation must be without the consent of the owner. This omission is particularly 
welcomed by some English courts.188 In particular, the exclusion of invito domino in 
section 1 of the Theft Act is said to be deliberate rather than inadvertent.189 
Accordingly, it is commented that the presence or absence of consent is simply 
relevant to the question regarding whether or not there was a dishonest appropriation 
of property.190 The requisite dishonesty cannot be inferred or implied from the 
existence of consent to the caption and asportation.191 
Invito domino relates to the mental state of mind or mens rea of a thief at the time that 
larceny is committed.192 It requires that both the caption and asportation must be such 
that the owner or lawful possessor could not have consented or could not be expected 
to have consented to the taking or carrying away.193 
(c)  Animus Furandi 
English law jurists differ in relation to the significance or not of animus furandi to the 
study of larceny. Plucknett argues that the early English law of larceny did not rely on 
intention.194 As a result of this, the presence or absence of animus was insignificant.195 
Fletcher and Blackstone state that animus furandi is fundamental to the English law of 
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larceny.196 They disagree however as to the nature and content of the required animus 
furandi. Blackstone submits that animus furandi serves or can serve as the 
replacement of the Roman law principle of lucri causa faciendi (for the sake of profit or 
gain).197 In particular, the acquiring of property ‘for the sake of gain’ is, according to 
Blackstone, tantamount to the obtaining of property feloniously.198 However, Fletcher 
opposes the idea that animus furandi could be equated with lucri causa faciendi.199 He 
particularly advocates the idea that the intention to appropriate property is sufficient in 
order to attract liability for larceny.200 This appropriation must be accompanied by an 
intention to steal201 or, as sometimes declared elsewhere, ‘an intent to deprive the 
owner permanently of his or her property’.202 Furthermore, it ought to be present at the 
time that the property is taken or carried away.203 Consequently, a person (thief) who 
takes or carries away the property must ‘know when he (or she) takes (and carries 
away) it (property) that it is the property of another person, and he (or she) must take 
(or carry away) deliberately, not by mistake, and with an intention to deprive the person 
from whom it taken of the property in it’.204 
It is established from the discussion above that the English law of larceny emphasises 
a permanent deprivation as opposed to a temporary deprivation of property.205 
Therefore, permanent deprivation does not apply to things that cannot be physically 
captured and asported, for example, information.206 Similarly, permanent deprivation is 
not extended to property which cannot be or is incapable of being owned, for example, 
the sky or the water in the seas.  
                                               
196   Fletcher Rethinking 6 and Blackstone W Commentaries on the laws of England 18th ed 
(Sweet Maxwell London 1836) 237-232. 
197   Blackstone Commentaries 237-232. See also, Rapalje S “Larceny distinguished from 
other offences” 1892 (14) The Criminal Law Magazine and Reporter 706 and Turner 
1942 The University of Toronto Law Journal 297-298. 
198   Blackstone Commentaries 237-232. 
199   Fletcher Rethinking 7. 
200   Fletcher Rethinking 7. 
201   S 1(1) of the Larceny Act and s (1) of the Theft Act. 
202   S 1(1) of the Larceny Act read with s 1(1) of the Theft Act. 
203   Griew Theft 11. 
204   Turner JWC and Armitage A Cases on criminal law 3rd ed (Cambridge University Press 
London 1964) 452. 
205   Brickey 1980 Vanderbilt Law Review 1109. 
206   Oxford v Moss (1979) 68 Cr. App. R. 183 184-186. 
  
100 
 
In summary, a number of occurrences have had an impact or effect on the 
development of the English principles of theft. Violent and forceful appropriations and 
dispossessions of property are examples of such phenomena. However, it is argued 
that flexible modes of appropriating property of others were introduced in order to 
respond to the developments that were unique to an English society.207 These methods 
came about because of the need to respond to cases where violence or force was not 
present. This culminated in the establishment of the law of theft. Theft has to do with 
the dishonest meddling with the property of another.208 A proper understanding of 
property that is capable of being stolen creates a split in English literature. More 
specifically, the difference between the description of theft before and after 1968 is 
central to this chapter. In both these periods, theft could be carried out in respect of 
certain incorporeals, for example a debt, legacy, deed, right under a trust or an 
obligation. However, it is accepted that information that is contained in a document is 
not property for legal purposes.209 The basis for this viewpoint is that a physical or 
actual taking and carrying away of information is impossible.210 Lastly, English law 
differentiates between larceny and receiving stolen property. Larceny is the dishonest 
taking and carrying away of property.211 It really is not clear whether the taking and 
carrying away should be accompanied by the desire to derive some gain or benefit 
from the property. However, it is evident that an intention to meddle with the property 
could be viewed as an indication that the property was appropriated feloniously or with 
fraudulent intent. 
From the above, it appears that the English law of larceny deals with the fraudulent 
meddling with corporeal and incorporeal property. It specifically defines the kinds of 
incorporeals that could form the basis of theft. With a view to accommodate novel 
developments, the definition of property that is capable of being stolen as contained in 
the Larceny Act was modified. This then compelled a move towards the inclusion of 
things, for example a right or obligation in the definition of property. However, other 
incorporeal things, such as, information, are excluded from this definition. Therefore, 
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the position seems to suggest that information is intangible property and that a physical 
taking and carrying away is consequently not possible. 
3.9 SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
3.9.1 Background  
The law of theft in South Africa is founded on or originates from a mixed or hybrid legal 
system.212 The principles upon which this system is based are a combination of the 
Roman-Dutch and English legal principles. The Roman-Dutch and English legal 
systems were transplanted to the Cape of Good Hope during 1652 and 1795 
respectively.213 Following the latter-mentioned, an examination of the principles of theft 
in South Africa is generally partly Roman-Dutch and partly English.214 These principles 
have evolved over the years and were adapted in a number of ways to accommodate 
new forms of challenges. 
In this section the developments of the principles of theft in South Africa are 
investigated. In undertaking such a study, different nomenclatures that represent the 
developing of these principles are distinguished. These are, for the purpose of this 
research, referred to as the traditional and adapted formulations of the principles of 
theft.    
3.9.2 Traditional Description of Theft  
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The traditional view is that theft is the unauthorised contrectatio with the intention to 
steal property which is capable of being stolen.215 An intention to steal, that is, animus 
furandi, demonstrates whether or not the contrectatio is unlawful or wrongful.216 
Consequently, the animus must evidence an ‘evil intent’ or ‘kwaad voornemen’ on the 
part of a thief.217 In relation to property that is capable of being stolen, a distinction is 
made between property that is absolutely and those that are relatively incapable of 
being stolen.218 The examples of the former category are immovable properties, 
incorporeal properties (an idea or design) and properties that are common to all (air, 
water of the sea and public streams).219 The examples of property which are relatively 
incapable of being stolen are things that are not owned but can be owned (res 
nullius),220 one’s own property (res sua) and wild animals.221  
The traditional formulation of theft was followed in the case of R v Larforte.222 This case 
was heard by the then Cape Provincial Division of the High Court. The facts were 
briefly that the accused broke into another person’s (Dr. Abdurahman) garage and took 
the latter’s motor car. The accused drove the car around Cape Town. While still driving, 
the accused bumped the car into a lamp post and caused damage to it. Thereafter, the 
accused abandoned the car a couple of streets away from Dr. Abdurahman’s garage. 
In finding the accused guilty of theft, the court concluded that theft encompasses an 
intention to terminate the owner’s enjoyment of his or her right to ownership.223 In this 
respect, the court stated that an intention to suspend the owner’s enjoyment of his or 
her right to ownership is inadequate.224  
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In this chapter, it is argued that the traditional description of theft is problematic. Firstly, 
the fact that the requisite contrectatio must be in respect of corporeal and tangible 
property is illogical.225 In particular, it demonstrates a total disregard of the fact that 
other objects, for example, information, are naturally incapable of being physically 
touched or handled.226 Consequently, it fails to recognise that a contrectatio in respect 
of these objects can be achieved even in circumstances where the actual or physical 
touching or handling is absent.227 Secondly, the traditional description of theft fails to 
regulate or deal with cases where the appropriation is temporal. One such a case is R 
v Dier.228 The aforesaid case dealt with an appeal from a decision of the Magistrate’s 
Court. In this case, Dier wished to cross a particular river (Kowie River). In order to 
carry out his objective, Dier needed to board a boat. While still deciding on the next 
step to take, Dier saw that there were ferryboats that were tied to the edge of the river. 
He untied one of those boats and duly crossed Kowie River.229 One of the ferryboats 
was subsequently found damaged the following morning. The question was whether or 
not the taking of the ferryboat, although it was not permanent, could be prosecuted 
under the crime of theft.230 The court answered this question in the affirmative. In 
particular, Smith J held that: 
 I do not intend by anything ...... to lay down that - if a man takes away 
anything belonging to another and applies it to his own purposes, and 
then abandons it with a reckless disregard as to whether it is destroyed 
or not, and it is (so) destroyed – such an act is not criminal. On the 
contrary, I am of the opinion that a man so acting can clearly be found 
guilty of theft. 231 
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It is imperative to take note that the passage above omits the fact that theft should be 
committed with the necessary intention to derive a benefit or gain.232 In particular, 
Smith J argues that only a fraudulent taking is necessary in order for the law of theft to 
ensue in South Africa.233 The fraudulent taking is commonly equated with the notion of 
contrectatio fraudulosa.234 Therefore, only contrectatio fraudulosa leads to theft in 
South Africa.235 An enquiry regarding the presence of contrectatio fraudulosa requires 
that one establishes whether or not the requisite intention to deprive an owner of the 
property exists.236 If the latter exists, contrectatio fraudulosa is inferred from the 
manner in which the property is dealt with after the taking.237 Consequently, a person 
who fraudulently appropriates property and deprives the owner of property is generally 
liable for theft.238 
The case of R v Olivier and Others also exposed the fallacies that are associated with 
the traditional description.239 In this case, the accused (Olivier and others) took 
property (being a motor vehicle) belonging to another person. They used this property 
for their purposes and thereafter carelessly abandoned it. The court per Wessels JP 
stated that it would be an injustice to the innocent party, that is, the owner or lawful 
possessor: 
 (If) our law were otherwise for then it would be no offence for a person 
who is a stranger to me to take my motor car out of the garage and drive 
it to Cape Town, leave it at a garage there with as much petrol as it 
contained, and then write to me that he is off to America and that he only 
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took my car for the temporary purpose of getting to Table Bay in order to 
catch the boat.240 
Consequently, the court developed the elements related to ‘fraud’. It particularly argued 
that contrectatio fraudulosa depends, or at least should depend, on the existence of an 
intention to deprive.241 The requisite intention is deduced from the act itself, that is, the 
fraudulent appropriation and the subsequent reckless dealing with the property.242 This 
is the case because not only is the thing required to be taken without the consent of the 
owner, but also that ‘the taker should have intended to terminate the owner’s 
enjoyment of his (or her) rights’.243 Intention is generally inferred from various factors, 
especially those that are related to the reckless dealing with the property.244 
From the above, it is established that courts in South Africa have accommodated a 
move away from the traditional approach to theft. In particular, these courts have 
recognised the need to expand the principles that regulate this crime. This growth has 
enabled courts to examine some of the external effects that motivate the perpetration 
of theft.245 In so doing, courts have denounced the idea of being ‘hypnotised by the 
concrete mechanics by means of which the crime is committed’.246 However, they 
adopt a cautious approach when developing these principles.247 More specifically, they 
accept that a court’s duty is not to create a new crime of theft, or to extend the 
definition of theft so as to establish novel ways to prevent modern confrontations.248 
The above-mentioned obligation is the responsibility of or is assumed by the 
legislature. Accordingly, it is simply expected of courts that they adapt the principles of 
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theft so that these principles are able to respond to recent societal developments.249 
However, such adaptation should still retain the fundamental components of theft.250 
3.9.3 Adapted Description of Theft 
In recent times, the principles of theft have been expanded. This expansion resulted in 
the traditional contrectatio being discarded in favour of an English law concept of 
appropriation.251 Snyman provides justification for the move from contrectatio to 
appropriation in South Africa.252 He states the following: 
Contrectatio might have been a satisfactory criterion centuries ago when the 
economy was relatively primitive and primarily based on agriculture. In today’s world 
with its much more complicated economic structure, it is far better to use the more 
abstract concept of appropriation to describe the act of theft than the term 
contrectatio, unless one discards the original meaning of the latter term and uses it 
merely as a technical erudite-sounding word to describe the act of theft.253 
Appropriation means the intention to ‘deprive the owner permanently of the benefits of 
ownership’.254 Simply put, it is the assumption of control of or over property of another 
person.255 However, control does not translate or extend to a touching or handling of 
property. It is equated with the gaining of control or possession of property.256 
Furthermore, appropriation must be illegal or wrongful. 
This meaning of appropriation has been read by South African courts to also mean that 
an appropriation in respect of other intangible or incorporeal objects is possible. An 
example is the case of S v Graham.257 In this case, company (A) was on the verge of 
being liquidated. During this period, A received a cheque amounting to thirty-seven 
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thousand one hundred and fifty three rand eighty eight cents (R 7 153.88). It was later 
established that the cheque was erroneously sent to A. The Managing Director of A 
(Graham) was aware of such a mistake. However, Graham paid or caused the cheque 
to be paid to the overdrawn bank account of A. Graham thought that A would recover 
from its debts and thereafter be in a position to repay the money. However, A was 
finally wound-up. At the time of its winding-up only a portion of the money was repaid. 
Graham was charged in his personal capacity with the theft of the cheque and the sum 
of money paid to A.258 The question was whether the paying of the cheque into A’s 
account amounted to theft or not.259 The court conceded that traditionally theft amounts 
to a physical and actual appropriation of property. In this respect, tangible and 
corporeal objects, save where these are expressly or impliedly excluded, constitute the 
aforesaid property. However, the court stated that the principles of theft are founded on 
a ‘living system’. This system is flexible and adaptable. In addition, this flexibility 
enables the system to be in touch with current realities and to be able to respond to 
existing societal conditions.260 Consequently, the court concluded that money is 
capable of being stolen even in cases where it is represented by entries in books of 
accounts, for example, credits.261 
Another development in the law of theft is that which pertains to the appropriation of 
intangible property, for example electricity and cash represented by a credit entry in 
books of accounts. These are fully captured in the cases of S v Kotze,262 S v 
Mintoor,263 Nissan South Africa (Pty) Limited v Marnitz No and Others (stand 1 at 6 
Aeroport (Pty) Limited intervening)264 and S v Ndebele and Others.265 These cases 
acknowledge the impact that recent advances have on the principles of theft. More 
specifically, the Nissan South Africa case followed the reasoning of the court in the 
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case of S v Graham that the Roman-Dutch law principles of theft are a living system 
that is ‘adaptable to modern conditions’.266 Therefore, it is no longer possible to apply 
the traditional Roman-Dutch law principle of contrectatio in order to establish if theft 
has arisen in each case.267 Appropriation in the sense of an assumption of control over 
property that belongs to another person is adequate.268 
The Ndebele case is also important in demonstrating the move from the traditional view 
on theft. In this case, the decision of the court in the Mintoor case was criticised.269 In 
the Mintoor case the court had to decide whether electricity can be an object of theft or 
not. In responding to this question the court followed the view that things which do not 
have corporeal existence are incapable of being stolen.270 Consequently, it was stated 
that electricity is energy and that energy is incapable of being stolen.271 Following this 
reasoning the court in the Ndebele case held that Mintoor disregarded existing 
authority and failed to consider the existing developments in the law of theft.272 The 
facts in the Ndebele case were briefly that: the accused (Ndebele and others) faced a 
number of charges regarding the theft of vending machines and electricity belonging to 
Eskom. The position regarding the theft of the machines was easy to determine. These 
were tangible objects or property and a contrectatio or appropriation in relation to them 
was established. The most difficulty question was whether or not electricity is capable 
of being stolen. In other words, is contrectatio of or over electricity possible? Following 
the decision in the Mintoor case, it was submitted on behalf of the accused that 
electricity ‘could not be stolen’.273 Before it could comment on this, the court referred to 
a number of previous court decisions (for example, S v Kotze, the Mintoor case, the 
Nissan South Africa case and S v Harper and another274) and surmised: 
It appeared to me that there was a more than slight possibility (which 
would be more conveniently decided at the end of the case) that 
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electricity is in fact capable of theft and that the law had already been 
advanced by judgements relating, in particular, to theft of 
incorporeals.275 
As a result, the court examined the meaning and importance of contrectatio for 
purposes of the law of theft in South Africa. It acknowledged that according to Roman-
Dutch law only corporeal or movable things are capable of being stolen.276 Therefore, 
property stolen must be ‘’n selfstandige deel van die stoflike natuur’.277 However, it 
applied S v Harper and another (where it was said that an incorporeal is capable of 
being stolen)278 and held that contrectatio is or should not only be constituted by the 
physical touching or handling of property. It is or should also be constituted by an 
appropriation of a ‘characteristic which attaches to a thing and by depriving the owner 
of that characteristic’.279 This is the case because of the following: 
(If) electricity is incapable of being stolen, then anyone would be 
entitled without permission of the owner to attach a load to his 
batteries and deplete the energy within them, thereby rendering the 
batteries useless. Yet nothing will have been stolen. Nothing 
physically has been taken from the battery; however, its 
characteristics have changed.280 
In view of the aforementioned, the court concluded that electricity can, notwithstanding 
the fact that it only amounts to energy and is incorporeal property, be the object of 
theft.281 
In summary, the law of theft in South Africa is a combination of the Roman-Dutch and 
English legal systems.282 In examining theft in South Africa, it is distinguished between 
the traditional and adapted description. The traditional description rests on the premise 
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that theft is a wrongful contrectatio with the intention to permanently deprive the owner 
of the benefits of ownership.283 In this respect, a contrectatio which is made in order to 
temporarily suspend the benefits of the owner over the property does not amount to 
theft.284 The adapted description requires a move from the rigid contrectatio to a more 
flexible appropriation. It is compelled by the idea that a dependence on contrectatio 
disregards the fact that an appropriation of other intangibles, for example information, 
has nowadays become a reality. This appropriation does not necessarily deprive the 
owner of information of the benefits of ownership. Simply, a thief could have a copy of 
the information without actually depriving the owner of the original information. In this 
respect, a thief possesses the information belonging to the owner.285 The effect of all 
this is to deny the owner the exclusive use and enjoyment of the information. The 
adapted description of theft assists in making a case to the effect that a theft of 
information is necessary in South Africa. This theft deprives the owner of the full 
benefits of ownership. These benefits are the control, use and enjoyment of 
information. In view of this, regard is had to S v Graham where it was stated that the 
principles of theft are generally founded on a living system of rules.286 This system is 
flexible and can be altered in order to conform to contemporary societal developments 
or challenges.287 However, this adaptation has to minimal,288 in the sense that it should 
not be so severe and relentless that these principles lose their meaning and 
importance in criminal law.289 
3.10 CONCLUSION 
The law of theft is generally a dynamic and flexible field. It is particularly adaptable to 
change and it is receptive to modifications. This flexibility was observed in the 
discussion of furtum in Roman-Dutch law. On the one hand, the Roman law of theft 
followed the viewpoint that furtum related to the dishonest contrectatio of or over 
property. Given this, only things that were capable of being physically touched or 
                                               
283   Burchell and Milton Law 479. See also Anders and Ellson Criminal law 264-265 and 
Maré Law 1125. 
284   R v Laforte 497. 
285  Snyman Criminal Law 487. 
286   S v Graham 578. 
287   S v Graham 578. 
288   R v Sibiya 321. 
289   Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes 514.  
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handled were regarded as property for this purpose. Because information could not be 
touched, it was excluded from the categories of things that were capable of being 
stolen.290 Accordingly, a contrectatio over information held by another person was 
deemed to be impossible. The latter view is supported by the notion that furtum 
constituted an autem fit non solum cum quis intercipiendi causa rem alienam amouet, 
sed generaliter cum quis rem alienam invito domino contrectat.291 This can be 
translated to mean that a touching or handling of property, on its own, is satisfactory for 
furtum to arise.292 On the other hand, the Dutch law recognised that furtum did not 
always amount to a permanent deprivation of property. Consequently, theft could also 
be committed in cases where there was a temporal deprivation of property. The 
significance of this is that e-crimes result in a temporal or partial deprivation of 
information belonging to a person. Therefore, a person does not necessarily have to be 
deprived of the original information in order for e-crimes to be carried out completely. 
The manner in which the aforementioned happens or is carried out is explained in 
chapter 4 below. 
The adaptability of the law of theft is also acknowledged in England and South Africa. 
In England, matters external to larceny, for example, agriculture and industrialisation 
necessitated that the principles that govern theft should be re-arranged. These 
modifications were necessitated by the inability of the traditional principles to regulate 
these external factors. In South Africa courts have also commenced an investigation 
into the essence and principles of theft. They consequently found that these principles 
originated from a ‘living’ and elastic system of law. This elasticity means that the 
principles can be adapted or modified with a view to make them compatible with 
current social realities and challenges.293 However, the courts have cautioned that a 
process to alter and develop the principles of theft should be negligible.294 More 
specifically, this process ought not to be so stringent and unremitting that it renders the 
elements of theft meaningless and insignificant to the discussion of criminal law.295 
                                               
290   Burchell and Milton oppose and condemn this view. See Burchell and Milton Law 543. 
291   G III.195. 
292   Jolowicz De furtis xvii. 
293   S v Graham 578. 
294   R v Sibiya 321. 
295   Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes 514.  
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Based on the above-mentioned, it is submitted that the principles of theft should be 
adapted and developed so as to deal with the appropriation of other intangibles, such 
as information. More specifically, this research follows the suggestion by Snyman that 
there is currently a need to move away from the rigid contrectatio. 296 This is specifically 
the case because e-crimes have emerged that resemble theft or furtum. Although 
these e-crimes mimic these traditional crimes, they are perverse and their reach is far 
more elongated than offline crimes. The National Research Council puts it bluntly and 
states that ‘the modern thief can steal more with a computer than with a gun’.297 
Furthermore, e-crimes do not necessarily lead to the actual taking and carrying away of 
information. Simply, they result in the wrongful interference or meddling with the 
information of another. This meddling does not always pertain to the entire information. 
It can arise in situations where a person is only dispossessed of the part or copy of the 
information without the latter’s consent. With this in mind, it becomes necessary to 
develop the law of theft in a manner that accelerates a response to the challenges that 
are posed by e-crimes to the information society. In particular, it has to be recognised 
that e-crimes and the techniques that are normally used in e-crimes constitute the 
modern risks to the information society.  
Because of this, e-crimes are discussed in chapter 4 below. In discussing e-crimes, it is 
accepted that crimes are vast. They particularly differ in form and content. Thus, it is 
conceded that an examination of all the crimes that are carried out online will be 
impossible to achieve in this research. This is the position because the emergence of 
new forms of technologies brings about a change in the nature of e-crimes and the 
methods of attacks criminals follow. Therefore, the most common of e-crimes, for 
example computer cracking, denial of service (DDOS) attacks, man-in-the-middle 
attacks and phishing, are investigated. This selection supports the view that a theft of 
online information is possible. 
 
                                               
296  Snyman Criminal law 487. 
297  National Research Council Computers at risk: safe computing in the information age 
(National Academy Press Washington DC 1991) 7. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE STUDY OF E-CRIMES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter 3 the stages of development of the principles of theft were investigated. 
These are the Roman-Dutch, English and South African law approaches to theft. It was 
submitted that the principles of theft generally form part of a living system of laws. This 
system is flexible and can be modified in a way that accommodates other societal 
developments. Given this elasticity, contrectatio as an element of furtum may no longer 
have the same significance it traditionally had in Roman-Dutch law. Accordingly, it may 
be necessary to improve the aforesaid element in a manner that also considers a 
fraudulent appropriation of information as theft. Furthermore, it was argued in chapter 3 
that appropriation as opposed to contrectatio can be appropriate in studying theft and 
the challenges that are posed or generated by ICTs. Costa discusses the ‘emerging 
challenges’ of recent technologies.1 He states that the ‘presence of ICT in societies is 
pervasive, which makes crimes, especially ICT-related crimes, a constituent aspect of 
the wider political, social and economic restructuring currently affecting countries 
worldwide’.2 
In this chapter it is submitted that ICTs present opportunities for criminals to commit 
crime. In the main, criminals rely on recent technologies to refine and purify their 
modus operandi.3 In addition, criminals use modern forms of technologies as a vehicle 
to transform the manner of committing the traditional crimes, for example, furtum or 
theft.4 Downing lists three distinct circumstances in which these technologies may be 
                                               
1   Costa AM “Emerging challenges” in Savona EU (ed) Crime and technology: new 
frontiers for regulation, law enforcement and research (Springer Dordrecht 2001) 1-6 1.  
2   Costa Crime and technology 4.  
3   Savona EU and Mignone M “The fox and the hunters - how ICT technologies change 
the crime race” in Savona EU (ed) Crime and technology: new frontiers for regulation, 
law enforcement and research (Springer Dordrecht 2004) 7-28 8. 
4   Sussmann MA “The critical challenges from international high-tech and computer-
related crime at the millennium” in Carr I (ed) Computer crime (Ashgate Publishing 
Limited Surrey 2009) 379-418 379-381. 
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used as a tool to commit crime.5 He submits that ICTs may be used as an instrument to 
perpetrate offences, as a target for criminals to attack and carry out attacks or as 
storage machinery which is exploited in order to preserve information related to crime.6  
The dependence on current technologies in order to commit conventional crimes leads 
to the emergence of e-crimes. E-crimes are a ‘migration of real-world crime (or crimes) 
into cyberspace’.7 The examples of e-crimes are vast. These include cyber-terrorism, 
cyber-extortion, harassment, cyber-bullying, online predators and cyber-stalking. In this 
research, computer cracking, distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, man-in-the-
middle attacks and phishing are examined. This selection is made because the 
aforementioned e-crimes demonstrate the manner in which criminals devise methods 
of stealing information online.  
4.2 COMPUTER CRACKING 
4.2.1 Background 
In earlier times, ‘computer hackers’ were an assemblage of computer experts and what 
Raymond refers to as ‘Real Programmers’.8 In particular, they were formerly harmless 
people who were associated with Open-Source development.9 In this instance, hackers 
would continuously test and evaluate the security of computer or information systems 
or networks.10 In order to do this, they launched attacks against a system or network. 
                                               
5   Downing RW “Shoring up the weakest link – what lawmakers around the world need to 
consider in developing comprehensive laws to combat cybercrime” in Carr I (ed) 
Computer crime (Ashgate Publishing Limited Surrey 2009) 4-72 9. 
6   Downing Weakest link 9. 
7   Brenner SW “History of computer crime” in de Leeuw K and Bergstra J (eds) The 
history of information security: a comprehensive handbook” (Elsevier Amsterdam 2007) 
705-721 706. 
8   Raymond ES The cathedral and the bazaar: musings on linux and open source by an 
accidental revolutionary (O’Reilly and Associates Beijing 2001) 3-4. 
9   For a definition of the term ‘open source’ see Perens B “The open source definition” in 
DiBona C, Ockman S and Stone M (eds) Open sources: voices from the open source 
revolution (O’Reilly and Associates Beijing 1999)171-188 176-180. Open Source is the 
opposite or precursor to ‘Free Software’. See Raymond ES “The revenge of the 
hackers” in DiBona C, Ockman S and Stone M (eds) Open sources: voices from the 
open source revolution (O’Reilly and Associates Beijing 1999) 207-219 212. 
10   A description of computer or information systems or networks does not refer only to 
computer hardware (physical technology that houses and executes the software, stores 
and transport data). It also refers to a set of software (applications, operating systems 
and assorted command utilities), data, computer users and procedures to carry out 
certain tasks. See Whitman ME and Mattord HJ Principles of information security 4th ed 
(Cengage Learning Australia 2012) 16. 
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These attacks included acts that take advantage of vulnerability in controlled or 
regulated systems or networks.11 The goal was not to destroy the systems or networks. 
Instead, the attacks were aimed at exposing and identifying limitations or vulnerabilities 
in existing computer security protocols.12 In cases where vulnerability was detected, 
computer hackers would re-design the system or network.  
However, we have in the recent past come to know of computer hacking (originally, 
computer cracking)13 as an activity whereby information belonging to a computer user 
(victim)14 is altered or retrieved dishonestly.15 This change in the meaning of computer 
hacking represents a stage wherein ‘serious cracking episodes were first covered in 
the mainstream press – and journalists began to misapply the term hacker to refer to 
computer vandal’.16 Given these developments, the term ‘computer cracking’ or 
‘computer cracker’ is preferred in this research. 
4.2.2 Method of Attack 
In computer cracking schemes, the security (or lack thereof) of information systems or 
networks is exposed or sought to be exposed. In order to do this, a computer cracker 
infiltrates and infects a victim’s computer with computer viruses17 or worms.18 Most of 
                                               
11   Whitman and Mattord Principles of information security 63.  
12   Gupta MS Cyber crimes (Centrum Press New Delhi 2013) 2 and Bossler AM and 
Burruss GW “The general theory of crime and computer hacking - low self-control 
hackers?” in Holt TJ and Schell BH (eds) Corporate hacking and technology-driven 
crime: social dynamics and implications (Information Science Reference Hershey 2011) 
38-67 40. 
13   Simply put, the difference between hackers and crackers is that hackers built 
information systems or networks and crackers break these. See Raymond Cathedral 
and the bazaar 196-197. 
14   For purposes of this research, the term ‘victim’ refers to governments, companies 
(private or public), financial or payment services providers and computer users that are 
targets of e-crimes. 
15   Summers D (ed) Longman dictionary of contemporary English 3rd ed (Longman Harlow 
Essex 1995). See also Fraud Advisory Panel Cybercrime Working Group “Recent 
attack trends” in Reuvid J (ed) The secure online business handbook: a practical guide 
to risk management and business continuity 4th ed (Kogan Page Limited London 2006) 
5-10 6. See also s 86(1) and (2) of the ECT Act. 
16   See Raymond Cathedral and the bazaar 3-4. 
17   Computer viruses consist of a number of codes. These codes carry out illegal actions 
on computer systems or networks. They operate more like the viral pathogens that 
attacks humans, animals and plants. See Whitman and Mattord Principles of 
information security 44 and Gordon BJ “Internet criminal law” in Buys (ed) Cyberlaw @ 
SA: the law of the Internet in South Africa (Van Schaik Publishers Pretoria 2000) 426. 
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these viruses or worms are created and transported cheaply and effortlessly. 
Accordingly, they can be sent over local systems or networks or be carried out on a 
removable medium, for example a CD, DVD or USB modem.19 As soon as a system or 
network is infiltrated with viruses or worms, a computer cracker then takes control of 
victims’ computer systems or networks.20 Thereafter, they deliberately and maliciously 
appropriate victims’ personal or sensitive particulars. This theft occurs in circumstances 
where a victim is not even aware that his or her computer is being accessed 
unlawfully.21  
Figure 4.1 below demonstrates how victims’ computer or information systems or 
networks are normally cracked.22 
                                                                                                                                         
18   Computer worms are a set of malicious programmes. They generate other programmes 
within information systems or networks. See Whitman and Mattord Principles of 
information security 45-46 and Forst ML Cybercrime: Appellate court interpretations 
(Montclair Enterprises San Francisco 1999) 133. 
19   CIFAS 
http://www.cifas.org.uk/secure/contentPORT/uploads/documents/CIFAS%20Reports/Di
gital_Thieves_October2010.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 2012). 
20   Sciglimpaglia RJ “Computer hacking - a global offense” 1991 (3) Pace International Law 
Review 199-266 200-201. 
21   LIoyd I Legal aspects of the information society (Butterworths London 2000) 100 and 
Singh N “Digital economy” in Bidgoli H (ed) Handbook of information security: threats, 
vulnerabilities, prevention, detection, and management (John Wiley New Jersey 2006) 
15-36 31. See also Commission of the European Communities “Proposal for a Council 
framework decision on attacks against information systems” 19 April 2002 (hereinafter 
referred to as COM (2002) 173). To be accessed at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52002PC0173&from=EN. 
22   Fig 4.1 is inspired by the discussion of computer cracking which is made by Bossler and 
Burruss. See Bossler and Burruss “The general theory of crime and computer hacking - 
low self-control hackers?” 40-41. 
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Figure 4.1: A typical computer cracking procedure 
In figure 4.1 above the original connection between a computer user (victim) and Web-
server is shown. This is the connection which usually facilitates the communication 
between a victim and the outside world. In addition, it enables a transfer of information 
from the Web-server to a victim. In figure 4.1 above a typical computer cracker 
monitors the communication. It then attacks the victim’s computer system or network 
with a view to access and to intercept information.23 It is noteworthy that the victim is 
not necessarily dispossessed of the original contents of the information. Furthermore, it 
is commonly difficult and sometimes impossible to establish whether or not particular 
information has moved from the victim to the cracker, that is, an unlawful appropriation 
has taken place.  
4.3 DDOS ATTACKS  
4.3.1 Background 
                                               
23   Bossler and Burruss “The general theory of crime and computer hacking - low self-
control hackers?” 40-41. 
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DDoS attacks are sometimes described as the ‘mischievous attacks’.24 This mischief is 
attributed to the fact that these attacks make or renders the targeted systems or 
networks ‘unusable or inaccessible’.25 Furthermore, the harm is associated with the 
fact that the attacks cause ‘catastrophic errors’ that interrupt the proper functioning of a 
system or network.26 Immediately after the aforementioned occurs, computer crackers 
gain entry into the system and steal information.27 
Furthermore, DDoS attacks are generally pervasive. Their scope and effect extends 
beyond borders. In other words, they can be started or commenced in one or different 
locations and their adverse impact can be felt by victims in other localities.28 Also, the 
affected or targeted systems or networks do not have to be situated in a single 
jurisdiction. They can be located or situated in diverse jurisdictions as well.29 
4.3.2 Method of Attack 
In carrying out DDoS attacks, a computer cracker generally sends a number of 
connections or information requests to victims. These can be requests for information, 
or requests that victims enter their sensitive or secret credentials to certain allocated 
spaces. A promise is often made to victims that such entering will entitle them to a 
specific benefit, normally money.30 Most DDoS attacks overloads or burdens the 
targeted systems or networks with a number of requests.31 As a result, they interrupt 
the appropriate functioning of a system or network and afterwards deny victims the 
lawful or legitimate accessing of information or documents stored in a computer.32 
Thereafter, computer crackers access the system without the consent of the victim and 
steal information. Figure 4.2 below illustrate the manner and form of DDoS attacks. 
                                               
24   Schwabach A Internet and the law: technology, society and compromises (ABC-CLIO 
California 2006) 83. 
25   Kessler GC and Levine DE “Denial-of-service attacks” in Bosworth S, Kabay ME and 
Whyne E (eds) Computer security handbook  5th ed (John Wiley and Sons New Jersey 
2009) 18.1-18.28 18.1. See also s 86(5) of the ECT Act. 
26   Kessler and Levine Attacks 18.1. 
27   Kessler and Levine Attacks 18.1. 
28   Schwabach Internet and the law 83. 
29   Schwabach Internet and the law 83. 
30   Whitman and Mattord Principles of information security 67-68. 
31   Schwabach Internet and the law 83. 
32   Schwabach Internet and the law 83. 
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Figure 4.2: DDoS attack appears in what seems to be Webpage. 
In figure 4.2 above a page, file or document which resembles that which victims 
ordinarily works on is shown. The number of messages that appear on top of the page, 
file or document are also demonstrated. The messages masquerade as genuine 
software33 applications that are relevant to the security of victims’ computer systems or 
networks. They sometimes resemble those that a computer user normally receives 
from his or her Web administrator. In these messages victims are informed about a 
particular software that is necessary for the security of their computer systems or 
networks. Victims are also assured that the presence of this software is indispensable 
as it assists in the installation or downloading of conventional information security 
                                               
33   This may be component of the information system and has applications, operating 
systems and assorted command utilities. See Whitman and Mattord Principles of 
information security 16. 
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facilities. In addition, the messages request victims to enter or punch-in their sensitive 
information or particulars from certain allocated spaces. The victim is consequently 
denied access to work on a document or file until the requested information is entered.  
4.4 MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS 
4.4.1 Background 
Man-in-the-middle attacks are sometimes referred to as the transport control protocol 
or (TCP) hijacking attacks.34 These attacks take place in situations where a computer 
cracker takes control of an information system or network.35 This is made by forcing a 
system or network to operate in a manner intended to by a computer cracker. In 
carrying out these attacks, a computer cracker operates between computers.36 These 
can be computers that are used by computer users in one location or those that are 
operated by computer users in different jurisdictions.  
Furthermore, man-in-the-middle attacks generally attack and compromise a computer 
or the Internet or other local area networks (LANs) or Web-server.37 As soon as these 
networks are compromised, computer crackers eavesdrop and monitor the 
communication, information which passes through from the Web-server to the victims. 
This monitoring enables computer crackers to illegally appropriate sensitive or useful 
information that belongs to the victims. 
4.4.2 Method of Attack 
In man-in-the-middle attacks, a computer cracker would turn a victim’s computer into a 
‘zombie’. Once this happens, a computer cracker then controls and takes charge of a 
computer. Consequently, the cracker can change, delete, reroute, add, forge or divert 
information which is stored in a victims’ computer system or network. Furthermore, it 
can access, control and divert information to use other than that intended for by 
victims. 
                                               
34   Whitman and Mattord Principles of information security 66-67. 
35  S 86(4) of the ECT Act. 
36   Strebe M Network security jumpstart: computer and network security basics (SYBEX 
Inc. Alameda 2002) 41. 
37   Strebe Network security 41. See also COM (2002) 173. 
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Figure 4.3 below illustrates the manner in which man-in-the-middle attacks are 
commonly carried out.38 
 
Figure 4.3: Caption 
In figure 4.3 above a computer cracker is situated between the Web-server and the 
computer which is used by victims. In one case, it monitors the information which 
passes through from the Web-server to a victim’s computer. In other cases, it interrupts 
the connection between a victim and the Web-server and intercepts information 
belonging to a victim. The compromised or cracked connection does not only affect a 
victim. It also has an impact on other computer users that have relations with or are 
connected to victims’ computers. 
4.5 PHISHING  
4.5.1 Background   
                                               
38   Exhibits 18.1 and 18.4 in the handbook by Kessler and Levine had an influence in the 
structure of figure 4.3. See Kessler and Levine Attacks 18.8. See also, Ornaghi 
http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-03/bh-us-03-ornaghi-valleri.pdf (Date of 
use: 13 August 2013). 
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It is often said that phishing is a completely recent occurrence.39 In particular, the 
criminal attacks on the American Online Network systems, that is, the AOL attacks, are 
identified as the first phishing attacks ever witnessed worldwide.40 Consequently, it is 
stated that phishing gained worldwide recognition or prominence immediately after the 
AOL attacks.41 The AOL attacks included scams whereby information or particulars, for 
example usernames and passwords, belonging to various computer users were 
intercepted.42  
Despite the perceived novelty of phishing, it appears however that the trends that are 
used for phishing are old.43 More specifically, comparable phishing activities can be 
traced back to ancient Rome.44 In one case, a scrutiny of dolus malus illustrates the 
ancient nature of the trends.45 Literally, dolus malus denotes fraud or dishonesty where 
treachery is precipitated.46 Fraud or fraus in the sense in which the word was applied in 
Roman law denoted an intelligent trick, deception or machination.47 The trick, 
deception or machination had to be made in order to induce another to do something 
which is different to that which was primarily professed.48 Dolus malus is also applied 
by South African courts in certain circumstances. For example, cases dealing with 
                                               
39   Sullins LL “’Phishing’ for a solution – domestic and international approaches to 
decreasing online identity theft” in Carr I (ed) Computer crime (Ashgate Publishing 
Limited Surerey 2009) 73-109 77-78 and Myers S “Introduction to phishing” in 
Jakobsson M and Myers S (eds) Phishing and counter-measures: understanding the 
increasing problem of online identity theft (John Wiley New Jersey 2007) 1-30 2-3. 
40   Sullins Computer crime 77-78.  
41   Whitman and Mattord Principles of information security 72. 
42   Dunham K (ed) Mobile malware attacks and defence (Syngress Publishing Inc. 
Burlington 2009) 127. 
43   The story of Jacob in the Bible is one of the classical examples wherein an identity of a 
person may be stolen. See Genesis 27:1-40. In the aforementioned case, Jacob, who 
was motivated by greed and envy, misrepresented his blind father (Isaac) into believing 
that he (Jacob) was his brother (Esau). The aim was to steal away the blessings that 
were meant for Esau. See Genesis 27:19-29. 
44   See in general Smith W and Anthon C (eds) A dictionary of Greek and Roman 
antiquities 3rd ed (Harper New York 1870) and Fantham E “With malice aforethought – 
the ethic of militia on stage and law” in Sluiter I and Rosen RM (eds) Kakos: badness 
and anti-value in classical antiquity (Brill Leiden 2008) 319-334. 
45   In its entirety, the concept of dolus malus is referred to as dolus malus est omnis 
callidity fallacia, machination ad circumveniendum, fallendum, decipiendum alterum 
adhibita.  
46   Fantham Malice aforethought 331. The accepted Roman law term is totus ex fraude et 
mendaciis studio et artificio quodam malitiae condivisset. 
47   Frier BW and McGinn TAJ A casebook on Roman family law (Oxford University Press 
Oxford 2004) 483. See also Kazazis v Georghiades (1979) 3 TPD 886 892 (hereafter 
referred to as Kazazis v Georghiades). 
48   Smith and Anthon Greek and Roman 164. 
  
124 
 
misrepresentation,49 undue influence50 and breach of contract51 demonstrate such 
application. In South Africa, dolus malus amounts to anything which the law does not 
sanction. This extends to everything which is unwarranted and is carried out with the 
comprehension that one is acting contrary to the ‘law or good faith’.52 
In other cases, the principles of crimen injuria are applied to occurrences that are 
comparable to phishing. Crimen injuria is an act or conduct which impairs a person’s 
dignitas.53 Dignitas is one of the interests of personality which is protected under the 
actio inuriarum. The other interests of personality are corpus and fama. Dignitas is a 
wider notion than corpus and fama. It particularly encapsulates corpus and fama.54 The 
famous South African case of R v Umfaan55 provides meaning to the notion of dignitas. 
In R v Umfaan the following was stated about dignitas: 
 (Every) person has an inborn right to the tranquil enjoyment of his (or 
her) peace of mind, secure against aggression upon his (or her) person, 
against the impairment of that character for moral and social worth to 
which he (or she) may rightly lay claim, and of that respect and esteem 
of his (or her) fellow-men (or women) of which he (or she) is deserving, 
and against the degrading and humiliating treatment; and there is a 
corresponding obligation incumbent on all others to refrain from assailing 
that to which he (or she) has such right.56 
The necessity to safeguard the ‘tranquil enjoyment of a person’s peace of mind’ was 
also acknowledged in another South African case of S v A.57 The parties in S v A were 
Mr Swartzberg (the Complainant), the wife of Mr Swartzberg (the First Appellant) and 
                                               
49   See in general Macduff & Co Ltd (in liquidation) v Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investment Co Ltd 1924 AD 573 (hereinafter referred to as Macduff & Co Ltd (in 
liquidation) v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd). 
50   See Preller v Jordaan 1956 1 AD 483. 
51   See Kazazis v Georghiades 892-893. 
52   Macduff & Co Ltd (in liquidation) v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd 610 
and Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537 551. 
53   Burchell J and Milton J Principles of criminal law 3rd ed (Juta Lansdowne 2005) 748. 
54   O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publication Co Ltd 1954 3 SA 244 (C) and Neethling J, 
Potgieter JM and Visser PJ Law of delict 2nd ed (Butterworths Durban 1994) 13-17. 
55   See in general R v Umfaan 1908 TS 62 (hereinafter referred to as R v Umfaan). 
56   R v Umfaan 67.   
57   See S v A (1971) 2 TPD 293 (hereinafter referred to as S v A). 
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Tel Peda Investigation Bureau (the Second Appellant). The Complainant and the First 
Appellant were married to each other. However, they had, due to other factors, 
separated from each other. The Complainant was thus living alone in a block of 
apartment flats. The First Appellant was, at all reasonable times, suspicious of the 
Complainant’s activities. In particular, she suspected that the Complainant had extra-
marital affairs. By reason of this suspicion, the First Appellant instructed another 
person (Kenneth Mills) to manufacture a spying device (the device). As soon as it was 
produced, the device was to be installed or fitted inside the complainant’s apartment 
flat. The aim was to enable the First Appellant and Kenneth Mills to listen to various 
conversations of the Complainant, and possibly those of his mistresses. Kenneth Mills 
followed and carried out the First Appellant’s instructions and handed the device to the 
Second Appellant. The Second Appellant thereafter caused the device to be hidden 
underneath a ‘vanity drawer’ in the Complainant’s apartment flats.58 The Complainant 
discovered the device when he was opening the drawer. From the Complainant’s 
viewpoint, the device appeared to be a ‘transmitting bugging device’.59 On 
apprehending the intended purpose of the device, the Complainant alleged that he felt 
‘terribly indignant and hurt’ because his privacy had been compromised.60 In view of 
this, the Complainant opened a case against the First and Second Appellants for 
crimen injuria. The court stated that the prevailing boni mores in accordance with public 
opinions were essential. The requisite boni mores particularly demonstrated, the court 
held, whether or not the conduct or action in question impairs a person’s dignitas. In 
view of the aforementioned, the court concluded that the actions of the First and 
Second Appellants were of such a nature as to amount to an impairment of the 
Complainant’s dignitas.61 The First and Second Appellants’ actions were of such a 
reprehensive nature that they deserved punishment.62 
From the above-mentioned we can extrapolate that although the notion of phishing is 
new practices always existed however that were comparable to phishing. They varied 
depending on the time or place and the object to be exploited. For example, in the 
biblical story of Jacob the object of theft was the blessings that were intended for Esau 
and in the case of S v A the reason was to intercept and listen to the victim’s 
                                               
58   S v A 295. 
59   S v A 295. 
60   S v A 295. 
61   S v A 297-299. 
62   S v A 299. 
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conversations. However, in recent times ICTs have extended the scope of application 
of these practices. They particularly augment the methods that were traditionally used 
for phishing. As a result, computer crackers possess innovative ways that ease the 
burden of cracking or breaking systems or networks. Consequently, they are able to 
‘communicate, to organise themselves better, to widen the spectrum of their 
businesses, to update their modus operandi and techniques, and to avoid law 
enforcement’. 
Having identified the complexities that are created by contemporary technologies, it is 
now essential to explicitly describe the boundaries within which phishing operates. By 
doing this, it is contemplated that such a description will assist in distinguishing 
phishing from the other e-crimes. However, such a description acknowledges that 
computer crackers usually conduct themselves in ways comparable to those of people 
who are in business. Their concerns are to decrease their expenditure and maximise 
the proceeds which originate from phishing.63  
4.5.2 Conception of Phishing  
Academics disagree as to the foundation of the concept of ‘phishing’. Some are of the 
opinion that the notion of phishing was formulated following the phone cracking scams 
called ‘phreaking’.64 Phreaking, it is argued, has particular resemblance with computer 
cracking.65 Phreaking is an unauthorised accessing66 of a telephone system.67 The 
accessing enables the cracker to direct a telephone system to make lengthy and free 
telephone-calls; to alter the appropriate operation of a telephone service; to steal 
                                               
63   Sullivan D The definitive guide to controlling malware, spyware, phishing, and spam 
(Realtime publishers.com San Francisco 2006) 32. 
64   Schwabach Internet and law 235.   
65   Moore R Cybercrime: investigating high-technology computer crime 2nd ed (Anderson 
Publishing Oxford 2011) 42-43.   
66   ‘Unauthorised access’ refers to the accessing, interception or misusing of a system, 
resource, file, or database without the requisite lawful authority. See Kapoor N 
Computerised banking system in India (Sublime Jaipur 2008) 16 and Gattiker UE The 
information security dictionary: defining the terms that define security for e-business, 
internet, information and wireless technology (Kluwer Academic Publishers New York 
2004) 3.  
67   Schwabach Internet and law 235.   
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specialised telephone services, and to cause disruptions to a telephone service.68 
There are also those who hold the viewpoint that the term ‘fishing’ has particular 
influence on the notion of ‘phishing’.69 Minnaar is specifically the follower of this 
proposal.70 According to Minnaar, the expression ‘phishing’ is ‘derived from ‘fishing’ i.e. 
baiting the hook (the temptation and the believable convincing solicitation (approach) 
and throwing in your fishing line (e-mailing the tempting offer) and go fishing and see 
what you can catch (a gullible victim’s identity details)’.71  
The opinion by Minnaar above seems to stem from the understanding that the trends or 
methods that are used in phishing are comparable to those of a fisherman.72 In fishing 
activities, for example a fisherman entices a fish by concealing the menacing nature of 
the emblematic methods that are used.73 These emblematic techniques are commonly 
referred to as the ‘lure’, the ‘hook’ and the ‘catch’.74 Figure 4.4 demonstrates how the 
aforesaid methods operate in phishing schemes.75 They are demonstrated by 
reference to certain phases (phases 1, 2 and 3) that are considered to be fundamental 
in completing the crime of phishing. 
                                               
68   Stewart JM, Chapple M and Gibson D Cissp: certified information systems security 
professional study guide (John Wiley San Francisco 2005). 
69   Gorge M and Brudenall P “Phishing, pharming and the requirement for strong user 
authentication” in Reuvid J (ed) The secure online business handbook: a practical guide 
to risk management and business continuity 4th ed (Kogan Page London 2006) 91-94 
91. 
70   Minnaar A “You’ve received a greeting e-card from.... – the changing face of cybercrime 
email spam scams” 2008 (2) Acta Criminologica 92-116 99. 
71   Minnaar 2008 Acta Criminologica 99. 
72   Brown BC How to stop e-mail spam, spyware, malware, computer viruses and hackers 
from running your computer or network: the complete guide for your home and work 
(Atlantic Publishing Group Florida 2011) 32. 
73   Wehmeier S et al Oxford advanced learner’s dictionary of current English 7th ed (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 2005) 581. 
74   Myers Counter-measures 5-6. 
75   Garber L “Denial-of-service attacks rip the Internet” 2000 Technology news 1-17 15. 
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Figure 4.4: Phishing scheme 
Phase 1 in figure 4.4 above represents the lure. The bank is used as an example in 
order to represent the ultimate object of phishing, that is, where money is. The user key 
signifies the login details or identifying information or particulars, for example pins or 
passwords. In this instance, a computer cracker monitors the online activities or 
sessions of a user. It can do this by either situating itself in the Web (Website) or by 
breaking the connection which a victim has with other users and the bank. Once this 
happens, it may hijack these activities or sessions (session hijacking) and masquerade 
as a genuine computer user. This is normally done by infiltrating the Web with 
malicious messages (malware) or requests. Sometimes a computer cracker will send 
message requests to a user that impersonates those of genuine institutions. The 
example of these messages is illustrated in figure 4.5 below. 
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Figure 4.5: The lure 
The message in Figure 4.5 has a malware. The malware prompts or requests victims to 
follow a particular URL hyperlink in order to provide or disclose certain information or 
particulars.76 This information or particulars may provide a key as enunciated in figure 
4.4 above. Thereafter, the key may be used in order to unlock the message and this 
unlocking enables a computer cracker to view the contents of the message. After doing 
all this, a computer cracker could masquerade as a victim and use the key in order to 
access networks, for example online banking facilities that should be available to or are 
designed for use by a victim. 
The second phase or phase 2 symbolises the hook. In this instance, a victim has 
responded to the message or request and entered or punched-in the key as requested 
in phase 1. A computer cracker will thus receive this key and stores it on its database. 
The storage of the key is made in anticipation of phase 3. The third phase is referred to 
as the catch. In this case, a computer cracker uses the key to unlock the security 
mechanisms that are designed to protect a victim from outside phishing attacks. 
Consequently, a computer cracker is able to gain entry into a victim’s computer system 
or network and retrieve sensitive information that is related to, for example e-banking 
facilities.77 
                                               
76   Myers Counter-measures 5-6. 
77   Myers Counter-Measures 5-6. 
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4.5.3 What is Phishing? 
Scholars and computer specialists alike have had difficulty in defining the term 
‘phishing’. The aforesaid trouble is frequently attributed to the continuous progressions 
of the technologies that are used to commit phishing.78 Despite this challenge, there is 
agreement that phishing is a pernicious transgression. Therefore, attempts to 
appropriately delineate and criminalise this wrong should be made. The Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (the OECD)79 describes phishing as an 
amalgamated manifestation that encompasses both the communal and technological 
factors.80 This approach originates from the fact that phishing is one of the types of e-
crimes. Emails and Web addresses that impersonate original or genuine sources, for 
example, a government, a business or an institution are commonly created or 
designed.81 The OECD’s viewpoint on the description of phishing is followed by 
Myers.82 Myers submits that phishing involves social and technical attacks.83 In this 
instance, computer crackers trick or swindle victims, that is, to defraud, in order that 
they (victims) may disclose or surrender their personal information.84 Consequently, it 
becomes ‘an example of social engineering techniques (that are) used in order to take 
advantage of human ignorance’.85 In technological terms, social engineering is the 
malicious act or conduct of manipulating victims, by deception, into giving information, 
                                               
78   James L Phishing exposed (Syngress Publishing Rockland 2005) 10. 
79   The OECD is an international institution which provides a forum in terms of which 
national governments can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to 
certain or common problems. The OECD work with national governments to understand 
what drives economic, social and environmental change. The OECD analyses and 
compares data to predict future trends. See OECD http://www.oecd.org/about/ (Date of 
use: 13 September 2012). The OECD currently has 34 member countries and 6 key 
partners including South Africa. See OECD 
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (Date of use: 13 September 2012). 
80   The OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry Committee on Consumer 
Policy Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/28/36494147.pdf (Date of use: 13 May 2012). 
81   Graham J, Howard R and Olson R (eds) Cyber security essentials (Auerbach 
Publishers Florida 2011) 87-88. See also Gorge and Brudenall Secure online 91-93. 
82   Myers Counter-measures 1-2. 
83   Myers Counter-measures 1-2. 
84   Sullins Computer crime 78-80.  
85   Reid http://www.allspammedup.com/2009/02/history-of-e-crimes/ (Date of use: 22 April 
2010). 
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or performing an action.86 In this activity, computer crackers ‘exploit the weaknesses in 
web security technologies’ and sometimes the lack of awareness on the part of 
victims.87  
The viewpoint that phishing is a process which seeks to weaken existing IT security 
mechanisms is followed in section 87 of the ECT Act (Computer-related extortion, fraud 
and forgery). It may be deduced from this section that phishing is a process that 
includes the following: 
The ability or threat to, amongst others, access data without authority, 
interfere with data, unlawfully produce, sell, offer to sell, procures for 
use, design, adapt for use, distribute or possess any device 
(computer program or a component) which is designed primarily to 
overcome security measures with the intention of gaining an unlawful 
proprietary advantage (i.e. theft) by causing fake data to be produced 
with the intent that it be considered or acted upon as if it were 
authentic.88 
Accordingly, phishing is ‘social engineering’ and ‘technical subterfuge’ attacks that 
exploits a blemish in existing computer security mechanisms.89 In addition, it 
incorporates online identity (ID) theft and online ID fraud.90  
(a) Online ID Theft 
There is no comprehensible difference which currently exists between situations 
involving online ID theft and those related to online ID fraud. Online ID theft is 
sometimes referred to as ‘online impersonation fraud’.91 The association of theft with 
fraud is acknowledged in chapter 3 of this research. For example, chapter 3 describes 
theft as a fraudulent appropriation or contrectatio fraudulosa of another’s property. In 
                                               
86   Mann I Hacking the human: social engineering techniques and security 
countermeasures (Gower Publishing Hampshire 2008) 11. 
87   Singh Information security 31. 
88  See s 87(1) an (2) of the ECT Act. 
89   Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) 
http://www.antiphishing.org/reports/apwg_trends_report_q1_2012.pdf (Date of use: 22 
July 2012). 
90   Myers phishing 2-3. 
91   CIFAS 
https://www.cifas.org.uk/secure/contentPORT/uploads/documents/reports/Confidential-
%20Fraudscape%202011.pdf (Date of use: 13 July 2012). 
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this instance, a physical touching or handling of property is necessary. The latter has to 
be carried out with the necessary fraud. 
Because of the difficulty in differentiating theft from fraud it sometimes happens in 
practice that the meaning of online ID theft is mistakenly correlated to that of online ID 
fraud.92 This inaccuracy can be found, for example, in Hoffman and McGinley, where 
online ID theft is described as the fraudulent or dishonest seizure of another’s 
identity.93 The fraudulent seizure exists in cases where a person’s good name (fama) 
and reputation or communal status (corpus) is taken away or tampered with.94  
ID theft is generally an old phenomenon. The American case of TRW v Andrews is an 
example of a case which involves and deals with ID theft.95 The facts in TRW v 
Andrews were briefly that: Adelaide Andrews (Adelaide) visited the offices of a 
particular doctor (a radiologist). She was requested by a receptionist (Andrea Andrews) 
at the doctor’s offices to fill in a consultation form (form). The form required her to 
disclose information or particulars such as her names, date of birth and Social Security 
Number. After completing the form, Adelaide handed in the form to Andrea. Andrea 
copied the information or particulars belonging to Adelaide, immediately resigned her 
position as the receptionist and moved to another state.96 In that state Andrea made 
several attempts to seek and open credit accounts using Adelaide’s last name, address 
and Social Security Number. On all occasions credit reports related to Adelaide were 
requested by the companies from which Andrea sought credit from TRW Inc.97 In each 
case, TRW Inc’s computers would register a match of Adelaide’s last name, address 
                                               
92   Finch E “The problem of stolen identity and the Internet” in Jewkes Y (ed) Crime online 
(Willan Devon 2007) 29-43 29-31. 
93   Hoffman SK and McGinley TG Identity theft (Greenwood Publishing Group 2010) 2 and 
Vacca JR Identity theft (Pearson Education New Jersey 2003) 4. See also the 
European Union (EU) Fraud Prevention Expert Group (FEPG) 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fpeg/identity-theft_en.htm (Date of use: 20 July 
2012). 
94   Biegelman MT Identity theft handbook: detection, prevention, and security (John Wiley 
New Jersey 2009) 2-6. 
95   See TRW v Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001). 
96   TRW v Andrews 23-24. 
97   TRW Inc. is a global manufacturing and service company which has its headquarters in 
Cleveland, Ohio. TRW Inc. was founded in 1901 and focuses on providing products and 
services with a high technology or engineering content to the automotive, space and 
defence markets. See Military Analysis Network “TRW” 
http://www.fas.org/man/company/trw.htm (Date of use: 13 June 2012). 
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and Social Security Number. As soon as a match could be established, credit reports 
would consequently be furnished to the companies. The companies would thereafter, 
upon receipt of the aforementioned reports, grant credit to Andrea on the basis of the 
information or particulars contained on those reports.98 Sometime later, Adelaide 
sought a loan for the re-financing of her home mortgage. Adelaide discovered the 
fraudulent activities when she was furnished with a credit report by TRW Inc. The 
report contained all the attempts and loans that were made and granted to Andrea in 
Adelaide’s last name. Therefore, Adelaide sought an order from court averring that the 
disclosure of her information or particulars by TRW Inc were improper.99 Adelaide 
submitted also that TRW Inc did not follow appropriate verification procedures. In other 
words, TRW Inc failed to ascertain whether or not the information or particulars 
belonged to a person who was seeking the credits (Andrea).100 As a result of the 
omission by TRW Inc, the disclosure was, according to Adelaide, made in 
contravention of § 1681e(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.101 Conversely, TRW Inc 
failed, Adelaide argued, to maintain ‘reasonable procedures’ in order to prevent an 
improper disclosure of her credit information or particulars.102 
The emergence of contemporary technologies and the desire to do business and 
transact online, has compelled a move from ID theft to online ID theft.103 Online ID theft 
is an extension of ID theft. Online ID theft is one of the forms of fraud.104 This theft is 
carried out in order to appropriate another person’s information and to make gain.105 E-
                                               
98   TRW v Andrews 24. 
99   TRW v Andrews 24. 
100   § 1681e(b) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the FCRA). 
101   TRW v Andrews 25. 
102   § 1681e(a) of FCRA. The aforementioned section stipulates that ‘every consumer 
reporting agency shall maintain reasonable procedures (that are) designed to avoid 
violations of § 1681c of this title and to limit the furnishing of consumer reports to the 
purposes (that are) listed under § 1681b of this title. The procedures shall require that 
prospective users of the information identify themselves, certify the purposes for which 
the information is sought, and certify that the information will be used for no other 
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a consumer report to any person if it has reasonable grounds for believing that the 
consumer report will not be used for a purpose listed in § 1681b of this title’. 
103   Hoffman and McGinley Theft 13-14. 
104   Leary MS Quantifying the discoverability of identity attributes in internet-based public 
records: impact on identity theft and knowledge-based authentication (Ph.D thesis 
Capella University Minneapolis 2008) 13 and Watney M “Identity theft - the mirror 
reflects another face” 2004 (3) TSAR 511-519 511. 
105   Watney 2004 TSAR 511. 
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crimes, for example computer cracking, DDoS or man-in-the-middle attacks may be 
used for this purpose.  
The existence of ‘gain’ in cases involving online ID theft has caused considerable 
uncertainty. It is argued by some that ‘gain’, for purposes of online ID theft, amounts to 
a financial gain.106 However, it appears from Vacca107 and various others108 that ‘gain’ 
also extends, or at least should extend, to factors beyond a financial gain.109 More 
specifically, ‘gain’ should be present in cases where information or particulars are or 
were used in order to masquerade as another person or business.110 Given this, online 
ID theft may also be aimed at achieving certain nefarious ends. These may include 
espionage, terrorism, revenge, illegal immigration or assuming a new identity in order 
to avoid a criminal charge. 
(b) Online ID Fraud 
Online ID fraud is frequently described as the result of online ID theft, that is, the theft 
of information in order to commit an offence.111 Viewed in the aforementioned sense, 
online ID fraud appears to be a forerunner of online ID theft.112 For example, online ID 
fraud amounts to the use of stolen identities (IDs) in order to accomplish or achieve 
unlawful pecuniary and economic gains.113 It is the actual theft of information for 
financial gain and ‘occurs when criminals take (possession of) illegally obtained 
personal information and make fraudulent purchases or withdrawals, create false 
accounts or modify existing ones, and/or attempt to obtain services such as 
employment or health care’.114 
                                               
106   Hoffman and McGinley Theft 6. 
107   Vacca Identity 4-5. 
108   Solove DT, Rotenberg M and Schwartz PM Privacy, information, and technology 
(Aspen Publishers New York 2006) 251-253. 
109   Vacca Identity 4-5. 
110   Vacca Identity 4-5. 
111   Collins JM Preventing identity theft in your business (John Wiley New Jersey 2005) 8-
13. 
112   Collins Identity theft 8-13. 
113   Finch Crime online 34-36. 
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er.pdf (Date of use: 13 May 2012). 
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In addition, online ID fraud involves the unlawful appropriation or interception of 
information which is essential for the identification of a person.115 This information 
includes the identifying information of victims, for example a pin, username, password, 
credit card, bank ATM card, bank statement, pre-approved credit offer and tax 
information.116 The interception is often made in respect of e-transactions belonging to 
unsuspecting or credulous victims.117 It is also made in order to commit crime, for 
example online theft.118 
4.5.4 Method of Attack 
Computer crackers generally do not always have to possess sophisticated 
technological skills or experience in order to carry out phishing attacks. Sometimes, 
minimal technical skills may be enough to break into computer systems or networks. 
For example, codes or devices that spy on victims and monitor their daily activities are 
easily available on the Internet. Examples of the codes or devises include keystrokes 
logger or keystrokes decoder and malicious software (malware).119 Some of them can 
be easily accessed and downloaded from the Internet.  
The manner in which codes or devices spy on victims is discussed below. This 
discussion is technically inclined. However, an attempt is made to simplify the study so 
that it becomes clear to an ordinary reader. The first section revises the use of sniffing 
devices, for example keystrokes loggers or keystrokes decoders in phishing. The 
second examines how malware works. 
(a) Sniffing Devices 
Sniffing devises are mostly microscopic devices. They are or may be attached to a 
computer keyboard.120 Once there, they observe and record every keystroke which a 
                                               
115   Best RB Identity theft: a legal research guide (Buffalo New York 2004) 2-3. 
116   Jasper MC Identity theft and how to protect yourself 2nd ed (Oceana Oxford 2006) 2-3 
and Granova P and Eloff JHP “A legal overview of phishing” 2005 Computer Fraud and 
Security 6-11 6. 
117   Jasper Identity 1.   
118   Whitson JR “Identity theft and the challenge of caring for your virtual self” 2000 (51) 
British Journal of Sociology 605-622 605-607. 
119   BusinessWeek http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_15/b3979068.htm 
(Date of use: 14 January 2010). 
120   Rasdale M “Denial of service attacks - legislating for robots and zombies” 2006 (22) 
Computer Law and Security Report 222. 
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victim types or enters.121 Computer crackers use keystroke loggers or decoders in 
order to intercept the online activities of a victim. As soon as this happens, computer 
crackers steal the sensitive information of victims. 
Two incidents can be mentioned that demonstrate the influence which keystrokes 
loggers or decoders have in illegally recording and stealing information. In one 
occurrence, a student compromised his school’s computer system.122 He hooked up a 
keystrokes logger in one of his teachers’ computers. This was made with a view to 
access and intercept the teacher’s confidential information, and to steal tests. The 
student carried out his deceitful dealings for several months without the school or the 
affected teacher being suspicious.123 Consequently, information and documents 
relating to test questions and answers were retrieved and some were sold to other 
students. In another case, a computer and technologically intelligent learner cracked 
the computer systems of his school.124 The student used his technological brilliance in 
order to steal his teachers’ personal information, for example, usernames, IDs and 
passwords. When in possession of the information, he gained entry into or accessed 
the school’s computer system, changed his friends’ marks and credited himself for 
classes that he had failed to attend.125 
(b) Malware 
Malware is a section or portion of malicious software.126 It comprises segments of 
cracking codes. They may be sets of numerical or phrases, codes or digits. These 
                                               
121   Janczewski LJ and Colarik AM Cyber warfare and cyber terrorism (Information Science 
Reference London 2008) 310 and Di Pietro R and Verde NV “Digital forensic techniques 
and tools” in Jahankhani H, Watson DL, Me G and Leonhardt F (eds) Handbook of 
electronic security and digital forensics (World Scientific Publishing New Jersey 2010) 
321-356 330. 
122   Estes and Jan 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/04/29/boston_latin_teen_is_accused_of
_hacking/ (Date of use: 14 January 2010). 
123   Estes and Jan 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/04/29/boston_latin_teen_is_accused_of
_hacking/ (Date of use: 14 January 2010). 
124   Click2Houston.com http://www.click2houston.com/rducation/4152951/detail.html (Date 
of use: 14 January 2010). 
125   Click2Houston.com http://www.click2houston.com/rducation/4152951/detail.html (Date 
of use: 14 January 2010). 
126   Brown E-mail spam 23. 
 137 
codes generate instructions on a computer and compel a computer system or network 
to function according to the wishes of a computer cracker.127 In carrying out phishing 
attacks, computer crackers attach malware into computer systems or networks.128 The 
malware generally causes harm to those systems or networks and subvert them to use 
other than that intended by a victim.129  
Malware can take a number of forms. It can be a collection of computer viruses or 
worms.130 The examples of these viruses or worms include rootkits,131 trojan horses,132 
backdoors, botnets or spyware.133 Like any other cracking attack, viruses or worms 
exploit a flaw or blemish in a computer system or network. They use a ‘refined stealth 
technique’134 in order to spread into the entire computer system or network and without 
the knowledge of a victim.135 After they had spread, the viruses or worms hide and 
masquerade as genuine computer programmes and sometimes, other anti-virus 
software. Thereafter, victims may be directed to a particular Website or Webpage. A 
request will consequently follow to the effect that a computer user should click a 
                                               
127   Skoudis ED and Zeltser L Malware: fighting malicious code (Pearson Education New 
Jersey 2004) 3. 
128   OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry Committee on Consumer 
Policy Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy 
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hyperlink which appears on such a Webpage.136 As soon as it has been clicked, the 
malware becomes active and begins to phish for sensitive information.  
Computer viruses or worms also download and invite other computer viruses or worms. 
This then frustrates or impedes the proper functioning of a victim’s computer. The 
computer then becomes a safe sanctuary (zombies or bots) for other viruses and 
worms.137 As soon as this happens, computer crackers commence and disperse 
viruses or worms to other victims from there.138  
Figure 4.6 below illustrates the methods that are often used in turning a victim’s 
computer into a zombie.139 
 
Figure 4.6: Compromise or attack of Web-servers. 
                                               
136   OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry Committee on Consumer 
Policy Committee for Information, Computer and Communications Policy 
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In figure 4.6 the connection between a victim’s computer and the Web-server is 
demonstrated. A cracker appears at the zombie computer at the top of figure 4.6. It 
(zombie) noticeably compromises and attacks the Web-server. It generates and installs 
Web-Sites and emails (mass-phishing emails) from this zombie computer. The latter 
lures and catches unsuspecting victims. Thereafter, it uses a victim’s computer to send 
malware-infected Websites and emails to other computer users. For tracing purposes, 
the URL which is registered under a victim’s name will appear from those Websites and 
emails. 
4.5.5 Summary 
ICTs present opportunities for criminals to commit theft of information online, that is, e-
crimes. Three scenarios are stated where these ICTs can be used for the 
aforementioned purpose. They can be an ‘instrument’ to perpetrate offences, a ‘target’ 
for criminals to attack and carry out crime or ‘storage machinery’ which is exploited in 
order to preserve information related to crimes.140 E-crimes mark a development of the 
established offences, for example theft or furtum. More specifically, they represent a 
migration of offline crimes in online settings. The different forms of e-crimes that are 
discussed in this chapter include computer cracking, DDoS attacks, man-in-the-middle 
attacks and phishing. Computer crackers exploit a blemish which is found in computer 
or information systems or networks. DDoS attacks deny and prevent victims from the 
lawfully accessing of computer or information systems or networks. Man-in-the-middle 
attacks operate effectively when a computer cracker is situated between the Web-
server and a victim’s computer. The expression ‘phishing’ was coined recently. In 
particular, the concept was formulated following contemporary criminal incidents. The 
AOL and phreaking attacks are but the few incidents that contributed to how the notion 
is currently understood. However, it is illustrated that criminals always found ways to 
commit phishing. A study of the crimes of dolus malus and crimen injuria reveals that 
behaviours comparable to phishing had long existed. These crimes were recognised in 
classical Rome and, to some extent, by South African courts. However, modern forms 
of technologies have transformed the manner of understanding phishing. They have 
also complicated the process to properly understand phishing. This has led some to 
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regard it as a communal and technological crime and others to conclude that it is a 
form of a social engineering and technical subterfuge attack.141  
Advanced computer skills are not necessary in order to carry out these forms of theft. 
Mostly, minimal expertise is sufficient to defraud victims of their sensitive information. 
Keystrokes loggers or decoders and malware serve as techniques that are frequently 
used for phishing. They generally moderate the efforts that are used for phishing. For 
example, they exclude the physical or actual removal of stolen information. In addition, 
there is no actual dispossession of information required in order for phishing to ensue. 
Lastly, there is no necessity to identify victims before the attacks are generated and 
sent. Computer crackers generate attacks online and indiscriminately send them to a 
number (or ‘sea’) victims.  
4.6 SCALE OF E-CRIMES 
4.6.1 Background  
Estimating the degree and magnitude of e-crimes is generally a cumbersome activity. 
Two factors can be mentioned that influence this difficulty. Firstly, e-crimes are 
commonly carried out in underground financial systems or markets.142 Such 
marketplaces do not publicise their accomplishments.143  
Secondly, victims of e-crimes or computer cracking attacks are usually hesitant to 
report those attacks.144 The fear of degradation, pecuniary losses and, sometimes, 
legal liabilities are but some of the issues that are associated with the abovementioned 
scepticisms.145 Despite these limitations, it is accepted that e-crimes continue to be the 
fast-growing internet crimes.  
4.6.2 Reported Data 
                                               
141   APWG http://www.antie-crimes.org/reports/apwg_trends_report_q1_2012.pdf (Date of 
use: 22 July 2012). 
142   Stavroulakis P and Stamp M (eds) Handbook of information and communication 
security (Springer Heidelberg 2010) 435. 
143   Myers Counter-measures 4. 
144   Myers Counter-measures 4. 
145   Myers Counter-measures 4. 
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Various institutions assist in detailing the advances and declines in e-crimes. In this 
chapter the reports by the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG)146 and MarkMonitor147 
are discussed. APWG detected a total number of 83 083 malware-infected Web Sites 
that targeted specific organisations or institutions during 2011.148 It reported an 
increase in this number during 2012. More than half (56 859) of these Web Sites that 
were reported during 2011 were established and used during the month of February 
2012. The number marked an ‘all-time high’ in the history of the APWG’s reporting 
framework. About 70.86 per cent of these sites were hosted in the US. China was the 
most malware infected country (57.13 per cent during the second half of 2011 and 
54.10 per cent in the first quarter of 2012). Furthermore, APWG reported that the HTTP 
port 80149 had been the most used port in committing e-crimes (standing at 99.324 per 
cent as compared to other ports).150  
MarkMonitor reports that typosquatting is mostly used in order to commit e-crimes.151 
Typosquatting is a particular form of cybersquatting.152 In one case, computer crackers 
register a domain name which resembles an existing trade or mark.153 The aim is to 
licence or sell the domain name to an owner of a mark or other victims.154 In others, 
computer crackers register misspellings of popular websites.155 For example, 
                                               
146   The APWG is a non-profit global, pan-industrial and law enforcement association. It 
focuses on eliminating fraud, crime and identity theft that result from e-crimes, 
pharming, malware and email spoofing. See APWG http://www.antiphishing.org/ (Date 
of use: 13 September 2012). 
147   MarkMonitor is an international institution which offers comprehensive online solutions 
that enable organisations around the globe to establish and defend themselves against 
multiple online risks. See MarkMonitor 
https://www.markmonitor.com/company/overview.php (Date of use: 13 September 
2012). 
148   APWG http://www.antiphishing.org/reports/APWG_GlobalPhishingSurvey_2H2011.pdf 
(Date of use: 22 July 2012). 
149   HTTP port 80 is a specific port that a web server listens to for requests from web users. 
See Anson S et al Mastering windows networks forensics and investigation (John Wiley 
Indianapolis 2012) 140. See also, Dubrawsky I How to cheat at securing your network 
(Syngress Publishing Burlington 2007) 175. 
150   APWG http://www.antiphishing.org/reports/apwg_trends_report_q1_2012.pdf (Date of 
use: 22 July 2012). 
151   MarkMonitor https://www.markmonitor.com/mmblog/typosquatting-continues-to-pose-
dangers-to-enterprises-consumers/ (Date of use: 20 August 2012). 
152   Howells M “Beware cybersquatters and typosquatters” 2002 (20) Ancestry Magazine 
55-58 56. 
153   Schwabach Internet and law 67-68. 
154   Howells 2002 Ancestry Magazine 56. 
155   Moore T and Edelman B “Measuring the perpetrators and funders of typosquatting” in 
Sion R (ed) Financial cryptography and data security (Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2010) 
175-191 175. See also Howell 2002 Ancestry Magazine 56. 
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http://mailyahoo.com may be entered instead of http://mail.yahoo.com, 
http://mailgmail.com as opposed to http://mail.gmail.com. This registration is made in 
anticipation that some victims will mistype a particular domain name or URL.156 When 
such misspellings are entered victims will be directed to a fictitious Web Site where e-
crimes are carried out.157  
E-crimes also pose a financial burden to governments, commercial institutions and 
consumers. In the US, it is reported that it accounted for approximately 483 million US 
dollars during 2009.158 The extent of the attacks resulted in about 545 000 US 
consumers being forced to replace their computers. The number of the attacks 
increased during 2010. For example, it is reported that the damage caused to 
consumers and their computers amounted to 650 million US dollars during 2010. As a 
result thereof, about 617 000 US consumers changed their affected or malware-
infected computers.159 The financial burden which is attributed to e-crimes is not limited 
only to the US. The UK government, institutions and consumers have also expended 
time and financial resources in an effort to prevent e-crimes. In particular, an amount 
that is estimated to be around 27 billion UK pounds was used during 2009 for the 
aforementioned purpose.160 The latter amount is divided into the following: 2.2 billion 
pounds was used by the UK government; 21 billion pounds by the UK businesses 
responsible for securing sensitive information, and 3.1 billion pounds by individual 
consumers.161  
                                               
156   Moore and Edelman Typosquatting 56. 
157   In particular, it is reported that 15 per cent of the victims who visit hacked web sites 
disclose their personal or sensitive information or data. See Oghenerukeybe EA 
“Customers perception of security indicators in online banking sites in Nigeria” 2009 
(14) Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce 1-15 2. 
158   Consumer Report Magazine http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-
archive/june-2009/electronics-computers/state-of-the-net/state-of-the-net-2009/state-of-
the-net-2009.htm (Date of use: 24 July 2012). 
159   Consumer Report http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-
archive/2010/june/electronics-computers/social-insecurity/state-of-the-net-
2010/index.htm (Date of use: 24 July 2012). 
160   UK Cabinet Office http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/news/making-travel-safer-
cyberspace (Date of use: 18 July 2012). 
161   UK Cabinet Office http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/news/making-travel-safer-
cyberspace (Date of use: 18 July 2012). 
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In South Africa, the economic impact of e-crimes equals to 0.14 per cent of the national 
GDP.162 It is estimated to be around 5.8 billion rand each year.163 It is then argued that 
this amount is likely to escalate in the event that e-crimes are insufficiently regulated.164 
These costs take various forms. They include costs of replacing the malware infected 
software and hardware, financial losses due to the theft of information, security costs 
and regulatory or costs that are necessary for the control of e-crimes. 
4.6.3 Summary 
Predicting the scale of e-crimes is commonly challenging. Secrecy of the activities 
involved in carrying out e-crimes, fear of victimisation and financial losses are some of 
the factors that contribute to this complexity. However, it is argued that incidents of e-
crimes continue to grow. This progression is mostly related to the evolution of modern 
technologies.  
Given this growth, a need exists to measure the scale of e-crimes. In doing so, the 
surveys and charts by APWG and MarkMonitor are studied. They demonstrate that 
countries continue to expend time and effort to curb e-crimes. In addition, these 
surveys reveal that computer crackers use typosquatting techniques for purposes of 
disguising the chain of e-crimes. In the latter instance, computer crackers establish and 
register Internet domain names that impersonate or masquerade as that of existing 
trades or marks. Examples are ‘http://mailyahoo.com’, ‘http://mailgmail.com’.  
4.7 CONCLUSION  
E-crimes can be seen as the contemporary version of the traditional crimes. More 
specifically, they have the elements that are similar to those found in conventional 
crimes. For example, phishing amounts to an unauthorised or fraudulent appropriation 
of a person’s information or particulars with the intention to of making gain out of the 
information. In this respect, e-crimes have some of the qualities of theft that are found 
in Roman-Dutch, English and South African law. However, e-crimes differ from 
                                               
162  Fripp http://htxt.co.za/2014/11/11/cybercrime-costs-south-africa-about-r5-8-billion-a-
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163  Center for Strategic and International Studies 
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traditional crimes in a number of respects. Firstly, they have to do with the 
appropriation of a particular kind of property, namely information. This appropriation 
does not necessarily amount to the tangible touching or handling of this property. 
Simply, a computer cracker attacks the security systems of a computer and accesses 
information that belongs to the victim. In this instance, a computer cracker does not 
actually dispossess the victim of physical possession of the information. In other words, 
the information does not physically move from the possession of the victim to the 
possession of computer cracker. Secondly, the scope of e-crimes is not limited by 
borders. In other words, e-crimes exploit the interconnectedness of computers in order 
to reach the vast number of victims in various locations. Accordingly, computer 
crackers do not essentially have to be in one particular jurisdiction in order to carry out 
malicious attacks. They may commence malware attacks in one location; disperse the 
attacks in another locality and the effect could be felt by victims in a number of 
jurisdictions.  
Figure 4.7 below provides a summary of the main similarities and differences between 
e-crimes. It reveals the scale and severity of e-crimes to the victims.  
E-Crimes  
Meaning 
 
Attack methods 
 
Severity 
 
Counter-measures 
 
Computer Cracking 
 
- Formally harmless 
attacks  - Associated with Open-
Source development - Aimed at identifying 
system insecurity / 
setbacks - Redesign security in 
order to correct 
identified system 
insecurities  
- Expose system 
insecurity - System / session 
interruption - Disperse viruses / 
worms - Create a ‘zombie’ 
computer - Appropriate 
information wrongfully 
- These attacks are 
not limited by 
borders - Computer crackers 
hides their identities 
and locations 
The measures to 
prevent computer 
cracking form part of a 
study of what is referred 
to in this research as 
the of ‘ICT regulatory 
agenda’. See Chapters 
5, 6, 7 and 8. 
 
DDoS Attacks  
 
- Mischievous attacks - Render systems un-
usable /inaccessible - Cause ‘catastrophic’ 
system errors - Interrupt system proper 
operation 
- Create system errors - Overload system with 
malicious requests - Block proper 
functioning of systems - Render systems 
inaccessible 
- DDoS attacks are 
pervasive - They are borderless 
(they know no 
borders) - Systems could be 
located in diverse - Effect felt by victims 
in diverse localities 
The measures to curb 
DDoS Attacks are 
studied in Chapters 5, 
6, 7 and 8. 
 
Man-in-the-Middle 
Attacks 
- Also referred to as 
transport protocol / TCP 
attacks - Computer cracker takes 
control of a system - Divert system / 
information   
- Computer cracker 
operates between 
computers - Hijack the computers - Attack LAN  / Web 
server - Delete  / re-route 
information  - Turn victim’s 
- Borderless attacks - Corroboration with 
local computer 
crackers is 
sometimes necessary  - Attacks to 
international victims 
using remote 
The measures to 
discourage man-in-the-
middle attacks are 
studied in Chapters 5, 
6, 7 and 8. 
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 computers into 
zombies - Eavesdrop on victim’s 
computers - Divert information 
 
locations 
 
Phishing 
 
- Has close 
resemblances with 
‘phreaking’ - Emblematic techniques 
are the lure, hook and 
catch. -  Social and technical 
attacks - Trick or defraud victims - Manipulate  victims by 
sending deceptive 
messages - Involves online ID theft 
and fraud - Computer crackers 
send malicious codes in 
order appropriate 
victims’ information 
fraudulent - The motivation is to gain 
(financial, espionage, 
terrorism, revenge, 
illegal immigration / 
assuming a new identity  
- Exploit weaknesses 
in systems - Impersonate genuine 
users - Sends sniffing / 
microscopic  devices 
and malware - In one case, 
computers or 
computer keystroke 
loggers are targeted - The victims 
keystrokes in a 
computer keyboard 
are then monitored - Victims’ information is 
then appropriated -  In other cases, 
malware is dispersed 
in victims’ system - Malware downloads 
other malicious codes - Victims’ computer 
then becomes a safe 
sanctuary for other 
viruses / codes 
- No sophisticated 
computer skills are 
necessary to carry 
out phishing - Messages that 
represents the lure, 
hook and catch are 
sent to diverse 
victims in different 
locations - Viruses / worms are 
attached to these 
messages - The refined stealth 
technique is usually 
used in order to hide 
the viruses / worms - Some of these 
viruses / worms are 
available on the 
Internet for free - The viruses / words 
are then spread into 
a victim’s computer 
& those connected 
to a victim  
 
The measures to 
prevent and deter 
phishing form part of a 
study of what is referred 
to in this research as 
the of ‘ICT regulatory 
agenda’. See Chapters 
5, 6, 7 and 8. 
Figure 4.7: summative assessment of the e-crimes 
Having examined the aforementioned disparities, it is argued that e-crimes generate 
grave challenges to the ICT regulatory agenda. On the one hand, the problem relates 
to the fact that law or legal rules operate within borders. This means that a state 
enforces its laws and legal rules in situations where a contravention of the rules 
occurred within its territory.165 On the other hand, a challenge arises in relation to the 
control of ICTs and consequently, e-crimes. Therefore, it becomes necessary to 
investigate questions regarding whether it is possible to regulate ICTs or not, and 
whether the law is or legal rules are sufficient to adequately address ICTs and the 
challenges that are generated by these contemporary technologies or not. These 
questions are more relevant because modern forms of technologies continuously 
develop whereas law relies on inflexible legal rules. 
Given the above-mentioned regulatory setbacks, chapter 5 below examines the 
structure of ICT regulations. It investigates an ICT regulatory framework which is 
founded on the law and that which is abstracted outside of the legal rules. Thus, a case 
is made that certain theories for regulation could assist in establishing an opposite ICT 
regulatory agenda. These theories are generally technology neutral and they assist in 
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providing a regulatory framework that is appropriate in order to prevent and control e-
crimes. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE STRUCTURE OF ICT REGULATIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The position of information in the law property was discussed in chapter 2 above. 
Specifically, it was investigated whether information is or should be property for legal 
purposes. Thus, it was revealed that information is a significant asset of an information 
society. Governments, institutions, businesses and individual computer users expend 
time, effort and money in order to gather information. Following this, there is legal 
interest in information. Because of this interest, these governments, institutions, 
businesses and individual computer users reasonably expect that this information 
should be legally recognised as an object of property rights. Because information is 
property for purposes of the law, an inquiry is made in chapter 3 regarding whether or 
not it is property that can be stolen. In that chapter, it was demonstrated that the law of 
theft is dynamic and flexible. It can be adapted according to the needs of a particular 
society. Given this flexibility, it is possible to regard information as property that is 
capable of being stolen.  
In chapter 4 the manner in which information that is kept online may be stolen was 
revealed. This theft does not necessarily result in the physical taking and carrying away 
of information. It simply results in the wrongful interference with the information of the 
victim. In addition, an illegal appropriation of online information does not have to be in 
respect of the whole information as such. It can also arise in situations where a person 
is unlawfully dispossessed of the part or copy of the information. Because of this, it is 
argued in chapter 4 that ICTs generate challenges to the information society. 
Particularly, ICTs have become more pervasive in the information society.1 This 
increase then leads to crimes especially the theft of information online, that is, e-crimes 
becoming widespread. Despite the fact that e-crimes are similar to the traditional forms 
of crimes, it is accepted that their impact and scope far exceeds those of its offline 
equivalents. The following example demonstrates in what way this occurs: a theft of a 
                                               
1   Costa AM “Emerging challenges” in Savona EU (ed) Crime and technology: new 
frontiers for regulation, law enforcement and research (Springer Dordrecht 2001) 1-6 1.  
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bicycle connotes a tangible or actual loss of that bicycle.2 However, an appropriation of 
information, in cases when a copy is illegally made, does not amount to the actual loss 
of that information.3 In this case, only the power to possess and deal with the 
information is lost.4 Furthermore, the degree and scope of e-crimes is not limited by, for 
example geographical borders. E-crimes can be started in one place and completed in 
another.  
Having examined the above-mentioned, it is submitted that ICTs or the challenges that 
are associated with ICTs generate difficulties for law. In view of these challenges, an 
effort is made in order to respond to and interrogate the questions that were mentioned 
in chapter 1. These questions are whether or not contemporary technologies can be 
managed, controlled or regulated by law, and whether the challenges that are 
generated by modern technologies can be managed and regulated by law or not. In 
addition, if ICTs and their associated challenges can be managed, controlled or 
regulated then how should such a technology management or regulatory framework be 
structured in law?  
With a view to scrutinise and respond to the aforementioned questions this chapter is 
divided into three sections. Section 1 discusses the differences between the law and 
regulations. It is contended that the law does not regulate in the same way as 
regulations do. Section 2 deals with ICT regulation. Selected theories are investigated 
that assist in providing for or establishing appropriate ICT regulatory structures. These 
theories help in modelling or shaping a regulatory framework which is suitable for ICT. 
Furthermore, this discussion is intended to discover and establish an innovative 
approach to ICT regulation.5 Section 3 is the conclusion. It examines the strengths and 
limitations of the theories in regulating ICTs. More specifically, it is illustrated that a 
discriminatory or selective way of studying the regulatory theories will undoubtedly not 
yield positive results to the overall study of ICT regulations. Therefore, it may be 
necessary to examine the principles upon which these theories are founded as a 
whole.  
                                               
2   Von Klink BMJ and Prins JEJ Law and regulation: scenarios for the information age 
(IOS Press Amsterdam 2002) 11. 
3   Von Klink and Prins Law and regulation 11. 
4   Von Klink and Prins Law and regulation 11. 
5  See Chapter 7 below. 
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5.2 THE LAW AND REGULATIONS 
5.2.1 The Law 
The traditional view regarding a process of regulating is that the law or legal rules 
regulate.6 The state or government plays an essential role in this regulation.7 The state 
specifically regulates in terms of ‘tools or toolkits’.8 The examples are the tools of 
detection and effecting. Detection enables the state to gather information about the 
society.9 Effecting is one of the instruments which a government uses in order to have 
an impact on and to influence the behaviour of society.10 This can be illustrated by 
means of an example: in cases where an allegation is made that a crime, for example 
furtum or theft is committed, the state investigates (tool of detection) the crime. This is 
aimed at ensuring that all the elements of the crime are present. Thereafter, the state 
imposes and enforces (tool of effecting) a penalty on a guilty person. The idea behind 
the aforesaid tools is to shape or assist in shaping the behaviour of society.11 
Consequently, one of the ideas of the positivist legal theory, wherein regulations 
assume a form of ‘command and control’, is adopted.12 In this manner, the law 
becomes a support structure for a state whereby legal rules are used in order to 
channel and control the behaviour of society and (legal) sanctions being imposed 
against transgressors.13 In other words, the law becomes a political tool wherein the 
most powerful in society imposes legal rules in order to regulate the conduct of those 
who are less powerful. This is the case because it ‘claims to be authoritative, the rules 
                                               
6   Black J Critical reflections on regulation (Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation 
London 2002) 2 and Ding J “Internet regulation” in Campbell D, Bán C, Bán S and 
Szabo S (eds) Legal issues in the global information society (Oceana Publications New 
York 2005) 279-351 281-282. 
7   Torfing J Politics, regulation and modern welfare state (MacMillan Press Ltd Hampshire 
1998) 142. 
8   Hood CC and Margetts HZ The tools of government in the digital age (Palgrave 
MacMillan New York 2007) 2. 
9   Hood and Margetts Tools of government 3. 
10   Hood and Margetts Tools of government 3. 
11   Hood and Margetts Tools of government 2. 
12   Baldwin R and Cave M Understanding regulation: theory, strategy, and practice (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 1999) 1-2 and Coglianese C and Mendelson E “Meta-regulation 
and self-regulation” in Baldwin R, Cave M and Lodge M (eds) The Oxford handbook of 
regulation (Oxford University Press Oxford 2010) 146-168 146. 
13   Black Critical reflections 2. 
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are part of a system, the system claims jurisdiction in a wide range of matters, the rules 
elicit obedience, and the rules are or derive from a sovereign’s command’.14 
A regulatory process which is founded on the law is generally stagnant and 
cumbersome.15 It fails to evolve with the time and demands a strict adherence to 
established sets of rules. The latter can be demonstrated by examining the process of 
law-making in South Africa. This law-making process is contained in the South African 
Constitution.16 For example, the legislative process commences with a discussion 
document which is referred to as a Green Paper. The Green Paper is followed by a 
second document which is known as a White Paper. This White Paper generally sets 
out the policy or programme of the current or existing government. After that, a Bill that 
embodies a draft version of the legislation or statute is prepared.17 The Bill is 
introduced or tabled in the National Assembly or the National Council of Provinces for 
consideration by the members. It is then referred to the related committee and 
published in the Government Gazette for the public to comment on it. The committee 
where the bill was referred will debate the bill and make certain amendments, if 
necessary. Accordingly, the last stage of the law-making process is to have the Bill 
assented to and signed into law by the president.18  
The ECT Act is currently one of the legal mechanisms to regulate ICTs. Chapter XIII of 
the ECT Act particularly sets out the ways of controlling the behaviours of computer 
users. It states that a user is or shall be guilty of an offence if the latter accesses or 
interferes with data without the requisite authority.19 Before this Chapter of the ECT Act 
was passed into law, it had to be subjected to the long and cumbersome process that 
is enunciated in Chapter 4 of the Constitution. It is submitted that this process poses a 
                                               
14   Watson A The nature of law (Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh 1977) 35. 
15   Barlow JP https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/EconomyOfIdeas.html (Date of use: 24 
October 2012). 
16   Chapter 4 of the Constitution. 
17   Various types of Bills are therefore distinguished, namely: Ordinary Bills (the Section 75 
Bills), Ordinary Bills that affect provinces (the Section 76 Bills), Money Bill (the Section 
77 Bills) and Constitutional Amendments (the Section 74 Bills). See Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group (PMG) http://www.pmg.org.za/parlinfo/sectionb3 (Date of use: 2 
November 2012).  
18   Ss 74(9), 75(1)(d) and 76(1)-(3) of the Constitution. It is important to note that the 
provision of assenting to and signing of Money Bills by the president is not expressly set 
out in the Constitution. See s 77 of the Constitution. 
19  See s 86 and 87 of the ECT Act. 
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challenge for ICT regulation. This is the case because ICTs change and develop 
almost on a daily basis. With these developments criminals explore innovative ways to 
circumvent the existing security measures of a system. Consequently, by the time all 
the steps that are listed in Chapter 4 of the Constitution are exhausted new e-crimes 
would have emerged which would not have been anticipated at the time of drafting the 
legislation.  
The challenges as set out above are even more apparent after studying Chapter XIII of 
the ECT Act. This Chapter deals with the interference with and destruction of data. It 
commences by discussing the unauthorised accessing of data. It will be recalled from 
chapter 1 of this research that the term data means the ‘electronic representations of 
information in any form’.20 This then indicates that computers or other electronic 
devices, for example mobile cellular phones are essential to the representation of 
information online. Taken further, this means that an unauthorised accessing of data is 
only possible in situations where computers or these devices have an Internet 
connection. Therefore, if a computer cracker only uses a computer or other means 
other than the Internet in phishing for information, then the e-crimes that are listed in 
sections 86 and 87 of the ECT Act cannot be expected to ensue.  
The above-mentioned may not be a misjudgement. This is specifically so if recent 
developments in e-crimes are to be taken into account. Nowadays, e-crimes do not 
only result in the destruction of or interfering with data. They also result in the 
unauthorised use of data. This use of data does not necessarily render the actual or 
original data meaningless to the victims of e-crimes. Furthermore, it does not mean that 
the data loses or will lose its shape and content given the fact that it is also available to 
a computer cracker. Following this reasoning, it is argued that it may have been fair 
and reasonable for Chapter XIII of the ECT Act to have been drafted the way it did at 
some stage before its commencement. Furthermore, the Chapter may have covered 
the kinds of e-crimes that existed at the time of its conceptualisation. However, its 
limitation as a regulatory tool rests on the premise that it does not cover current, 
emerging or future e-crimes. Because of this, it lacks foresight in the sense that it does 
not forecast the developments in ICTs and thus regulate the risks that are likely to arise 
                                               
20  See s 1 of the ECT Act. 
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as a result thereof. Consequently, the shortcomings of the ECT Act result or can result 
in a situation where it may be necessary to unceasingly modify and improve the ECT 
Act or provide legal rules that seek to address the challenges in Chapter XIII of the 
ECT Act. The example of this is the Draft Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Bill of 201521 
which encumbers the ICT regulatory agenda in South Africa by creating a long list of e-
crimes.  
5.2.2 Regulations 
Recent developments in regulatory frameworks have supported a move away from 
state regulations. It is argued that regulations or regulatory structures are disciplines 
separate from the law.22 Given this uniqueness, they should be allowed to develop as 
such.23 Accordingly, the law is not the only technique of social control.24 It becomes 
one of the four regulatory constraints or tools25 that are essential to the control of 
societal behaviour.26 The other constraints or tools are social norms,27 market28 and 
nature or ‘architecture’.29 These tools promote a shift or departure from a regulatory or 
controlling framework of state sanctions to a structure of regulation whereby other 
actors in regulatory paradigms, for example regulated industries, also play a role. They 
also illustrate a progression or development towards a ‘balancing act (in terms of) 
which just the right amount of support and restriction of private sector innovation is 
                                               
21  Hereinafter referred to as the CaC Bill. 
22   Morgan B and Yeung K An introduction to law and regulation: text and materials 
(Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2007) 1. 
23   Morgan and Yeung Law and regulation 1. 
24       Lessig L “The laws of cyberspace” in Spinello RA and Tavani HT (eds) Readings in 
cyberethics (Jones Bartlett Sudbury 2004) 134-144 134 and Kesan JP and Shah JC 
“Deconstructing code” 2003 (6) Yale Journal of Law and Technology 277-389 279. 
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approaches beyond Lessig and Hood” in Brownsword R and Yeung K (eds) Regulating 
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required for optimal results’.30 The term innovation needs additional clarity. It signifies 
‘a process and it results ....in a new functionality or a new way of using an existing 
functionality’.31 This functionality is relevant both in both the private and the public 
sectors.32 
Regulations are (or appear to be) more flexible than the law or legal rules.33 The 
ordinary law-making process is not applicable in regulations. Thus, they are introduced 
to the public (or society) whenever a country’s state sees a need for their introduction 
and provided that they are empowered to do so. The intensity of this process is also 
not as rigorous as that demanded for law-making purposes.34 In addition, regulations 
provide for an amorphous and adaptable controlling framework which is or can be 
applied to ‘any widely derived source of control or direction’.35 Given the flexibility of 
regulations, it is accepted that regulations should be seen as a field that is distinct from 
the law. However, this separation does not imply that the law does not or ceases to 
have a role to play in regulation. Conversely, the law continues to play a facilitative 
function in the sense of channelling the shape of regulations.  
Notwithstanding the agreement regarding the necessity for a move towards regulatory 
instruments, it is argued that a holistic or all-inclusive view regarding the meaning and 
structure of regulations is currently lacking. Brownsword submits that regulations 
remain an ‘unwieldy concept’ whereby an absence of confidence regarding who 
regulates and what is being regulated subsists.36 There are some who regard 
                                               
30   Gregersen B “The public sector as a pacer in national systems of innovation” in 
Lundvall BÅ (ed) National systems of innovation: toward a theory of innovation and 
interactive learning (Anthem Press London 2010) 133-150 134-135.  
31   Heldeweg MA “Legal design of smart rules and regimes – regulating innovation” in 
Heldeweg MA and Kica E (eds) Regulating technological innovation: a multidisciplinary 
approach (Palgrave Macmillan Hampshire 2011) 52-76 53. 
32   Heldeweg Legal design 53. 
33   Stenning PC et al “Controlling interests – two conceptions of order in regulating a 
financial market” in Friedland ML (ed) Securing compliance: seven case studies 
(University of Toronto Press Toronto 1990) 88-119 102. 
34   Barlow JP https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/EconomyOfIdeas.html (Date of use: 24 
October 2012). 
35   Murray AD “Conceptualising the post-regulatory (cyber) state” in Brownsword R and 
Yeung K (eds) Regulating technologies: legal futures, regulatory frames and 
technological fixes (Hart Publishing Portland 2008) 287-315 288. 
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regulations or regulatory processes as instruments by a state (in order) to influence the 
behaviour of society by introducing legal rules.37 To this end, a form of principal-agent 
or regulator-regulated relationship comes into existence. In this relationship, it is 
inferred that a state occupies a superior position in society or community. Given this 
supremacy, regulations become a tool for a state to inhibit and constrain the manner in 
which the agents of regulations, that is, a society, conducts or wishes to conduct 
themselves.38 The regulator-regulated relationship is favoured by Koops,39 
Brownsword40 and Canguilhem.41 For Koops, every regulatory process is naturally a 
controlling exercise.42 In this exercise, the behaviour of humans or society is directed 
towards a particular angle by means of rules or limitations.43 To achieve this end, a 
state can use whatever means possible, sometimes including the imposing of 
sanctions.44 Canguilhem states that a regulatory process is the ‘adjustment in 
accordance with certain rules or norms of a plurality of movements or acts, and their 
effects or results, which (they) because of their diversity or succession are rendered 
alien to each other’.45  
However, some academics criticise the rule-based examination of regulations.46 They 
argue that rules are never neutral and objective.47 In particular, they are human 
                                               
37   Koops BJ “Should ICT regulation be technology neutral?” in Koop BJ, Lips M, Prins C 
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38   Mitnick BM Planning regulation: a framework for the analysis of regulatory possibilities 
(University of Pittsburg Pittsburg 1979) 4 and Mitnick BM Regulation and the theory of 
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1979) 8. 
39   Koops Technology 80-81. 
40   Brownsword 2005 Journal for Legal Studies 4. 
41   Canguilhem 1985 Encyclopedia Universalis 797. 
42   Koops Technology 80-81. 
43   Koops Technology 80-81. 
44   Brownsword 2005 Journal for Legal Studies 4. 
45   Canguilhem 1985 Encyclopedia Universalis 797. 
46   Gunningham N “Enforcement and compliance strategies” in Baldwin R, Cave M and 
Lodge M (eds) The Oxford handbook of regulation (Oxford University Press Oxford 
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inventions that ‘rely on interpretation, enforcement and sanction’ through human 
dealings.48 To assist in moving away from this rule-based approach to regulation, a 
decentring analysis is proposed. The decentring analysis recognises that the use of 
different role-players, for example a state, individual firms or regulated industries and 
society or community in regulatory paradigms, produce or can produce better 
regulation.49 Better regulation is opposed to or promotes a shift from less regulation.50 
It is sometimes equated with Good Regulations.51 Good Regulations rely on whether 
regulations meet the necessary benchmarks for their evaluations or not.52 These are 
whether a regulatory framework is supported by legislative authority; there is an 
appropriate scheme of accountability; the regulatory procedures are fair, accessible, 
and open; the regulator has the requisite expertise, and the framework for regulation is 
efficient or not.53 They also improve regulations and the tools that are commonly used 
in regulatory frameworks.54 The aforementioned is done by ensuring that regulations 
are both effective and efficient.55 Because better regulations are not a product of the 
single state actor, the role-players in regulations, that is, the state and the regulated 
industries decide on proper regulatory benchmarks that are to be adopted and applied 
by them. 
A number of concepts assist in ensuring that better regulations are attained. These 
concepts are referred to as smart-regulations, meta-regulations or reflexive regulations, 
self-regulations and co-regulations.56 These concepts are important to this chapter. In 
particular, they help in understanding the ICT regulatory theories that are examined in 
section 5.3 below.  
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(a) Smart Regulations  
Smart regulations are the opposite of ‘dumb regulations’. Dumb regulations present 
themselves in a number of ways. Firstly, they put ‘pointless burdens on businesses’.57 
Secondly, they fail to ‘reflect changing technology’.58  Thirdly, they are ‘overly 
protective of the turf’ in the sense that they ‘leave investors as sheep to be sheared’.59  
However, smart regulations emphasise a progression beyond state control and 
government rules.60 They provide that legal rules are insufficient to control social 
behaviour.61 Accordingly, they entail a study of legal rules and the normative 
frameworks within which the rules operate.62 Therefore, rules do not become stationary 
or inflexible objects.63 They evolve and allow for the establishment of regulatory 
structures that holistically mixes or matches all the role-players that are or should be 
involved in regulatory structures.64   
In Europe, a move has been witnessed towards smart regulations. Specifically, this 
shift is motivated by the realisation that legal rules are the supporters of dumb 
regulations. This acceptance appears in fields such as consumer protection. For 
example, the European Consumer Organisation (The Consumer Voice in Europe) 
articulates the need for smart regulations.65 It states that this form of regulating is 
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human genetics, food and patents (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Cheltenham 2007) 3-
18 6. 
61   House of Commons Regulatory Reform Committee Getting results 181-184. 
62   European Commission “Smart regulation in the European Union” 8 October 2010 2-3 
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indispensable because it places the welfare of consumers at the forefront of the 
regulatory process.66  
(b) Meta-Regulations  
Meta-regulations are also referred to as reflexive regulations. Reflexive regulations 
entail a structure of regulation that controls and manages other associated regulatory 
structures.67 In addition, they discourage the understanding that the state is the only 
primary role-player in regulation.68 More specifically, they acknowledge that the 
‘capacity of the regulatory state to deal with increasingly complex social issues has 
declined dramatically’.69  
Morgan submits that the notion of meta-regulation ‘captures a desire to think reflexively 
about regulation, such that rather than regulating social and individual action directly, 
the process of regulation itself becomes regulated’.70 Thus, a regulatory process, within 
the context of meta-regulations, is regarded as the progression within which affected 
industries establish their own systems of domestic or internal control and 
management.71 In this instance, a state regulates at a distance,72 and can sometimes 
be an agency within which regulations apply.73 Ford supports the importance of meta-
regulations.74 He states the following: 
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….open-ended, learning systems are preferable . . . where the 
regulator “knows the result it is trying to achieve but does not know 
the means for achieving it, when circumstances are likely to change 
in ways that the [regulator] cannot predict, or when the regulator does 
not even know the precise result that she desires.”75 
Meta-Regulations have been found by some to be more suited in environmental 
studies. Specifically, it is established that this particular form of regulating has worked 
very well in mitigating the risks caused by pollution.76 This success is attributed to the 
fact that the regulatory role-players adopt specific regulatory measures and, thereafter, 
self-assess their performance in meeting these regulations.77 In South Africa, this form 
of regulating seems to be preferred by, for example the Health Professions Council of 
South Africa.78 The HPCSA works in conjunction and co-ordinates with its other 12 
Professional Boards79 in guiding and regulating the health professions in South 
Africa.80  
(c) Self-Regulation  
Self-regulation connotes self-control and self-correction.81 Regulatory industries control 
and modify their behaviours and activities in order for those behaviours and activities to 
conform to particular desired ends.82 It also presupposes an independent method or 
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structure of regulating.83 For example, the regulatory industries interact with each other 
in order to establish a set of regulatory standards for their compliance.84 
Schraw, Crippen and Hartley argue that self-regulations have been pivotal in science 
education.85 From the forgoing, regulators are required to identify the desired 
regulatory objectives and remove certain impediments to the achievement of those 
targets.86 In order to do this, it is necessary to ‘select strategies that help us achieve 
these goals, implement those strategies, and monitor our progress towards our 
goals’.87 
(d) Co-Regulation  
Co-regulation is generally a combination of government and self-regulations.88 In this 
instance, the government and self-regulatory industries collaborate in order to establish 
a particular regulatory paradigm.89 On the one hand, the state recommends a particular 
regulatory framework.90 On the other hand, the self-regulatory industries generate 
rules, methods and ways of administering the rules.91 
One of the examples where co-regulations have been found to be productive is the 
area of food safety.92 In this field, it was established that this form of regulating is the 
most transparent and trustworthy of the regulatory concepts.93 
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5.2.3 Summary 
Regulatory frameworks will almost always differ depending on the regulatory processes 
that are selected or used. For example, laborious sets of rules are required to be 
followed in order to commence the law-making process. When it has been passed, the 
law regulates in terms of particular tools or toolkits. These tools necessitate that a 
regulator-regulated relationship should commence. In this relationship, the state 
channels the behaviour or activities of society towards a particular angle.94 In cases 
where society becomes disobedient of the rules, the state enforces the rules by 
imposing sanctions.  
However, regulations as compared to law are flexible95 and easier to establish.96 For 
their commencement, a convenient and adaptable process is necessary. Despite this 
flexibility and convenience, differences exist regarding the proper meaning and 
structure of regulations. One viewpoint argues that regulations are a form of ‘command 
and control’ mechanism.97 To this end, the state regulates in terms of legal rules.98 
However, others recommend a decentring analysis to regulation. This recognises the 
importance of other role-players, for example, society and regulated firms, to a 
regulatory structure.99 It also leads to what is referred to as better regulation.100 Better 
regulation is generally opposed to a rule-based framework of regulating. It 
acknowledges that rules are human inventions to control human relations.101 
Consequently, partial or subjective conjectures regarding the behaviours that are 
sanctioned or punished by the imposition of legal rules are likely to ensue. Concepts, 
for example smart-regulations, meta-regulations or reflexive regulations, self-
regulations and co-regulations, are distinguished that supplement and, sometimes, 
contradict better regulation.  
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The move towards establishing better regulations does not necessarily mean that the 
state becomes insignificant to the ICT regulatory agenda. This essentially illustrates 
that ICT regulatory measures should generally not be a product of a single state actor. 
Rather, the state becomes or should become one of the role-players in ICT regulations. 
5.3 ICT REGULATION  
5.3.1 Background 
There is no easy answer which currently exist regarding the question whether it is 
possible to regulate (or govern)102 recent technologies or not. There is a viewpoint that 
a technology has or creates its own space.103 This space is referred to as the 
‘cyberspace’.104 Cyberspace, it is argued, is a space where no one is in charge. It is 
principally a space in which people are free from state control.105 Furthermore, 
cyberspace is, as Biegel puts it, a ‘mysterious conglomeration of virtual communities’106 
and a ‘lawless frontier where anarchy and vigilantism are alive and well’.107 In this 
space, regulations ‘adapt by continuous increments and at pace second to geology in 
its stateliness. Technology advances in.....lunging jerks like punctuation of biological 
evolution grotesquely accelerated.....this Mismatch is permanent’.108 Therefore, 
technology and regulations are opponents. Technology connotes marketplaces, new 
                                               
102   Weber RH Shaping internet governance: regulatory challenges (Springer Heidelberg 
2009) 203. 
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ventures and development.109 Regulations symbolise supervision, bureaucracy and 
affront to development.110   
However, there are those who contest this alleged total exclusivity of cyberspace.111 
They state that cyberspace or the development of cyberspace is partially linked to the 
physical space.112 More specifically, the activities that are carried out through the use 
of current technologies have relevance for the computer users or other entities relying 
on computers.113 The aforementioned can be illustrated by means of an example: 
Suppose that M is a customer of B Bank. M wishes to access B Bank’s Internet 
banking (e-banking) facilities in order to transfer money to C. In terms of B Bank’s e-
banking facilities, all its customers must enter their identifying particulars before they 
are or can be logged on to B Bank’s e-banking facilities. In this regard M will have to 
comply with the laws and regulations of the country where he resides, of the country 
where the computers belonging to B Bank are located and of the country where B Bank 
is situated. These laws and regulations can include those that relate to privacy and the 
protection of national borders. Once logged on to B Bank’s e-banking facilities, M has 
to obey the laws that are created for and by cyberspace. These include the laws that 
govern the manner of processing and sharing data or information, encryption or e-
authentication. Given the aforementioned association, it is argued that technology 
regulation is not a phenomenon or process completely disconnected from real or 
physical space. An activity undertaken through the use of ICTs will, as shown in the 
example above, have an impact on other activities occurring in non-virtual spaces. 
Therefore, technology is a space or sphere where regulations apply or should apply. 
This consequently brings us to the next question, namely, how should these modern 
technologies be regulated, controlled and managed?  
In this chapter, a selected number of theories for regulating ICTs and their associated 
challenges are discussed. The theories include the codes-based theory or regulation 
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113   Bonnici Cyberspace 1. 
  
164 
 
by codes, the Danger or Artificial Immune Systems (the AIS) theory, the Systems 
theory and the Good Regulator Theorem. These theories are not regulations as such. 
They merely assist in establishing better ICT regulations. The latter simply means that 
the different role-players in ICT regulation assume the role of a regulator. They also 
help in creating a method of regulating which is best suited to the technologies to be 
regulated and the challenges that are connected to ICTs. Furthermore, they support 
the hypothesis that better regulations can only be achieved in situations where the role-
players in technology regulation and the interaction of the role-players during 
technology regulation is allowed to flourish. Lastly, the theories propagate the 
significance of developing technology-neutral or technology-independent114 regulatory 
regimes.115 The latter accepts that legal rules still have a facilitative role to play in ICT 
regulations. 
The term ‘theory’ has to be understood according to what this concept particularly 
means for purposes of technology regulation. It shall therefore be understood to denote 
a ‘set of propositions or hypothesis about why regulations or regulatory processes 
emerge, which actors contribute to that emergence and typical patterns of integration 
between regulatory actors’.116 
5.3.2 The Codes-Based Theory  
The theory of regulation by codes generally found its significance during the 1990s. 
Some of the founders of this theory are Reidenberg117 and Lessig.118 It is sometimes 
compared with ‘techno-regulation’.119 Techno-regulations accept that both the codes 
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and the design of the codes are indispensable to the ‘regulatory repertoire’.120 In the 
narrow sense, codes denote ‘computer codes’.121 The examples include a password, 
pin and username. In the broad sense, codes are referred to as the ‘architecture’122 
and sometimes, the technical architecture of the Internet.123 This relates to all the 
hardware and software that function as normative rules.124 It comprises the layers that 
together make an ICT infrastructure. These layers are the content layer (the symbols 
and images), the application layer (the underlying infrastructure that the Internet or 
Web programmes operate on), the transport (TCP) layer, the Internet protocol (IP) 
layer (the infrastructure that handles the flow of data), the link layer (this is the interface 
between physical layer and the network layer) and the physical layer (the copper, wire 
and links).125  
A study of the codes-based theory is divided into two (2) sub-sections. Sub-section (a) 
investigates the theory of Lex Informatica. Sub-section (b) examines the codes-based 
approach.  
(a) Lex Informatica 
Lex Informatica draws inspiration from the Law Merchant (Lex Mercatoria) of the 
Middle Ages.126 Law Merchant included the laws of different nation states.127 These 
laws were enshrined in the practices and customs of those nation states.128 It 
developed as a result of the necessity to regulate and control expansions in cross-
                                               
120   Yeung Regulation by design 81. 
121   Koops BJ “Criteria for normative technology – the acceptability of ‘Code as Law’ in light 
of democratic and constitutional values” in Brownsword R and Yeung K (eds) 
Regulating technologies: legal futures, regulatory frames and technological fixes (Hart 
Publishing Portland 2008) 157-174 158. 
122   Lessig Cyberspace 134. 
123   Bonnici Cyberspace 115. 
124   Kesan and Shah 2003 Yale Journal of Law and Technology 281. 
125   Chung M and Solum LB “The layers principle – internet architecture and the law” 2004 
(79) Notre Dame Law Review 815-948. 
126   Johnson and Post 1996 Stanford Law Review 1389.  
127   Pollock F and Maitland FW The history of English law before the time of Edward I 2nd 
(Cambridge University Cambridge 1968) 467 and Trakman LE “From the medieval Law 
Merchant to E-Merchant Law” 2003 (53) University of Toronto Law Journal 265-304 
265. 
128   Trakman 2003 University of Toronto Law Journal 265. 
  
166 
 
border trading.129 Consequently, it was necessary to establish a set of rules that were 
separate from those national laws. These rules were designed to control merchant 
activities. Furthermore, the merchant rules were to be applied by special Merchant 
courts. It is argued that the aforesaid rules grew rapidly and became so dynamic and 
resilient that they progressed with market improvements.130  
Having monitored the successes of the merchant rules, Lex Informatica was 
developed. It studies the differences between legal rules and the technical architecture 
of the Internet. It accepts that legal rules and technological rules differ. For instance, 
the elementary structure for legal regulation is the law.131 However, the basic structure 
or framework for Lex Informatica is the architectural standard of the Internet, for 
example, the HTTP and the defaults.132 In addition, it concedes that the foundation of 
default rules for a law-making process is the state.133 However, the foundation of 
default rules for Lex Informatica is the ‘technology developer and the social process’ in 
terms of which the use of technology develops.134  
According to Lex Informatica, the technology itself or its applications impose 
regulations on computer users.135 The nature of or the choices in the design of the 
technology generally establish the existence of these rules. Therefore, technologies 
can be regulated through or by relying on their design choices or architecture.136 This is 
the position because the design or architecture of the technology determines who 
should access a particular technology and who should not.137 This accessing depends 
on who holds the required authentication key, for example, username or password. 
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Regulations in accordance with Lex Informatica do not imply the direct regulation or 
management of cyberspace.138 They signify a balancing exercise which influences a 
modification or change to a technological architecture.139 
(b) The Codes-Based Approach  
The codes-based approach is an additional development of Lex Informatica. It 
acknowledges the existing differences between the real or physical space and 
cyberspace, and the activities that take place in these respective spaces. The notion of 
‘dual presence’ is introduced in order to illustrate these differences. It implies that 
computer users occupy two spaces at once. They are both offline or are in real physical 
world and online or in virtual spaces. It also accepts that the manner in which computer 
users communicate and transact whilst online is opposed to that which applies when 
they are in physical spaces.140 In real spaces, legal rules regulate and constrain their 
activities or behaviours. In cyberspace, codes or architecture develop particular 
regulatory frameworks within which their activities should be controlled.141 The 
examples of these codes include the software that provides for internet filtering or 
blocking. Internet filtering technologies prevent or limit the accessing or distribution of 
particular information.142  
Having examined how codes regulate or operate, it is stated that a suitable method of 
controlling modern technologies is one which recognises the following:  
People meet, and talk (communicate), and live in cyberspace in ways 
not possible in real space. They build and define themselves in 
cyberspace in ways not possible in real space. And before they get cut 
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apart by regulation, we (regulators) should know something about their 
form, and more about their potential.143 
Furthermore, the regulatory structures that are based on codes should comprehend the 
disparities between real physical spaces and automated or cyberspace 
communications.144 This includes an understanding of how codes regulate as opposed 
to how legal rules govern.145  
In summary, it is revealed that Lex Informatica and the codes-based approach belong 
to the same codes-based theory. The former follows the successes of Lex Mercatoria. 
It particularly draws a clear distinction between the foundation of legal rules and default 
rules. Consequently, the design or architecture of a technology determines the manner 
of controlling that technology. The latter accepts that regulating online behaviours will 
always be different as compared to the control of the activities that occur offline. For 
example, codes (and not the law) are relevant when regulating online activities. 
Therefore, it is essential for regulators to understand these disparities. This should 
compel them to model their regulatory frameworks using the aforesaid dissimilarities.  
5.3.3 The Danger or AIS Theory 
The danger or AIS theory is a biologically-inspired regulatory approach. It draws 
inspiration from the biological immune system (BIS).146 The BIS consists of various 
kinds of cells or molecules or lymphocytes, macrophages, dendritic cells, natural killer 
cells, mast cells, interleukins and interferons.147 It is generally a defence organism or 
mechanism for the human or organic body.148 It also serves as a protection mechanism 
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against external attacks (pathogens).149 The examples of these attacks include bacteria 
and viruses.150 The BIS distinguishes and discriminates between self and non-self 
attacks.151 Self-attacks relate to those that are known to a system or human body. Non-
self attacks include those that arise in the future as a result of a system being exposed 
to danger. For these attacks to be recognised by a system, alarm signals (Pattern 
Recognition Receptors) from injured tissues are reported.152 Thereafter, the immune 
system reacts by breaking down these attacks. The aim of all this is to maintain or 
restore a balance in a body.153 In cases where a balance cannot be maintained, it then 
becomes necessary to inject a body (process of immunisation) with security boosting or 
enhancement measures.  
Having observed the workings of the BIS, the AIS theory was introduced. Its popularity 
can be attributed to the fact that a biological body is also understood in terms of ‘codes, 
dispersals or networks’.154 A biological body is armed with biological immune systems 
that are ‘robust, adaptable and autonomous’.155 Given the aforementioned, it is argued 
that computer systems or networks also possess characteristics that are analogous to 
that of a human body.156 They are dynamic in that programmes and software are 
installed and erased whenever there is need, new computer users emerge almost 
every day and configurations always change.157  
For purposes of technology regulation, the AIS theory supports a creation of a self-
protective framework (immune system). The immune system should be able to respond 
to external non-self attacks or dangers. The dangers should be measured by ‘damage 
to cells indicated by distress signals that are sent out when cells die an unnatural death 
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(cell stress or lytic cell death, as opposed to programmed cell death or apoptosis)’.158 In 
addition, it should facilitate the building of different sets of detectors (intrusion detection 
systems), for example anomaly and misuse detections. These detectors should 
correspond with conventional antigens.159 These antigens must be empowered with 
sniffing capabilities. They ought to be able to sense external anomalies, for example 
the illegal use, exploitation and abuse (intrusions) of computer systems.160 The 
anomalies should then be matched with known or probed intrusions. If there is a match, 
or should the anomalies go beyond a particular threshold, the detectors should be 
automatically activated.161 This activation ought to consequently be reported to an 
operator who must then assess and evaluate the anomalies.162 
5.3.4 The Systems Theory  
The systems theory was first introduced by Von Bertalanffy during the 1930s. He 
acknowledges that a study of systems has been a province of academic scrutiny for 
many years. However, Von Bertalanffy observes that academics have failed to 
examine the dynamics of systems. Having spotted this loophole, he then introduced the 
idea of a ‘general system theory’.163 The general system theory holds the view that 
‘every living organism is an open system, characterised by a continuous import and 
export of substances or subsystems.164 It also describes systems as elements or parts 
that are connected or attached to an operated organism, like a computer.165 These 
systems can include a ‘set of social, biological, technological or material partners’ that 
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collaborate on a common purpose.166 Von Bertalanffy calls this organism the ‘whole or 
wholeness’ of a system.167  
The idea that computers operate in a similar fashion to other organisms, for example 
humans, animals or plants needs to be substantiated. It does not necessarily suggest 
that computers have a life of their own or that their operation can be linked to Plato’s 
two world theory, namely the sensible and intelligible worlds.168 Computers particularly 
carry out the functions as directed by humans. Sometimes, these functions are beyond 
the scope of what is normally anticipated in real physical spaces or offline. Simon 
appears to also support this viewpoint.169 From his reasoning, it is inferred that 
computers fall within the category of things or objects that he refers to as the ‘artificial’ 
or ‘man-made’ things or objects.170 These he calls objects that are a product of or 
generated by art rather than nature.171 They are not authentic or natural and do not 
have relations with the essence of the matter, for example the force of gravity.172 
The general systems theory acknowledges that various systems produce their own 
existence within a living organism.173 They cultivate their own languages. These 
languages are appropriately understood by those who habitually or consistently work 
with those living organism, that is, technicians or computer programmers.174 Von 
Bertalanffy cautions technicians and computer programmers against the danger of 
becoming a computer ‘moron, button-pusher or learned idiot’.175 These he describes as 
people who do not contribute to computer innovation or solve existing technology 
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regulatory challenges.176 He then requires that a technology regulatory framework 
should examine the ‘whole or wholeness’ of all the systems that make-up the living 
organism.177  
The works of Morgan and Yeung in relation to the systems theory of regulation are also 
worth noting. They group the systems theory under the label ‘institutionalist’.178 This 
grouping is made following the criticism of the systems theory that it fails to recognise 
the important role played by institutions in regulatory settings.179 Morgan and Yeung 
acknowledge that institutional dynamics have ‘a life of their own in regulatory 
regimes’.180 Also, they concede that regulatory theories must accept that rule-based 
spheres, for example regulatory organisation, corporations or states are essential in 
‘explaining why or how regulation emerges’.181 In particular, they must accept that 
regulations are a product of an organisational structure.182 Therefore, processes, for 
example rules, norms and routines, serve as a guide for such a structure.183 The 
meaning of ‘rules’, norms and routines in this instance is not attributed to legal rules, 
norms and routines. However, they connote for purposes of the systems theory of 
regulating ‘rules, norms or routines of technology’ or ‘technological rules, norms or 
routines’.184 
An approach to an ICT regulation which is abstracted from the institutionalist label is 
one which recognises and is modelled from society or societal developments. In 
particular, it accentuates the idea that systems are closed and self-referential 
spaces.185 In addition, systems generate or re-generate their own constituent parts 
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through interaction with their various constituent parts.186 Accordingly, legal rules do 
not shape the activities or behaviours of systems. Simply, legal rules are peripheral 
nuisances to the workings and operations of systems.187 
5.3.5 The Good Regulator Theorem 
Conant and Ashby are the champions of the Good Regulator Theorem.188 The theorem 
claims that every good regulator of any arrangement must be a model or reproduction 
of that specific arrangement.189 For our purposes, this means that a framework to 
regulate ICTs must be a representation of the software or networks that form the basis 
of the technology to be regulated.190 From this, it is deduced the theory that ‘every 
good key must be a model of a lock it opens’.191 Simply put, it means something like 
the following: 
 (The) pursuit of a goal by some dynamic agent (Regulator) in the face of 
a source of obstacles (System) places at least one particular and 
unavoidable demand on that agent, which is that the agent’s behaviours 
must be executed in such reliable and predictable way that they can 
serve as a representation (Model) of that source of obstacles.192  
Having observed the argument by Scholten, it is argued that ICTs are a conglomeration 
of systems or networks many of which have sub-systems or sub-networks. They share 
similar characteristics. These characteristics have similar structures or shapes and 
others do not. Therefore, regulators are required to develop regulatory models that 
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appreciate the functioning or non-functioning of the systems or networks. The basis 
must be to establish a framework to control existing hindrances and to also provide 
solutions to potential disputes.193 This framework should discourage regulators from 
habitually and invariably re-inventing the technology ‘regulatory wheel’.194 In other 
words, regulators should anticipate the dynamics of systems or networks (system or 
network dynamics), and the various challenges that those systems are likely to 
generate.195 This should enable them to create ICT regulatory paradigms that are 
bound to the technology and are evolving with it.196 Lastly, it requires regulators to 
establish and identify areas where ICT challenges are likely to ensue and thereafter to 
map, design and re-design measures or processes that respond to the looming 
challenges. 
Better regulations for purposes of the Good Regulator Theorem would be those that 
are conceptualised and adopted by the people who are involved in a particular industry. 
For example, regulations for ICT industry would require that expert or skilled people in 
that industry be involved. The basis for all this is to ensure that ICT regulations are 
modelled from the technology itself and the dynamics of the systems or networks that 
form the basis of the ICT.    
5.3.6 Summary 
The question regarding whether or not ICTs can properly be regulated is no longer only 
a question of fact. It has nowadays become a question which the legislators also 
grapple with. However, a proper scrutiny of this question has been hampered by the 
existing disagreements regarding whether or not recent forms of technologies can be 
regulated or controlled. For example, there are some who argue that ICTs and 
regulations are distinctive and, sometimes, opposing spheres. Technologies connote 
innovation, growth and development. However, regulations imply administration, 
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bureaucracy and an affront to innovation, growth and development. Given these 
differences, it is argued that one domain cannot or should not be used to control and 
manage the other. There are also others who contend that technologies or the activities 
that take place through the use of technologies are connected to real physical spaces. 
Consequently, technologies are spheres where regulations apply or should apply.  
In this research, the view that ICTs can be regulated is preferred. Following this 
preference, it is then asked how such a technology controlling or regulatory framework 
should be structured? An attempt is made in this chapter to answer this question by 
examining the certain selected theories related to technology regulation. These are the 
codes-based theory, the AIS theory, the systems theory and the Good Regulator 
Theorem. The theories are not necessarily ICT regulations. They only assist in creating 
a regulatory structure which is able to respond to ICTs and the ease with which these 
technologies develop. 
An examination of the codes-based theory is divided into two sections. There is Lex 
Informatica and the codes-based approach. Lex Informatica avers that the law is the 
structure of legal regulation. However, the Internet architecture or design structure is an 
indispensable framework for lex Informatica. The Internet architecture and the design 
of the technology regulate or impose regulations. The codes-based approach builds 
from lex Informatica. It accepts that codes are essential for technology regulation. 
These codes determine who should access the technology and who should not. An 
example of this is the technology related to Internet filtering. The AIS theory is an 
immunological regulatory approach which is inspired by biology. It is modelled on how 
a human body defends itself from the outside or non-self attacks, for example, germs 
and viruses. It submits that ICTs have characteristics that are similar to those found in 
a human body. Therefore, defence mechanisms that are analogous to those that are 
found in humans should be built. The defence measures are referred to as a set of 
detectors (immune system). They help in segregating between different attacks. They 
also assist in sniffing out non-self anomalies in computer systems or networks. The 
systems theory is influenced by the works of a number of academics. Firstly, the 
‘general systems theory’ is revealed. It avers that every living organism is generally an 
open system. The systems that constitute this living organism generate various sub-
systems. Therefore, a suitable method to regulate these organisms should aim to 
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control and manage their ‘whole or wholeness’. Secondly, an approach which is 
modelled from the institutionalist label is discussed. It argues that systems generate 
their constituent parts by means of having relationships with each other. The Good 
Regulator Theorem is influenced by the idea that ‘every good key must be a model of a 
lock it opens’. Following this idea the theorem argues that every regulatory scheme 
must be a reproduction of the scheme it seeks to regulate. For example, if regulations 
are designed to control a particular technology, a complete study of the nature and 
workings of such a technology is indispensable.  
The theories above guide the manner of controlling recent forms of technologies and 
their associated challenges. In that regard, they accept that the law or legal rules 
regulates in a different way from regulations. A number of conclusions are reached that 
support this averment. However, it is submitted that an isolated or selective reading of 
the theories will not assist a regulator to fully understand their objectives. This is the 
case because the regulatory approaches that are followed by these theories differ in 
relation to the manner and structure of the control. Consequently, an attempt should be 
made to harmonise the differences in these theories in order to help establish, design 
and endorse a compact ICT regulatory structure.  
5.4 CONCLUSION 
It is revealed that, for purposes of regulating ICTs and their associated challenges, a 
clear distinction should be made between the law and regulations. This necessity is 
encouraged by the fact that a control of a particular occurrence should, in principle, be 
fit for its purpose. Accordingly, if the law is preferred as the fitting ICT regulatory 
mechanism then it should understand the dynamics of the technology. This entails 
being able to evolve with the changes that emanate from the technology. Having 
studied the law and regulations, regulations are found to be better suited to regulate 
recent forms of technologies. This selection is made because regulations are flexible197 
and easier to establish.198 Therefore, regulators do not have to follow the inconvenient 
and rigid process of commencing legal rules if technology develops or a new 
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technology emerges. It is important to note that the law does not necessarily cease to 
have a role to play in ICT regulations. Specifically, the law retains a facilitative function. 
This means that it assists in channelling the nature and shape of ICT regulations.  
There are differences which exist regarding the meaning and structure of ICT 
regulations. On the one hand, regulations are said to denote a form of command and 
control mechanism. The latter is enforced by means of legal rules.199 In addition, the 
state plays an essential role.200 On the other hand, it is argued that regulations follow a 
decentring stance. This entails that the essential role-players in regulatory regimes, for 
example, the state, society, regulated firms and Internet users are involved in the 
regulatory process.201 This consideration particularly leads to what is referred to as 
better regulation.202 Better regulations are products of a holistic approach to regulating 
whereby the idea of a single and supreme regulator is discarded. They assist in the 
study of certain selected ICT regulatory theories. The theories are the codes-based 
theory, the AIS theory, the systems theory and the ‘Good Regulator Theorem’. These 
regulatory theories are not complete and exhaustive. However, they are essential in 
that they promote the hypothesis that every technology regulatory paradigm should 
generally be technology-neutral or independent.  
For ICT regulatory purposes, it may be necessary to read the theories together in order 
to establish a complete comprehension of their objects or principles. In one case, the 
meaning of the codes-based theory may be lost if it is not read together with the 
systems theory or Good Regulator Theorem. It may thus be impossible or challenging 
for a regulator to establish a codes-based framework without following the steps that 
are set out in the systems theory. Accordingly, it may be necessary for a regulator to 
copiously understand the dynamics of ICT systems, such as the Internet and Web. 
These relate to the fact that these systems are connected to a living organism, like an 
operated computer.203 A regulator may have to understand that in order to regulate 
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these systems or networks it is essential to examine their ‘whole or wholeness’, that is, 
the ICT.204 In other words, they may be required to model their ICT regulation from the 
‘whole or wholeness’ of the technology to be regulated.205 In other cases, the Good 
Regulator Theorem may assist regulators in establishing a structure of ICT regulation 
which is abstracted from the danger theory. The AIS theory is a biologically-inspired 
regulatory structure. It specifically uses the robustness, adaptability and autonomy of 
biological immune systems as a lead.206 It then accepts that computer systems or 
networks also possess the characteristics that are comparable to those of a human 
body.207 They are dynamic and developing.208 Therefore, it may be necessary for the 
regulators that they develop frameworks that protect systems or networks from external 
attacks, such as e-crimes. These frameworks should follow the wording of the other 
ICT regulatory principles, for example the Good Regulator Theorem. In this instance, 
regulators may design regulations that conform to the principle that ‘every good key 
must be a model of a lock it opens’.209 In other words, it will have to acknowledge that a 
structure to regulate or control ICTs should be led by or founded from the manner in 
which ICTs are structured.  
Having examined the need to regulate and control ICTs and their associated 
challenges, chapter 6 below investigates the current approaches to ICT regulation. It 
particularly accepts that e-crimes are one of the major challenges to an information 
society. Therefore, chapter 6 examines the overall approach or approaches to the 
control and management of e-crimes. These approaches form part of what is referred 
to as the ‘System or Process of E-Authentication’ or the ‘E-Authentication System or 
Process’.210 
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CHAPTER 6 
E-AUTHENTICATION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter 5 answers or solutions to the questions regarding whether or not ICTs and 
their associated challenges can be regulated were sought. It was submitted that a 
difficulty generally exists regarding the regulation or not of ICTs. This challenge is 
partially associated with the uncertainty regarding whether or not the law or regulations 
are suitable for this control exercise. Given this uncertainty, different regulatory models 
were differentiated. These include those that are founded on legal rules and that which 
are abstracted from regulations. It was found that the role of law in ICT regulations 
should be to shape the structure of ICT regulations. This is the case because 
regulations in contrast to the legal rules are flexible and are able to evolve with the 
times.1 More specifically, they are able to transform and improve with the variations 
and developments in contemporary technologies. Consequently, it was submitted that 
regulations are better suited to regulate ICTs and the ICT challenges. However, a 
question still remained relating to the manner of structuring or shaping such a 
regulatory framework. In responding to this question, a number of regulatory theories 
were discussed. These theories are not regulations as such. They simply support the 
view that a suitable ICT regulatory approach is the one that recognises the role of all 
the regulatory industries in the regulatory process. This type of approach is referred to 
as Better Regulation as opposed to Less Regulation.2 The rationale for better 
regulation is to develop an all-encompassing regulatory structure which is attached to 
the technology and is able to evolve with it.3  
                                               
1   Stenning PC et al “Controlling interests – two conceptions of order in regulating a 
financial market” in Friedland ML (ed) Securing compliance: seven case studies 
(University of Toronto Press Toronto 1990) 88-119 102.  
2   Boyer R “The regulation approach as a theory of capitalism – a new derivation” in 
Labrousse A and Weisz JD (eds) Institutional economics in France and Germany 
(Springer Berlin 2001) 49-92 50. See also Baldwin R “Better regulation in troubled 
times” 2006 (1) Health Economics, Policy and Law 203-207 204-205. 
3   Kirkpatrick and Parker Regulatory Impact Assessment 1-2. 
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Despite the difficulty in regulating ICTs and their associated challenges, the viewpoint 
that ICTs can be regulated is followed. It is particularly conceded that e-crimes pose a 
serious threat to the information society. Therefore, processes should be established 
that mitigate the risks and identify the measures to regulate e-crimes (e-crimes 
regulatory measures). The measures ought to generally be two-fold. They should 
provide, on the one hand, for the criminalisation of e-crimes. In one case, the 
accessing,4 interception, interference with, modification or destroying of information 
without authority may be proscribed.5 In other cases, the manufacturing, trading or 
offering to trade, possession or use of a contrivance (for example, a computer 
programme) in order to overcome or obstruct computer security measures may be 
made an offence. On the other hand, the measures should deal with the prevention of 
e-crimes and endorse a System of Authentication or, alternatively, an Authentication 
Structure. The abovementioned system may sometimes serve as the ‘last line of 
defence’.6   
It was indicated in chapter 1 of this research that e-authentication is not the only 
method that can be used in order to prevent e-crimes. Other methods, for example 
awareness programs, anti-viruses and building of firewalls may also be useful in 
deterring e-crimes. In this chapter, it is submitted that preventing e-crimes is better than 
dealing with or recovering from the consequences of this phenomenon. The phrase 
prevention is better than cure properly illustrates the significance of this form of 
prevention.7 It specifically states that forestalling a wrong is usually better than dwelling 
on and making good its ‘adverse effects after the event’.8 Due to this importance, the 
                                               
4   The term ‘access’ means, within the context of the ECT Act, the ‘actions of a person 
who, after taking note of any data, becomes aware of the fact that he or she is not 
authorised to access that data and still continues to access that data’. See s 85 of the 
ECT Act.  
5   See in general, Chapter XIII of the ECT Act.  
6   Taylor A and Eder L “A comparison of authentication, authorisation and auditing in 
Windows and Linux” in Warkentin M and Vaughn RB (eds) Enterprise information 
systems and assurance system security: managerial and technical issues (Idea Group 
Publishing Hershey 2006) 326-342 327. 
7   However, in this research it is argued that prevention is not always better than cure. For 
example, cutting off a person’s head is not better than curing such a person’s 
headache. See Chesterton GK Eugenics and other evils (Cassell and Company London 
1922) 55. 
8   Cane P The Anatomy of tort law (Hart Publishing Oxford 1997) 100.  
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process of authentication is selected as one of the effective measures to prevent e-
crimes.  
6.2 A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO AUTHENTICATION 
The process of authentication is, in the main, an old phenomenon. Modes of 
authentication had long existed to support and preserve the credibility of a person or 
thing, for example a document. The notion credibility denotes the quality of being 
believable.9 Hence the saying that: ‘credible people are believable people….credible 
information is believable information’.10 Credibility is sometimes associated with trust, 
not necessarily confidence.11 Accordingly, it denotes the readiness to avail oneself to 
or accept a risk based on the positive expectations of or generated by the other 
person.12 The notion of trust is one of the most important aspects of everyday life.13 In 
their everyday lives people trust that their friends would be kind to them, they trust that 
motorists on the road would follow traffic rules and they trust that the goods that they 
buy have the quality that is commensurate with how much they pay for them.14  
A multitude of methods are frequently used in order to establish the credibility of a 
person or a person’s identity. Firstly, a person’s face may be analysed. The instructive 
feature points that are found in a person’s face, for example the eyes and mouth may 
assist in making this analysis.15 Secondly, a person’s finger prints may be inspected. 
This may be accomplished by scrutinising the uniqueness of the structures, that is, the 
                                               
9   Fogg BF and Tseng H “The elements of computer credibility” in Computing systems 
(Papers delivered at the International Conference on Human Factors in Computing 
Systems 18-20 May 1999 Association of Computing Machinery Inc. New York 1999) 80-
87 80. 
10   Fogg and Tseng “Elements” 80. 
11   Kim PH, Ferrin DL, Cooper CD and Dirks KT “ Removing the shadow of suspicion – the 
effect of apology versus denial for repairing competence-versus integrity-based trust 
violations” in Costa AC and Anderson N (eds) Trust and social capital organisations 
(Sage Publications London 2013) 175-205 175-177 and Earle TC, Siegrist M and 
Gutscher H “Trust, risk perception and the TCC model of cooperation” in Trust in risk 
management: uncertainty and the scepticism in the public mind (Earthscan Publishing 
London 2010) 1-49 4. 
12   Earle, Siegrist and Gutscher TCC model 4. 
13   Selby-Bigge LA (ed) A treatise on human nature by David Hume (The Claredon Press 
Oxford 1896) 15-18. 
14   Selby-Bigge David Hume 15-18. 
15   Tistarelli M, Lagorio A and Grosso E “Understanding iconic image-based face 
biometrics” in Tistarelli M, Bigun J and Jain AK (eds) Biometric authentication (Springer 
Berlin 2002) 19-29 22. 
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global and local structures, in such a person’s finger prints.16 Thirdly, a person’s 
signature may be verified or corroborated. The aforementioned is a complicated 
process. More specifically, the acceptance of a signature as one of the authentication 
means in legal discourse is usually debated. Studies relating to the validity of wills 
illustrate the aforementioned. In these readings, it is revealed that signatures are 
conventionally required to be handwritten, typewritten, or be in some form of a 
photographic procedure.17 In some cases, thumb prints18 and initials are accepted.19 
However, it has always been enquired whether a mark could or should be accepted as 
a signature or not. It is stated that a mark is, but does not necessarily entail, the making 
of a cross. It may be in a form of a ‘thumbprint, rubber stamp or a seal-ring 
impression’.20 In England, courts seem to agree that a mark satisfies the requirements 
of signing.21 However, it must have been written or included in a document with an 
intention of making it a signature. However, South African courts and academics alike 
have always differed in relation to the aforementioned question.22 These differences 
existed until the coming into operation of the Succession Amendment Act.23 Section 1 
of this Act expressly states that a signature includes the making of a mark. The said 
section partially followed the reasoning of the court in the case of Putter v Provincial 
Insurance Co Ltd and Another.24 In this case, the court stated that ‘any mark on a 
                                               
16   Nilson K and Bigun J “Complex filters applied to fingerprint image detecting prominent 
symmetry points used for alignment” in Tistarelli M, Bigun J and Jain AK (eds) Biometric 
authentication (Springer Berlin 2002) 39-47 39. 
17   Kerridge R and Brierley AHR Parry and Kerridge: the law of succession 12th ed (Sweet 
Maxwell London 2009) 43 and Barlow S, King LC and King AG Wills, administration and 
taxation: a practical guide 8th ed (Sweet Maxwell London 2003) 3. 
18   In the Estate of Finn (1935) 105 L.J.P. 36. 
19   S 1 of the Law of Succession Amendment Act 43 of 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Succession Amendment Act). 
20   De Waal MJ and Schoeman-Malan MC Law of succession 4th ed (Juta Cape Town 
2008) 60. 
21   In the Goods of Savoy (1851) 15 Jur. 1042, In the Goods of Jenkins (1863) 3 SW & Tr. 
93 and Thorn v Dickens [1906] W.N. 54. 
22   See in general Ricketts v Byrne and Another 2004 6 SA 474 CPD, Jhajbhai and Others 
v Master and Another 1971 (2) D. & C.L.D. 370 and Ex Parte Goldman and Kalmer 
NN.O 1965 1 W.L.D. 464. 
23   This Act came into operation on 1 October 1992. See Paleker M “Succession” in du 
Bois F (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9th ed (Juta Cape Town 2007) 666-
731 668. See also Scalise Jr RJ “Testamentary formalities in the United States of 
America” in Reid KGC, de Waal MJ and Zimmermann R (eds) Comparative succession 
law: testamentary formalities (Oxford University Press Oxford 2011) 357-403 385. 
24  Putter v Provincial Insurance Co Ltd and Another 1963 3 SA 145 (W) 
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document made by a person for the purpose of attesting the document, or identifying it 
as his act,…is his signature thereto’.25 
Generally, a number of tests are used in order to determine the authenticity of a thing, 
such as a document. These tests are often referred to as the dual tests.26 They are the 
authentication test and the best evidence test.27 The authentication test avers that in 
circumstances where a thing is not or does not provide for self-authentication its 
credibility should be established separately.28 The best evidence test regards a thing 
itself, for example a document, to be the best evidence.29 Consequently, in cases 
where the authenticity of the contents of a document is in doubt the best evidence, for 
example the document itself, must be furnished.30   
6.3 AUTHENTICATION – WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 
The concept authentication is often confused with the notion authorisation.31 It is 
sometimes presumed that these concepts share particular resemblances. However, an 
examination of these concepts illustrates that they are, in fact, different. The 
Commission of the European Communities’32 particularly discloses these 
dissimilarities. The CEC states that a system of authentication encompasses ‘a 
procedure which allows the payment service provider, i.e. bank, to verify that the 
payment service user (natural or legal person who has a right of disposal of funds and 
who allows them to be transferred to a payee) issuing the payment order is authorised 
to do so’.33 Thus, it is proof that a certain attribute, namely the identity of a person, 
                                               
25  See Putter v Provincial Insurance Co Ltd and Another 1963 3 SA 145 (W) 148E. 
26   Klotter JC Criminal evidence 5th ed (Anderson Publishing Ohio 1992) 304. 
27   Klotter Evidence 304. 
28   Munday R Evidence (Oxford University Press Oxford 2007) 26-27. 
29   Blond NC Evidence (Aspen Publishers New York 2009) 164. See also Murphy P and 
Baddour L “International criminal law and common law rules of evidence” in Khan KAA, 
Buisman C and Gosnell C (eds) Principles of evidence in international criminal justice 
(Oxford University Press Oxford 2010) 96-156 99. 
30   Blond Evidence 164 and Murphy and Baddour International criminal law 99. 
31   There is also another concept which precedes authentication and authorisation. This is 
referred to as auditing. It entails a process of investigating the activities that are carried 
out on a system in order to identify them by name and time.  
32  Hereinafter referred to as the CEC. 
33   Art 4(13) of the Commission of the European Communities “Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on Payment Services in the Internal Market 
and amending Directive 97/7/EC, 2000/12/EC and 2002/65/EC” 1 December 2001. 
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exists.34 From this analysis, it becomes evident that authorisation (or to authorise) 
succeeds the authentication process. It specifically denotes a practice to establish 
whether a person who has undergone or was subjected to an authentication procedure 
can access a particular resource or not.35 For example, when access to a particular 
infrastructure is sought, authority to use that infrastructure is granted to those who 
possess proper authentication.36 In contrast, access is denied to those with improper or 
insufficient authentication.37 
Having examined the aforesaid differences, it is stated that the system of 
authentication supports or assists in supporting, by means of substantiation, a finding 
that a person or thing is what it claims.38 This finding is established by verifying the 
identity of a person39 and testing the credibility of a thing.40  
6.4 SUMMARY  
Authentication processes are old phenomena. A number of methods are customarily 
used in order to authenticate or establish the credibility of a person or thing 
(document). In one case, face images may be analysed, finger prints may be examined 
and signatures may be verified. In other cases, the authentication and best evidence 
tests may be applied. The basis is or should be to promote trust and believability of a 
person or thing. It is also demonstrated that a system of authentication does not 
necessarily imply an authorisation process. The former is a process which seeks to 
identify a person or document, whereas the last-mentioned attempts to establish 
whether or not a person should access a specific resource. 
                                               
34  Camp LJ The economics of identity theft: avoidance, causes and possible cures 
(Springer Bloomington 2007) 13. 
35   Todorov D Mechanics of user identification and authentication: fundamentals of identity 
management (Auerbach Publications Florida 2010) 7. 
36   Todorov Identity management 4. 
37   Todorov Identity management 4. 
38   Andrews S “Building trust online – work at the OECD” in Schulz A (ed) Legal aspects of 
an e-commerce transaction (Sellier European Law Publishers München 2006) 243-
247 243. 
39   Oppliger R Authentication systems for secure networks (Artech House Publishers 
Boston 1996) 17-18. 
40   Martin SE “Information controls and needs of information flow in representative 
democracies” in Lederman E and Shapira R (eds) Law, information and information 
technology (Kluwer Law International The Hague 2001) 369-389 386-388. 
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It is submitted that the achievements or successes of the authentication measures in 
offline settings have led to these mechanisms being used in online environments. In 
online settings, they are called e-authentication.  
6.5 E-AUTHENTICATION 
6.5.1 Background  
E-authentication marks a progression from or is an online equivalent of offline 
authentication.41 It connotes ‘a process by (means of) which a person or legal entity 
seeks to verify the validity or genuineness of a particular piece of information’.42 
Alternatively, it encompasses a formal ‘assertion of validity, such as the signing of a 
certificate: we authenticate what it certifies’.43 It also responds to a need to promote 
trust in e-commerce.44 Accordingly, it sets out legal rules that increase certainty and 
security in the use of ICT systems or networks.45 These rules are designed to preserve 
the integrity of the information which is held by computer users.46 In addition, the rules 
encourage responsible parties, for example banks to identify the legitimacy of the 
users.47 Consequently, this identification helps to establish whether or not a particular 
user or information which is held by a user is known to a system or network.  
A number of codes or devices are generally used in order to support a structure for e-
authentication. The most significant of these include passwords, pins, digital or e-
                                               
41   Berinato 
http://www.csoonline.com/article/220784/FFIEC_Second_Thoughts_on_Second_Factor
s (Date of use: 22 April 2010). 
42  See Article 3(5) Regulation No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 July 2014. 
43   Mason S Electronic signatures in law 2nd ed (LexisNexis London 2007) 1. 
44   United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) “Promoting 
confidence in electronic commerce: legal issues on international use of electronic 
authentication” 2009 35. To be accessed at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/08-55698_Ebook.pdf. 
45   UNCITRAL 2009 35. 
46   UNCITRAL 2009 17. 
47   UNCITRAL “Legal guide on electronic funds transfer” 1987 7. 
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signatures that use public or private key infrastructures (PKIs), smart cards, one-time-
passwords (OTPs),48 USB plug-in devices or biometric identification.49  
(a) Passwords or Codes  
Passwords or codes are an assemblage of the technologies that are used to manage 
access to information systems or networks. They operate in a similar manner as a 
key.50 They may also be used in order to sign a document or a communication, for 
example an online document.51 
(b) E-Signatures  
E-signatures include cryptographic codes or techniques.52 They generally assist in 
ensuring that the original contents of information are protected from unwanted 
modifications or alterations.53 
(c) PKIs 
In cryptographic schemes different sets of keys are used in order to authenticate 
information.54 The first key is referred to as a symmetric key. In this case, the same key 
is used both for encryption (a process of making information unintelligible to other 
computer users) and decryption (process of transforming information into becoming 
                                               
48   OTPs are random numbers that are required to be used when entering into, for example 
e-transactions. They can only be used once and become inactive if the purpose for 
which they were initiated and issued has been achieved. 
49   Grabosky PN and Smith RG Crime in the digital age: controlling telecommunications 
and cyberspace illegalities (Transaction Publishers New Jersey 1998) 152. See also 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) 
http://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/authentication_guidance.pdf (Date of use: 13 July 2013).   
50   Burnett M and Kleiman D (eds) Perfect passwords: selection, protection, authentication 
(Syngress Publishing Massachusetts 2006) 3-4.  
51   UNCITRAL 2009 16. 
52   Zhang F and Wang Y “Security fundamentals” in Kou W (ed) Payment technologies for 
e-commerce (Springer Berlin 1998) 7-38 24. 
53   Zhang and Wang Fundamentals 24. 
54   Zhang and Wang Fundamental 13. 
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intelligible). The second key is called an asymmetric key. In this instance, the key 
which is used for encryption differs from the one used for decryption.55  
A difference is made between public-key cryptography and private-key cryptography. 
Pieprzyk, Hardjono and Seberry discuss this distinction and its importance to the e-
authentication process.56 In the former, two separate keys are used for e-authentication 
purposes. One key is referred to as the public key while the other is called the secret 
key. In the case of the latter, the keys are analogous and they are referred to as the 
secret keys.  
(d) Smart Cards  
Smart cards are comparable to computers. They have built-in computer chips. These 
chips record, compute and store sensitive information. The chips also assist in the 
verification and validation of information.57  
(e) Biometrics Identification  
In this category of identification, different technological devises are commonly used in 
order to identify a person or thing.58 These technologies investigate a person’s finger 
prints, hand geometry, retinal or iris scan, voice or facial features.59 This identification 
is made possible by the idea that humans possess particular biological characters that 
are different from other persons.  
However, it is accepted that certain constraints should be present before reliance can 
be placed on these characters. These are the following: 
 Universality, which means that every person should have the 
characteristic, uniqueness, which indicates that no two (or more) 
                                               
55   Zhang and Wang Fundamentals 13. 
56   Pieprzyk J, Hardjono T, and Seberry J Fundamentals of computer security (Springer 
Berlin 2003) 69-218. 
57   Whitman ME and Mattord HJ Principles of information security 4th ed (Cengage 
Learning Boston 2016) 241. 
58   Reid P Biometrics for network security (Pearson New Jersey 2004) 3-5. 
59   Pearson RL Electronic security systems: a manager’s guide to evaluation and selecting 
system solutions (Elsevier Amsterdam 2007) 37 and Zhang D and Yu L “Biometrics for 
security in e-commerce” in Kou W (ed) Payment technologies for e-commerce (Springer 
Berlin 2003) 71-94 71.   
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persons should be the same in terms of the characteristic, permanence, 
which means that the characteristic should be invariant with times, and 
collectability, which indicates that the characteristic can be measured 
quantitatively.60   
The cryptograms as studied above are essential to the discussion of e-authentication. 
They are indispensable in carrying out the pillars of e-authentication. These are either a 
single pillar or multiple pillars of e-authentication.  
6.5.2 E-Authentication Pillars 
The pillars of e-authentication depend on the evidence of knowledge or something a 
person knows; confirmation of possession or something a person possesses, or proof 
by property or something a person is.61 These are discussed below. 
(a) Proof of Something 
Proof of something is frequently associated with a single-factor e-authentication.62 This 
is the case because only one factor, that is, a code, pin or password is used for e-
authentication purposes. In this instance, a system validates a user, and not the other 
way around.63 A user enters a code, pin or password to an allocated space on for 
example a webpage.64 Thereafter, a system automatically verifies or matches a code, 
pin or password. This verification is made against the information of a user that is 
stored on a system. If a match is established, a system grants access to a user, that is, 
to authorise.  
(b) Proof of Possession 
                                               
60   Jain A, Bolle R and Pankanti S “Introduction to biometrics” in Biometrics: personal 
identification in networked society (Kluwer Academic Publishers Massachusetts 1999) 
1-40 4. 
61   Whitman and Mattord Principles of information security 240 and Reid Network Security 
9. 
62   Zhang and Wang Fundamentals 33. 
63   Zhang and Wang Fundamentals 33. 
64   UNCITRAL 2009 29. 
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This factor of e-authentication is also referred to as a multi or two-factor e-
authentication.65 Multi-factor e-authentication was established consequent to a need to 
develop a stronger e-authentication framework.66 It was particularly felt that an e-
authentication structure that depends solely on codes, pins and passwords is a ‘joke’.67 
In particular, Nielsen and Vedel identify the conventional ways of compromising codes, 
pins or passwords.68 In one case, crackers bribe victims of e-crimes in order to obtain 
the wanted codes, pins or passwords.69 In others, computer crackers pay guards who 
protect the physical structures where the codes, pins and passwords are kept and 
stored in exchange for them to gain entry into the structures.70  
With increases in online or e-transactions, another shortcoming of a single-factor e-
authentication is identified. This relates to the fact that it places ‘heavy loads (burden) 
on human memory’.71 Consequently, the inability of other computer users to memorise 
long and complex codes, pins and passwords (strong e-authentication) lead them to 
take shortcuts and rely on simple-to-guess codes, pins and passwords (weak e-
authentication).72 In order to prevent the aforementioned, an e-authentication 
framework that relies on more than one e-authentication pillar was developed. This 
does not necessarily prevent the use of codes, pins and passwords in e-authentication 
structures. However, it accepts that, for purposes of establishing a stronger e-
authentication framework, codes, pins and passwords should be supplemented by 
other tangible property. This property includes identity cards, smart cards, debit or 
credit cards.73  
(c) Proof by Property 
                                               
65   Allen R and Pickup A “Two-factor authentication” in Birch D (ed) Digital identity 
management: technological, business and social implications (Gower Publishing 
Limited Hampshire 2007) 113-120 113-119 and Schneier B “Two-factor authentication - 
too little, too late” 2005 (48) Communications of the ACM 136 136. 
66   Reid Network Security 9-14. 
67   See Huntington http://www.authenticationworld.com (Date of use: 13 February 2010). 
68   Nielsen G and Vedel M Improving usability of passphrase authentication (Kongens 
Lyngby Denmark 2009) 11-12. 
69   Nielsen and Vedel Passphrase authentication 11-12. 
70   Nielsen and Vedel Passphrase authentication 12. 
71   Ciampa M Security awareness: applying practical security in your world 4th ed 
(Cengage Learning Boston 2014) 40-41. 
72   Ciampa Security awareness 40-41. 
73   Oppliger Secure networks 18. 
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Proof by property refers to the characteristics or biometric features or credentials of a 
person.74 These may be physiological or behavioural or both.75 They include ‘finger-
scan, hand-scan or hand geometry, retina scan, iris-scan, facial-scan or facial 
geometry, signature-scan or dynamic signature verification, or voice scan or voice 
speaker or speaker verification’.76 In more astute cases, they encompass an 
observance of keystroke dynamics. These are the characteristic keys and presses of 
person on a computer keyboard.77  
6.5.3 Summary 
E-authentication demonstrates a progression from the traditional forms of 
authenticating. It relies on e-codes in order to provide security and trust in electronic 
systems or networks. The symbols include passwords or codes, pins, digital or e-
signatures that use public key infrastructures (PKIs), physical devises, for example 
smart cards, one-time-passwords (OTPs), USB plug-in devices or biometric 
identification. These cryptograms support the overall structure for e-authentication. 
They are also important to the performing of the e-authentication pillars, namely 
evidence of knowledge; confirmation of possession and proof by property.78 
Carrying out the e-authentication pillars is generally a part of a county’s broad cyber-
security framework. In some cases, selected government agencies or institutions 
assume the duty to ensure that a proper e-authentication agenda is followed. In other 
cases, this obligation is delegated to certain responsible parties that constantly deal 
with e-authentication. Ordinarily, countries’ e-authentication approaches may agree or 
differ depending on their overall cyber or information security structures. The section 
below illustrates these similarities or differences. This section is particularly selective. It 
only studies the United Kingdom and the European Union, Canada and South African 
approaches to e-authentication. This selection is made because the South African e-
authentication agenda is, in many respects, similar to that of the United Kingdom and 
                                               
74   Reid Network security 3-5. 
75   Helou TJ “Introduction” in Coats WS, Bagdasarian A, Helou TJ and Lam T (eds) The 
practitioner’s guide to biometrics (ABA Publishing Illinois 2007) 1-17 4-5. 
76   Zhang and Yu Biometrics 71.   
77   Jain, Bolle and Pankanti Biometrics 11. 
78   Reid Network security 9. 
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Canada. In particular, the approaches of these jurisdictions build on the argument that 
is contained in chapter 5 above. Furthermore, they help in examining the risk sensitive-
based e-authentication framework which is identified in chapter 7 below. 
6.6 APPROACHES TO E-AUTHENTICATION 
6.6.1 United Kingdom  
A number of initiatives or directives are available in the UK that deals with e-
authentication. The most significant of these are contained in the Electronic 
Communications Act,79 Directive 2007/64/EC80 and Regulation No 910/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014. The said initiatives are 
founded from the premise that ‘there is no such a thing as zero risks’.81 Accordingly, it 
is sufficient to basically ‘create a safe environment in which people…feel protected’.82 
In response to the latter, the initiatives address or seek to address the risks of 
computer networks83 and information being used by criminals as instruments to commit 
e-crimes. This is done by mitigating cases of interference with information, interference 
with computer systems, misuse of information or systems and online theft or fraud. In 
terms of Regulation No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
addressing the risks and discouraging the risks of interference with information are 
essential in building trust in electronic or e-transactions. This is the case because a 
                                               
79   See Electronic Communications Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Communications Act). 
80   See Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Payment Services in 
the Internal Market of 13 November 2007 (hereinafter referred to as Directive 
2007/64/EC). 
81  European Union 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3010313ENC.pdf 
(Date of use: 16 November 2015). 
82  European 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC3010313ENC.pdf 
(Date of use: 16 November 2015). 
83  A computer network is defined in section 1 of the Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Bill of 
2015 as meaning two or more inter-connected or related computer devices, which 
allows these inter-connected or related computer devices to exchange data or any other 
function with each other; exchange data or any other function with another computer 
network; or connect to an electronic communications network. 
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lack of trust in the security of systems generally results in consumers, businesses and 
public authorities becoming hesitant to carry out transactions electronically.84 
This envisaged trust is encapsulated in Directive 2007/64/EC. Article 5(e) of this 
Directive requires the structure for e-authentication to be proportionate, sound and 
adequate.85 This structure is intended to be comparable, commensurate or equivalent 
to the risks that are generated or potentially posed by e-crimes. In addition, it ought to 
be valid, reasonable and suitable for the aforesaid purpose. Furthermore, the e-
authentication process should identify the person to be e-authenticated, his or her 
origin and the integrity of the data used or to be used during the e-authentication 
process.86 
E-authentication in the United Kingdom is carried out as part of the United Kingdoms’ 
ICT governance strategy and internal control principles.87 The strategies and principles 
relate to administrative, risk management and accounting procedures.88 Therefore, a 
number of relationships are created that support the United Kingdom’s e-authentication 
structure. These relationships are exemplified below.  
(a) Important Relationships 
E-authentication in terms of Directive 2007/64/EC is based on the workings of certain 
relationships between different persons. In this chapter the interaction between a 
payer, payment system and payment institution is examined. A payer can be a natural 
or juristic person.89 It holds a payment account with a payment institution and allows 
payment orders to be made from that account.90 A payment account is held or kept in 
the name of a payer and is consequently used by it to execute e-transactions. Payment 
orders can be in the form of instructions by a payer for the execution of e-
                                               
84  See preamble to Regulation No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 July 2014. 
85   Article 5(e) of Directive 2007/64/EC. 
86  Article 3(5) of Regulation No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 July 2014. 
87   Art 5(e) of Directive 2007/64/EC.  
88   Art 5(e) of Directive 2007/64/EC.  
89   See, Art 4(7) of Directive 2007/64/EC. 
90   Art 4(7) of Directive 2007/64/EC. 
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transactions.91 A payment system is simply a fund-transfer system. It has formal and 
pre-arranged rules for the processing, clearing and settlement of payment 
transactions.92 Payment transactions refer to acts that are initiated by the payer or by 
the payee. They encompass the ‘placing, transferring or withdrawal of funds, 
irrespective of any underlying obligations between the payer and the payee’.93 
Payment institutions are juristic or legal persons. They have the authority to provide 
and execute payment services.94  
(b) E-Authentication Applied 
In e-authentication schemes, a payer normally uses the payment systems that are 
offered by a payment institution in order to commence a payment transaction or 
transactions. A unique identifier, for example a code, pin or password is commonly 
used for the aforesaid reason. Generally, a payer gives or indicates its approval to 
carry out a payment transaction or transactions as prescribed in article 54 of Directive 
2007/64/EC. Subsequent to that, a payment institution uses the unique identifier in 
order to identify a payer. A signature-verification data assists in this identification. They 
may be in the form of codes or public cryptographic keys95 or a combination of letters, 
numbers or symbols.96 For e-authentication purposes, they must be a valid means of 
‘establishing the authenticity and integrity of the communication or data’.97  
Annexure IV of Directive 1999/93/EC sets out the steps that should be complied with 
for secure signature verification by stating the following: 
During the signature-verification process it should be ensured with 
reasonable certainty that the data used for verifying the signature 
correspond to the data displayed to the verifier; the signature is 
reliably verified and the result of that verification is correctly 
displayed; the verifier can, as necessary, reliably establish the 
                                               
91   Art 4(16) of Directive 2007/64/EC. 
92   Art 4(6) of Directive 2007/64/EC.  
93   Art 4(5) of Directive 2007/64/EC. 
94   See, Art 4 (4) of Directive 2007/64/EC. 
95   Art 2(7) Directive 1999/93/EC. 
96   Art 4(21) of Directive 2007/64/EC. 
97   S 7(3) of the Communications Act. 
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contents of the signed data; the authenticity and validity of the 
certificate required at the time of signature verification are reliably 
verified; the result of verification and the signatory's identity are 
correctly displayed; the use of a pseudonym is clearly indicated; and 
any security-relevant changes can be detected.98 
Essentially, a signature-verification data amounts to what is referred to as an e-
signature. It is the equivalence of offline signatures. Its legal status in law is regulated 
by Article 25 (Legal Effects of Electronic Signatures) of Regulation No 910/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council. Article 25(1) of this Regulation specifically 
states the following: 
An electronic signature shall not be denied legal effect and 
admissibility as evidence in legal proceeding solely on the grounds 
that it is in an electronic form or that it does not meet the 
requirements for qualified electronic signatures.99 
                                               
98   Annexure IV of Directive 1999/93/EC. In terms of Art 3(9) of Regulation No 910/2014 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 a signatory is a natural 
person who creates an e-signature. 
99  A Qualified e-signature is an advanced e-signature that is created by qualified e-
signature creation device, and which is based on a qualified certificate for e-signatures. 
See Art 3(12) of Regulation No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 July 2014. A qualified e-signature creation device is an e-signature creation 
device that meets the requirements that are laid down in Annexure II. See Art 3(23) of 
Regulation No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014. 
The said Annexure II states that a ‘qualified e-signature creation device shall ensure, by 
appropriate technical and procedural means, that at least the confidentiality of the e-
signature creation data used for e-signature creation is reasonably assured; the e-
signature creation data used for e-signature creation can practically occur only once; 
the e-signature creation data used for e-signature creation cannot, with reasonable 
assurance, be derived and the e-signature is reliably protected against forgery using 
currently available technology; the e-signature creation data used for e-signature 
creation can be reliably protected by the legitimate signatory against use by others. 
Qualified e-signatures creation devices shall not alter the data to be signed or prevent 
such data from being presented to the signatory prior to signing. Generating or 
managing e-signature creation data on behalf of the signatory may only be done by a 
qualified trust service provider (that is, a trust service provider who provides one or 
more qualified trust services and is granted the qualified status by a supervisory body). 
Qualified trust service providers managing e-signature creation data on behalf of the 
signatory may duplicate the e-signature creation data only for back-up purposes 
provided that the security of the duplicated datasets must be at the same level as for 
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Section 2 of the Communications Act provides a definition of an e-signature. This 
section states that an e-signature includes anything in e-form which ‘as is incorporated 
into or otherwise logically associated with any electronic communication, such as 
sound, images, or both and a communication effecting a payment100 or electronic data; 
and purports to be so incorporated or associated for the purpose of being used in 
establishing the authenticity of the communication or data, the integrity of the 
communication or data, or both’.101 The steps to create an e-signature are referred to 
as an identification process. The aforementioned is a process of using personal 
identification information that uniquely represents a person.102 It is normally carried out 
using electronic identification means. Electronic identification means are defined as the 
‘material and/or immaterial unit containing a person identification data103 and which is 
used for authentication for an online service’.104  
Generally, the e-signature verification process should support the structure for 
advanced e-signatures.105 Advanced e-signatures are used in electronic settings for 
purposes of achieving a number of objectives. In one instance, they may be used in 
order to establish with accuracy the identity of a person (signatory).106 In other 
instances, they may be depended upon in order to guarantee the integrity of an e-
document.107 Srivastava identifies a digital signature with a PKI as the most important 
example of an advanced e-signature.108 Regulation No 910/2014 of the European 
                                                                                                                                         
the original datasets and the number of duplicated datasets shall not exceed the 
minimum needed to ensure continuity of the service. 
100   S 15(1) of the Communications Act. 
101   S 2 of the Communications Act of 2003 and Art 3(10) of Regulation No 910/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014. 
102  Art 3(1) of Regulation No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
July 2014. 
103  Person identification data is a set of data enabling the identity of a natural or legal 
person, or a natural person representing a legal person to be established. See Art 3(3) 
of Regulation No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 
2014. 
104  Art 3(2) of Regulation No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
July 2014. 
105   Art 3(1) Regulation No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
July 2014. 
106   Laborde CM Electronic signatures in international contracts (Internationaler Verlag der 
Wissenschaften Frankfurt 2010) 70. 
107   Laborde Signatures 70. 
108   Srivastava A Electronic signatures for B2B contracts: evidence from Australia (Springer 
Heidelberg 2013) 38. 
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Parliament and of the Council refers to PKIs as the ‘electronic signature creation 
data’.109 They include the unique data that is used by the signatory.110 Following this, 
Article 26 of the aforementioned regulation sets out the requirements that an advanced 
e-signature should generally comply with. These requirements are that: it must be 
uniquely linked to a particular signatory; it must be capable of identifying the signatory; 
it must be created using e-signature creation data that the signatory can, with a high 
level of confidence, use under his sole control; and it must be linked to the data signed 
therewith in such a manner that any subsequent change in the data is easily 
detectable.111  
6.6.2 Canada  
The principles for secure information systems or networks are central to the overall 
approach to e-authentication in Canada. In one case, the principles set out the manner 
of performing certain e-authentication tasks. These include the provisions for risk 
management, the provisions for the security, privacy, and the requirements for certain 
disclosures and those that are related to the handling of complaints.112 In other cases, 
they require a proper understanding of the risks to information systems or networks. 
This understanding assists in designing e-authentication frameworks that are 
comparable to the risks.113 Various factors help in developing this understanding. 
These include an analysis of the description of the risks, an assessment of the levels or 
degrees of the risks and the likelihood of the risks occurring in the future. The principles 
also guarantee the authentication of a person and seek to ensure, that is, an assurance 
or measure of certainty that a statement or fact is true, that certain credentials are 
reliable. The notion credentials have to be understood within the context of what it 
                                               
109  Art 3(13) of Regulation No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 July 2014. 
110  Art 3(13) of Regulation No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 July 2014. 
111   Art 26(a)-(d) of Regulation No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 July 2014. 
112   Industry Canada “Principles for electronic authentication – a Canadian framework” May 
2004 12-23. To be accessed at https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ecic-
ceac.nsf/vwapj/Authentication.pdf/$file/Authentication.pdf. 
113   Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-
eng.aspx?id=19422 (Date of use: 13 June 2013). 
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implies in e-authentication schemes in Canada. It denotes a unique physical or 
electronic object (or identifier) which is issued to, or associated with, an individual, 
organisation or device.114  
Three legal instruments are generally crucial to the application of the principles for 
secure information systems in Canada. These include the Canada Evidence Act,115 the 
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act116 and the Secure 
Electronic Signature Regulations.117 The relevance of these laws in e-authentication 
settings is discussed below. 
(a) The Evidence Act 
The Evidence Act applies to or regulates the admission or admissibility of evidence in 
court. More specifically, section 31 of the Evidence Act deals with the admissibility of e-
documents as evidence. It defines an e-document as data which is recorded or stored 
on any medium in or by a computer system or other similar device. In turn, the data 
must be capable of being read or perceived by a person or a computer system or other 
similar device or devices. It can be in the form of a display, print-out or other output of 
that data.118 For admission purposes, the person who seeks to admit an e-document 
has to establish the authenticity of such a document.119 In other words, he or she must 
demonstrate that the e-document is that which it purports to be.120  
Furthermore, the Evidence Act requires that the best evidence rule should be followed 
during the process of authenticating an e-document. In particular, it has to be alleged 
and proved that the information or computer system, that is, an e-document system,121 
was used in order to record or store the e-document; that regulations were made that 
establish presumptions in respect of the e-documents that are signed with secure e-
                                               
114   Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-
eng.aspx?id=26262 (Date of use: 6 June 2013). 
115   Canada Evidence Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Evidence Act). 
116   Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 (hereinafter 
referred to as the Documents Act). 
117   Secure Electronic Signature Regulations, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the Signature 
Regulations). 
118   S 31.8 of the Evidence Act. 
119   S 31.1 of the Evidence Act. 
120   S 31.1 of the Evidence Act. 
121   S 31.8 of the Evidence Act. 
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signatures, and an e-document in the form of a printout was or had been acted upon, 
relied on or used as a record of the information that is recorded or stored in it.122 
(b) The Documents Act 
The Documents Act covers a variety of issues. These comprise the protection of 
personal information in the private sector;123 e-documents,124 amendments to the 
Computer Evidence Act;125 amendments to the Statutory Instruments Act;126 and 
amendments to the Statute Revision Act.127 The system of e-authentication is 
incorporated in Part 2 of the Documents Act. It is applied to e-signatures, for example 
letters, characters, numbers or symbols.128 E-authentication endorses the 
establishment of a secure e-signatures’ structure. This formation relates to a variety of 
things. Firstly, it has relations with the application of the hash function to the data. A 
hash function is an electronic one-way mathematical process.129 In this process, hefty 
data is recorded into the system and smaller data is generated as an output.130 For 
example, a plain text (B) may be divided into a number of blocks, for example 180 
blocks.131 Thereafter, the blocks may be ciphered or coded.132 In addition, the data 
which is contained in an e-document are exchanged into a message digest.133 
Message digests should be unique to each specific example of information.134 This 
uniqueness is ensured by allocating message digest algorithms that are distinct from 
others. For instance, MD6 = F1, F2 & F3 may be used to mean message digest 6 
equals files 1, 2 and 3. The exchange of data should be such that if that data is to be 
                                               
122   See ss 31.2(1)(a), 31.2(1)(b) read with s 31.4 and 31.2(2) of CEA. 
123   Part 1 of the Documents Act. 
124   Part 2 of the Documents Act. 
125   Part 3 of the Documents Act. 
126   Statutory Instruments Act, 1985. See also Part 4 of the Documents Act. 
127   Statute Revision Act, 1985. See also Part 5 of the Documents Act. 
128   S 31.1 of the Documents Act. 
129   S 1 of the Signature Regulations. 
130   Rogers DJ Broadband quantum cryptography (Morgan & Claypool Publishers Columbia 
2010) 41. See also Radu C Implementing electronic payment systems (Artech House 
Boston 2003) 376-377.  
131   Lefèbvre F Message digests for photographic images and video contents (Presses 
universitaires de Louvain CIACO University 2004)10-11. 
132   Lefèbvre Message digests 10-11. 
133   S 1 of the Signature Regulations. 
134   S 1 of the Signature Regulations. 
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changed, it would, on conversion, result in a changed message digest.135 Secondly, the 
creation of a secure e-signature must be linked to the application of a key to encrypt 
the message digest. This key can be a Pin, username or password. Thirdly, it can 
pertain to the transmission of an e-document and the encrypted message digest 
together with either a digital signature certificate or a means of accessing a digital 
signature certificate. Fourthly, it can require that the hash function be applied to the 
data which is contained in an e-document in order to generate a new message digest. 
The message digest may be verified or compared with the data and that the validity of 
the digital certificate is tested.136 
Consequently, e-authentication must meet the requirements of section 48(2) of the 
Documents Act. These are that technologies or other processes should be used to 
create an e-signature; the e-signature must be unique to a person; the e-signature 
must be incorporated, attached or associated to an e-document; the e-signature must 
be under or subject to the sole control of a person (for example a computer user); the 
e-signature must identify the person; the e-signature must be such that it can be 
manifestly established whether or not it has been changed since its incorporation, 
attachment or association with the e-document.137 
6.6.3 South Africa  
The framework for e-authentication in South Africa can be abstracted from Chapter VI 
of the ECT Act. Also important for e-authentication purposes is the Draft National 
Cybersecurity Policy of South Africa of May 2011.138 Before delving into these e-
authentication instruments, it is important to note that a distinction generally exists 
between law and government policies. Policies are not law as such. They are merely 
plans of action that are chosen and adopted by a sitting government. They are 
introduced in order to respond to the imperatives of a particular legislation. In this 
instance, the Cybersecurity Policy gives effect to the ECT Act. Accordingly, the policy 
does not naturally have or carry the same weight as the promulgated statute laws. 
                                               
135   S 1 of the Signature Regulations. 
136   S 48.1 of the Documents Act. 
137   S 48(2) of the Documents Act.  
138   Hereinafter referred to as the Cybersecurity Policy. 
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However, this does not mean that decisions that are taken after following the wording 
of policies are meaningless.139  
Given the aforementioned, a reference to the Cybersecurity Policy in this section is 
made only insofar as the policy complements, at least in part, the ECT Act. It does not 
imply that the provisions of the Cybersecurity Policy have similar importance for 
enforcement purposes as those of the ECT Act. Therefore, section (a) below covers 
the selected provisions of the Cybersecurity Policy. Thereafter, section (b) examines 
the e-authentication procedure that is abstracted from the ECT Act. 
(a) The Cybersecurity Policy 
The Cybersecurity Policy was drafted pursuant to Proclamation R118 Government 
Gazette 32963 of 19 February 2010. It came about following the decision by the 
Department of Justice to ‘battle crime using technology-based solutions and 
partnerships’.140 This decision culminated into the the adoption of the National 
Cybersecurity Policy Framework for South Africa of 4 December 2015.141 The Policy 
aims to establish a ‘secure, dependable, reliable and trustworthy cyber environment’.142 
It intends to do all this by ensuring confidence and trust in the secure use of ICTs. This 
confidence and trust is necessary in attaining the following objectives: 
To facilitate the establishment of relevant structures in support of 
cybersecurity; to ensure the reduction of cybersecurity threats and 
vulnerabilities; to foster cooperation and coordination between 
government and private sector; to promote and strengthen 
international cooperation; to build capacity and promoting a culture of 
                                               
139  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 
2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para [48]. 
140  Guy 
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13783 
(Date of use: 16 November 2015).  
141  Hereinafter referred to as the NCP Framework. 
142   The Cybersecurity Policy 15.  
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cybersecurity; and to promote compliance with appropriate technical 
and operational cybersecurity standards.143 
The notion of cyber-security is defined very broadly in the Cybersecurity Policy. It refers 
to the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, safeguards and guidelines, risk 
management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurances and 
technologies that are essential to the protection of the online environments in South 
Africa.144  
The Cybersecurity Policy also recognises that cyber-crime, for example cyber 
espionage, cyber-terrorism, malware and e-crimes continue to pose a threat to South 
Africa’s cyber-security structures.145 Therefore, it recommends that an intelligible and 
integrated cyber-security approach in South Africa should be established.146 The 
approach should specifically promote a culture of cyber-security in South Africa. Lastly, 
it demands compliance with certain minimum cyber-security standards. These include 
the strengthening of intelligence collection, investigation, prosecution and judicial 
processes in respect of preventing and addressing cybercrime, cyber terrorism and 
cyber warfare; establishing public-private partnerships for national and international 
action plans and ensuring the protection of national critical information 
infrastructures.147  
For purposes of maintaining a culture of cyber-security in South Africa, national critical 
information infrastructures are described as the ‘ICT systems, data systems, 
databases, networks (including people, buildings, facilities and processes), that are 
fundamental to the effective operation of the Republic’.148  
(b) ECT Act 
The ECT Act operates within a broader national cyber-security structure. For e-
authentication purposes, sections 37 and 38 of this Act are particularly essential. These 
                                               
143  The Cybersecurity Policy 5. 
144   The Cybersecurity Policy 6. See also the NCP Framework 73.  
145   The Cybersecurity Policy 9-10.  
146   The Cybersecurity Policy 11.  
147   The Cybersecurity Policy 11-12.  
148   The Cybersecurity Policy 6. See also s 1 of the Draft Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Bill 
of 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the CaC Bill). 
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sections do not expressly provide for a system of e-authentication. They specifically 
regulate the accreditation of authentication products or services.149 This accreditation is 
made in support of an advanced electronic signature.150 The term accreditation for 
purposes of e-authentication is defined in section 33 of the ECT Act. It refers to the 
recognition of authentication products or services by an Accreditation Authority.151 The 
authority that carries out the accreditation process is known as the .za Domain Name 
Authority.152 The Director-General of the Department of Communications and Postal 
Services heads this Authority.153  
Authentication products or services are described in section 1 of the ECT Act. They are 
the products or services that are designed to identify a holder of an e-signature from 
other persons.154 These products or services may include the facilities, for example 
software or hardware that are used or intended for use in order to authenticate a 
person or thing. Within the context of the ECT Act, the e-authentication facilities are 
referred to as the signature creation data and the signature verification data.155 Firstly, 
a signature creation data is a unique number.156 This number is unique because it 
serves or should serve as a secret code or key that is exclusive to a computer user and 
which is used in order to create an e-signature.157 Secondly, a signature verification 
data can be any data.158 This data should be able to verify the e-signature that is 
exclusive to a computer user.159 
                                               
149   See s 37(1) of the ECT Act. Notice 1537 of 2004 and Chapter II of GN 8701 GG 29995 
of 20 June 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the Accreditation Regulations) deals with the 
application for accreditation, the manner of applying for accreditation, the information to 
be disclosed in such application, the submission of the application, the granting of the 
application, the publication of accreditation and the refusal of the application for 
accreditation.  
150  See s 37(1) of the ECT Act. 
151  S 33 of the ECT Act. 
152  S 1 of the ECT Act. 
153  South African Accreditation Authority 
http://www.saaa.gov.za/index.php/background.html (Date of use: 5 November 2015). 
154   S 1 of the ECT Act. 
155  S 1 of the Accreditation Regulations. 
156  S 1 of the Accreditation Regulations. 
157  S 1 of the Accreditation Regulations. 
158  S 1 of the Accreditation Regulations. 
159  S 1 of the Accreditation Regulations. 
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Section 38(2) of the ECT Act lists the factors that an Accreditation authority must 
consider before it accredits authentication products or services. These factors are the 
financial and human resources of the authentication product or service, including its 
assets; the quality of its hardware and software systems; its procedures for processing 
of products or services;  the availability of information to third parties relying on the 
authentication product or service; the regularity and extent of audits by an independent 
body.160 However, section 39(a) of the ECT Act provides that Accreditation Authority 
may suspend or revoke the accreditation if it is satisfied that the conditions that are 
specified in section 38 were not complied with.161 
Having studied Chapter VI of the ECT Act, it becomes evident that e-signatures are 
distinguished from advanced e-signatures. On the one hand, e-signatures are a 
representation of data in an electronic form which is attached to or logically associated 
with other data and which serves as one of the methods of e-authentication.162 The 
legal effect of e-signatures is dealt with in section 13 of the ECT Act. Section 13(2) 
states that an e-signature ‘is not without legal force and effect merely on the grounds 
that it is in electronic form’. Accordingly, the requirement in relation to a data 
message163 is considered to have been complied with if the following happens: 
If a method is used to identify the person and to indicate the person’s 
approval of the information communicated; and having regard to all 
the relevant circumstances at the time the method was used, the 
method was as reliable as was appropriate for the purposes for which 
the information was communicated.164 
On the other hand, an advanced e-signature is an e-signature that results or has the 
potential to result from a process which has been accredited by the Accreditation 
                                               
160  S 38(2)(a)-(d) of the ECT Act. 
161  See s 39(2) of ECT Act for the conditions that have to be met before a suspension or 
revocation of an accreditation could be effected. 
162   S 1 of the ECT Act. See also Spring Forest Trading v Wilberry (725/13) [2014] ZASCA 
178 (21 November 2014) 12 and Srivastava Signatures 38.  
163   Data message, within the context of the ECT Act, means data that is generated, sent, 
received or stored by electronic means and includes a voice, where the voice is used in 
an automated transaction, and a stored record. See s 1 of the ECT Act. 
164  S 13(3) of the ECT Act. 
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Authority as contemplated in section 37 of the ECT Act.165 Primarily, an advanced e-
signature facilitates the identification of a person.166 Furthermore, it helps in 
determining the integrity and credibility of information.167 Consequently, computer users 
should intend that the information which is a representation of their signatures will 
actually serve as an e-signature.168 For purposes of e-authentication in South Africa, it 
has to be established that: the e-signature to which the product or service relate is 
inimitably connected to the holder of an e-signature or; is capable of identifying the 
holder of an e-signature; is generated using the means that can be maintained under 
the exclusive control of the holder of an e-signature; is attached to the data or data 
message to which it relates in such a manner that any consequent alteration of the 
data or data message is detectable, and is based on the face-to-face identification of 
the holder of an e-signature.169 
The e-authentication process that is illustrated above must be carried out in specific 
‘trustworthy systems’.170 This means that the computer hardware or software that is 
used for e-authentication purposes ought to be reasonably secure from computer 
cracking attacks.171 Furthermore, the hardware or software must provide a sensible 
level of availability, reliability and correct operation.172 In addition, the hardware or 
software must be reasonably suited to perform the e-authentication process.173  Lastly, 
the hardware or software must conform to the existing and accepted ICT security 
procedures.174 As the soon as the above-mentioned has been completed, the 
provisions of section 13(4) applies mutatis mutandis. This section states that ‘where an 
advanced electronic signature has been used, such signature is regarded as a valid 
electronic signature and to have been applied properly, unless the contrary is proven’. 
6.6.4 Summary 
                                               
165  S 1 of the ECT Act. 
166   Laborde Signatures 70. 
167   Laborde Signatures 70. 
168   S 1 of the ECT Act. 
169   S 38(1)(a)-(e) of the ECT Act. 
170  Accreditation Regulations.  
171  S 38(3)(a) of the ECT Act. 
172  S 38(3)(b) of the ECT Act. 
173  S 38(3)(c) of the ECT Act. 
174  S 38(3)(d) of the ECT Act. 
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The sections above discuss a number of approaches to e-authentication. Firstly, the 
United Kingdom perspective to e-authentication is studied. The provisions of the 
Communications Act, Directive 2007/64/EC and Regulation No 910/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 are found to be significant. 
Firstly, the United Kingdom requires its e-authentication paradigm to be proportionate, 
sound and adequate.175 It has to be designed in a manner that adequately responds to 
the risks that e-crimes pose to the information systems. Secondly, e-authentication in 
Canada is founded on the principles for secure or sheltered information systems. 
These principles guarantee the reliability of certain credentials. Thirdly, e-authentication 
in South Africa falls within a structure to establish a culture of cyber-security. This 
culture is propagated by certain provision of the ECT Act and the Draft National 
Cybersecurity Policy.  
It is revealed that the United Kingdom, Canadian and South African perspectives to e-
authentication differ in a number of respects. Although they all support the structure for 
advanced e-signatures, it is argued that some are elaborate and others are not. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that the aim is to guarantee the sustenance of secure e-
authentication structures the selected countries adopt different approaches to 
achieving the aforementioned. For example, certain relationships are essential to the 
carrying out of e-authentication in the United Kingdom. These relationships are 
between a payer, payment system and payment institution. However, there are no such 
relationships that are expressly created by the Canadian and South African e-
authentication frameworks.  
Given the fact that the discussion above provides a descriptive study of e-
authentication, it thus leaves open the question regarding the manner in which the 
system of e-authentication should be carried out. In view of this, the sections below 
respond to this fissure. More specifically, they examine some of the prevailing practices 
to e-authentication. 
6.7 A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO AUTHENTICATION 
                                               
175   Art 5(e) of Directive 2007/64/EC. 
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This section continues from the viewpoint that maintaining the integrity, authenticity and 
trust in information systems or networks are essential. However, a different path is 
followed. Specifically, the practical operation and effects of e-authentication is 
investigated. This is done in order to provide meaning to the process of e-
authentication. For its completion, this section depends upon certain diverse theories of 
e-authentication. The most important of these theories include the B2G online 
authentication standard theory,176 the strand spaces theory,177 the theories of trust or 
trust theories178 and the remote authentication theory179 Given the vastness of these 
                                               
176   Campbell J “The development of a B2G authentication standard – a design perspective 
of the policy consultation process” 2007 (14) Australasian Journal of Information 
Systems 81-94. 
177   Doghmi SF, Guttman JD and Thayer FJ “Completeness of the authentication tests” in 
Biskup J and López J (eds) Computer security: ESORICS 2007 (Springer Berlin 2007) 
106-121, Guttman JD “Authentication tests and disjoint encryption – a design method 
for security protocols” 2004 (12) Journal of Computer Security 409-433, Thayer FJ and 
Herzog JC “Strand spaces – proving security protocols correct” 1999 (7) Journal of 
Computer Security 191-230, Newe T and Coffey T “Realisation of a minimum-
knowledge identification and signature scheme” 1998 (17) Computers and Security 
Journal 253-264, Burrows M, Abadi M and Needham R “Logic of authentication” 1990 
(8) ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 18-36, Perring A and Song D “Looking for 
diamonds in the desert – extending automatic protocol generation to three-party 
authentication and key protocols” in Computer Security (Papers delivered at the 
Foundations Workshop on Computer Security 3-5 July 2000), Thayer FJ and Herzog JC 
“Strand spaces – why is a security protocol correct?” in Security and Privacy (Papers 
delivered at the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 3-6 May 1998 IEEE 
Oakland)  160-171. 
178   Ma J, Orgun MA and Sattar A “Analysis of authentication protocols in agent-based 
systems using labeled tableaux” 2009 (39) IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and 
Cybernetics 889-900, Ma J and Orgun MA “Formalising theories of trust for 
authentication protocols” 2008 (10) Information Systems Frontiers 19-32, Ma J et al 
“Risk analysis in access control systems based on trust theories” in Web intelligence 
and intelligent agent technology (Papers delivered at the 2010 IEEE Conference on 
Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology 31 August-3 September 2010 IEEE 
Toronto) 415-418 and Harwood, Clark and Jacob http://www-
users.cs.york.ac.uk/~jac/PublishedPapers/TrustNetworks_rev2.pdf (Date of use: 13 July 
2013). 
179   Chang CC and Lee JS “An efficient and secure remote authentication scheme using 
smart cards” 2006 (18) International Journal of Information and Security 122-133, Chen 
TH, Tsai DS and Horng G “Secure user-friendly remote authentication schemes” 2006 
(18) International Journal of Information and Security 111-121, Wu ST and Chieu BC “A 
user-friendly remote authentication scheme with smart cards” 2003 Journal of 
Computers and Security 547-550, Wu TC and Sung HS “Authenticating passwords over 
insecure channels” 1996 Journal of Computer and Security 431-439, McElroy D and 
Turban E “Using smart cards in electronic commerce” 1998 International Journal of 
Information Management 61-72, Chang CC and Hwang KF “Some forgery attacks on a 
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theories, only the trust theories, the strand spaces theory and the remote 
authentication theory are discussed. This selection does not imply that the other 
theories are insignificant for e-authentication purposes. However, it is encouraged by 
the fact that the selected theories support the study of e-signatures and the structure 
for advanced e-signatures. The theories are motivated by the idea that three 
participants influence every system of e-authentication. Simmons refers to these 
participants as a transmitter, receiver and opponent (cracker).180 The theories are 
mathematically or computationally inclined. They provide or seek to provide ‘abstract 
descriptions of a more complex reality’.181 This reality is, for purposes of this research, 
called e-authentication. 
6.8 TRUST THEORY  
6.8.1 Background 
The trust theory holds the view that confidence in information systems or networks are 
essential to every e-authentication structure.182 The notion of trust assumes a particular 
meaning. It denotes the opposite of distrust.183 It has relations on the functions of an 
ICT system or network. Firstly, it is associated with the specification or specificity of the 
e-authentication protocols.184 These include the keys or cryptograms that assist in e-
authentication frameworks. Secondly, it is linked to the techniques that are essential to 
the implementation and management of the e-authentication protocols.185 Trust is 
established from reason, knowledge and experience. It is not founded on presumptions 
or what is referred to as a hunch. It certifies or entitles computer users to have 
assurance that their online communications or interactions are secure from outside 
                                                                                                                                         
remote user authentication scheme using smart cards” 2003 (14) Journal of Informatica 
289-294. 
180   Simmons GJ “Authentication theory/coding theory” in Blakley GR and Chaum D (eds) 
Advances in cryptology – CRYPTO (Springer Heidelberg 1985) 411-431 412-413. 
181   Ryan PYA “Mathematical models of computer security” in Focardi R and Gorrieri R 
(eds) Foundations of security analysis and design: tutorial lectures (Springer Berlin 
2001) 1-62 3. 
182   Ma and Orgun 2008 Information Systems Frontiers 19-20. 
183   Ma et al “Risk analysis” 415.  
184   Ma, Orgun and Sattar 2009 IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics 889. 
185   Ma, Orgun and Sattar 2009 IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics 889. 
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intrusions.186 Lastly, it assists in creating a trustworthy relationship between computer 
users, computers, systems and other entities.187  
Four steps are identified that assist in establishing the required trust.188 They are an 
analysis of how e-communication systems operate; an inquiry into the existing security 
mechanisms and an identification of the agents that are attached to systems; a 
definition of the appropriate workings of computers; and a description of the rules that 
describe the functions and behaviours of systems.189 These actions are given proper 
meaning by the creation of certain e-authentication models. In this chapter, the ‘trust 
model for access control systems’190 and the ‘trust (and reputational) systems’ are 
examined.191  
6.8.2 The Trust Model 
The trust model is generally a 6-turple or word, namely model or M ═ ‹U, R, A, O, P, 
AR›. In relation to the aforesaid, U refers to a set of users, R implies a set of roles 
(managers, admin or clerk), A means a set of actions (access, modify or approve), O 
denotes a set of objects (documents, records or data), P represents a set of 
permissions or pairs and AR connotes a set of assignment relations.192 The trust model 
helps in estimating the levels of trust in a specific system and the tools that are used to 
operate such a system. Accordingly, accessing may be allowed or denied depending 
on the quality and intensity of the risks in accessing a system. Consequently, the 
higher the risks that trust is absent or low, the higher the chances that authority to 
access a system will be denied.  
                                               
186   Ma and Orgun 2008 Information Systems Frontiers 19. 
187   Ma and Orgun 2008 Information Systems Frontiers 19-20. See also Ma J and Orgun M 
“Managing theories of trust in agent based systems” in Yolum P, Güngör T, Gürgen f 
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2005) 442-451 442. 
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190   Hereinafter referred to as the Trust Model. 
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2013). 
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The figures below indicate an e-authentication method which is founded on the trust 
model for access control systems. These figures generally refer to the formulae that 
are abstracted from the trust model. Accordingly, an e-authentication agenda that is 
deduced from the trust model for access control systems will come across as follows: 
Figure 6.8.2.1 
Holds(U,R) ʌ has permission(R,A,O) →  
user_permission(U,A,O) 
This implies that in cases where U wishes to perform A on O, U should afterwards 
possess R. This possession should consequently lead to the granting of P to U.193 It is 
also required that R should be appropriate in the circumstances.194 
Figure 6.8.2.2   
is_user(U,AR) →  
can_approve(U,O,P) 
This means that AR may grant P to U in order that U may perform A on O. It is 
important to note that U does not have to access O himself or herself. In other cases, it 
may be possible for U to delegate P to another user, for example Z.195 
Figure 6.8.2.3 
 is_in(U, AR¹) ʌ is_in(Y,AR²) →  
can_co_approve(U,Y,P) 
Figure 6.8.2.3 implies that if the scenario in 6.8.2.2 above takes place, two separate 
ARs (AR¹ and AR²) may then have to approve or grant P to U and Z.196 
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211 
 
6.8.3 Trust Systems 
Trust systems are sometimes associated with the reputational systems.197 Trust, in this 
instance, is a model which should be used to exclude cases of deception.198 This view 
is encouraged by the fact that a departure from agreed facts weakens the trust. Trust 
systems accept that a presence of trust depends on an existence of binary 
relationships. The first is a trust relationship. The second is a distrust relationship. 
Divergent paths determine whether these relationships are present or not.199 These are 
a trust path, a given path and a distrust path.200 A trust path demonstrates a sequence 
of trust pairs or agents to the extent that each and every pair or agent of a path is a 
trust.201 Let us suppose that A trusts B, B trusts C, and C trusts D. In this example, it 
can be said that A also trusts C and D and vice-a-versa. A given path can either be a 
trust or distrust path. It particularly illustrates the different sets of users and their 
interaction in a path. A distrust path attacks the trust path or the paths upon which the 
trust is founded. Let us suppose again that D, in our example above, distrusts B, A 
trusts E and E distrusts D. The question then is: can it be said that A trusts C? In 
answering this question, the trust systems state that D’s distrust of B defeats the chain 
which connects A and C. However, E’s distrusts of D defeats the distrust and so 
‘cancels its effect’.202 This then leaves A having trust in C. Consequently, A has trust in 
C because D’s distrust of B leads to an attack path which is weaker than the trust path 
between A and C.203 
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A generic method on how these diverse paths work is commonly implemented. For 
example, user (a) sends or wishes to send a message (msg X) to another user (b). It is 
common course that if b wants to access and read X he or she will then be required to 
encrypt X by using a particular key ka. In such a case, the trust theory will apply as 
follows:  
 
Figure 6.8.2.4 
(Bª Secure(ka) ʌ Receive(b, {X}ka) ↔                                                                                     
Bª Reliable(X)) 
This means that in the event that b accepts that k is secure and consequently receives 
X as encrypted with ka, b then accepts that X is reliable.204 
Figure 6.8.2.5 
(Receive(a, {X [T]}ka) ʌ Bª Duplicate(T) ↔  
Reject(X [T]) 
This connotes that if b receives X containing a series of characters or codes that 
illustrates and identifies the e-authentication or encryption process, that is, timestamp T 
and it appears from X that T is a replica or is duplicated, X will be rejected.205 
It is established from the above that the trust theory promotes the idea of trust in 
information systems or networks. The trust model and the trust or reputational systems 
are the models which are used to demonstrate the existence or not of trust in each 
case. The section below discusses the strand spaces theory. This theory focuses on 
the segments which constitute the whole or wholeness of systems. These segments 
are, for purposes of the strand spaces theory, referred to as the strands. 
6.9 STRAND SPACES THEORY 
                                               
204   Ma, Orgun and Sattar 2009 IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics 894. 
205   Ma, Orgun and Sattar 2009 IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics 894. 
  
213 
 
6.9.1 Background 
The strand spaces theory is one of the most widely used e-authentication models. It is 
relied upon to authenticate the infrastructure or architecture of a computer and to 
validate the tools for e-authentication.206 It basically improves or serves as an 
improvement of the so-called Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol. The Needham-
Schroeder Public Key Protocol was made famous by Needham and Schroeder in their 
article titled Using Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Computers.207 It 
argues that secret keys are usually indispensable in every e-authentication 
framework.208 For instance, they justify the authentication of a person or personal 
credentials. Some of these keys (short keys) are, according to the Needham-Schroeder 
Public Key Protocol, held by individual computer users.209 Others (long keys) are kept 
and computed in an authentication server.210 For e-authentication purposes, the 
Needham-Schroeder Public Key states that authentication servers are the final 
authority of e-authentication.211 Accordingly, they validate a user’s short key or keys by 
matching it or them with the long key or keys.212  
Having examined the workings of the Needham-Schroeder Public Key, the strand 
spaces theory was incepted. It introduces an e-authentication framework which is 
founded on strands. Before the workings of this theory are examined, it is essential to 
discuss certain terms that are central to it. These include a strand, node, bundle and 
strand space. Firstly, a strand is a sequence of events that a computer user may 
undertake. These may be a series of message transmissions (send) and receptions 
(receive).213 In this instance, it represents the local behaviours of principals in a session 
                                               
206   Fröschke S “Adding branching to the strand space model” 2009 (242) Theoretical 
Computer Science 139-159 139. 
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or run, that is, the sending and receiving of messages. It also characterises the basic 
actions of encrypting and decrypting messages. It illustrates whether or not encryption 
or decryption is necessary in each case. Two categories of principals are created in a 
strand. Principals may either be legitimate users of computers (victims) or the 
penetrators or intruders (crackers) of computers.214 In relation to the last-mentioned 
principal, a cracker uses what is referred to as a penetrator set.215 This set 
encompasses the keys (Kρ) that are originally known to a penetrator.216 They are 
public, private or symmetric keys.217  
Secondly, a node is the element of a strand. This element facilitates the transmission of 
messages between the principals.218 Thirdly, the structure of a strand is referred to as a 
bundle. It generally combines the local view of a strand to form a global view. Fourthly, 
a strand space is or represents the coming together of strands.219 For e-authentication 
purposes, a strand space may mean different things depending on whether or not a 
system is used by a victim or cracker. When used by a victim a strand space denotes a 
measure which illustrate the suitability of the existing e-authentication measures to 
withstand non-self intrusions.220 However, in cases where a system is used by 
computer crackers it implies ‘a sequence of message transmissions and receptions 
that model a basic capability a penetrator (computer cracker) should be assumed to 
possess’.221 A difference is generally made between strand spaces. There is a ‘secure 
strand spaces’ and an ‘intruder strand spaces’.222 The first-mentioned strand space is 
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sometimes called a standard or honest strand space. It contains both a legitimate and 
intruder strands.223 The second-mentioned belongs or is controlled by a computer 
cracker and contains nodes that are known to and controlled by an intruder.224 
6.9.2 Strand Spaces and E-Authentication  
As is shown in the discussion above, the strand spaces theory is a development of the 
Needham-Schroeder Public Key. The Needham-Schroeder Public Key creates a 
scenario where A represents a set of messages (msgs).225 These msgs are sent and 
received between principals. The elements of A are referred to as the terms (t). The ts 
are generated from two sets of msgs through encryption. There is T which represents 
the texts and K, which represents the key. For e-authentication purposes, the position 
will appear as follows: 
Figure 6.8.2.6 
 A , {|B , Nª|}κ 
This means that initiator A sends a t in order to commence an exchange of msgs with 
B.226 During the time when t is sent, a msg is still in the form of a plaintext. Afterwards, 
a ciphertext is created on msg. A long key (κ) is used to create the ciphertext. 
Consequently, the encryption of a msg is in respect of A’s name.227 
It is argued that the Needham-Schroeder Public Key has immeasurable drawbacks. 
For example, if we look at figure 6.8.2.6 above we can infer that κ was generated by S 
(denoting the Server). However, it cannot be said for certain how much time S took to 
complete the session. In other words, there is nothing available that measures the 
length of time between the sending of t and the creation of κ. This generates problems 
because a computer cracker may intercept the session and recover the generated κ. 
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Thereafter, it may send a duplicate or wrong κ to B. In all this, B will not know that k is a 
duplicated or wrong key.  
Having observed these shortcomings Guttman, Thayer and Herzog developed the 
strand spaces theory. It is founded on three principles.228 Principle one states that a 
computer cracker must never know k.229 Accordingly, the idea that k is generally good 
or safe should be approached with caution.230 The second principle avers that S must 
never be allowed to re-use k.231 Principle three asserts that a session k must never be 
similar to a long key.232 Thus, k and msg must always be fresh. K or msg is deemed to 
be fresh if it is not a part of k or msg which was sent prior to the current epoch or 
session.233 Accordingly, k or msg which was safe and good in the past session should 
not be regarded as such for purposes of current or future sessions. 
In a strand, A denotes a set of msgs that can be sent between principles. The elements 
of A are called the A terms (t). The transmission of t is represented as +t. The reception 
of t is characterised as –t. For computational purposes, the terms will appear as 
follows: 
Figure 6.8.2.7 
 {+t¹, +t²....-t¹, -t²} 
In addition, if s is a strand, it then follows that s ↓ i is the ‘ith node (n) on s’.234 The 
connection n ⇒ n¹ holds between nodes n and n¹ if n = s ↓ i and n¹ = s ↓ i +1. It is 
accepted that this working does not make sense to an ordinary reader. Therefore, it 
requires some unpacking or elaboration. The connection n → n¹ represents the 
communication (or msgs) between strands (s).235 When one t receives an m it is 
important that another t should also be allowed to receive a msg. This means that an 
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occurrence of one event should also lead to the incidence of another.236 Consequently, 
the situation is as demonstrated in formula 6.8.2.8 below: 
Figure 6.8.2.8 
{(n) = +t..... (n¹) = -t} 
Authenticating transmitted or outgoing msgs differs to the authentication of received or 
incoming msgs. In relation to outgoing msgs, a msg must be sent within a strand in an 
encrypted form and a k to decrypt it must be safe (K Є S). This assists in 
demonstrating whether or not a k is issued during the course of a session or is a result 
of a penetrated or cracked session. In relation to incoming msgs, the situation is 
complex. If a msg is encrypted and the encryption k was safe, then it can be said that a 
user was responsible for a session. This then leads to what is referred to as an honest 
session. A session is honest if it meets the following: ‘The elements of that session 
cannot be synthesised by the penetrator. They cannot be guessed and a computer 
cracker cannot deduce them via a sequence of decryptions, encryptions, or 
separations’.237 Nevertheless, in cases where a msg is encrypted and the encryption 
key (k) was unsafe, then it can be inferred that the session was penetrated.  
It is argued above that the strand spaces theory adds on, supplements or complements 
the Needham-Schroeder Public Key. It mentions that msgs are communicated within a 
strand. Their encryption and decryption by principals depends on whether or not they 
are transmitted or received msgs.   
6.10 REMOTE E-AUTHENTICATION THEORY 
6.10.1 Background 
Remote e-authentication implies an identification and verification of information 
remotely.238 Remotely is here used in a selective manner. It denotes a procedure or 
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process (of e-authentication) which is undertaken over a system. Generally, a user 
enters or registers his or her particulars or credentials into a system. The system 
records these particulars or credentials and then uses them to authenticate a user at a 
later stage. Local area network (LAN) systems are particularly critical to the working of 
the remote e-authentication process. LAN systems are ‘a collection of devices that are 
interconnected via a common transportation medium, for the purposes of transferring 
data’.239 They ensure that information is verified without a need for direct engagements 
between a verifier (usually a remote server) and a user.240 Furthermore, they help in 
the transfer of information from, for example a PC to a remote server.   
A password table is commonly used in order to facilitate a smooth performing of remote 
e-authentication schemes. The table can look a lot like the one which is indicated 
below: 
Password Table241 
Codes Narratives  
 
U 
V 
ID 
Pw 
 
A user 
A value 
An identity of the user 
A password of the user 
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S 
R 
Msg 
k 
rn 
A server 
A login request 
A message  
A secret key 
A random number 
H 
T 
→ 
═ 
A one-way hash function 
A time (operating like a time-stamp) 
A common channel 
A secure channel 
 
Remote e-authentication can be based upon various cryptograms. It can be centred on 
passwords, smart cards or biometric data.242  
6.10.2 Password-Based 
This form of e-authentication is one of the most extensively used. It was made popular 
by Morris and Thompson in their 1979 paper.243 In that paper, they found that 
passwords are one of the essential components in securing information.244 They then 
argued that measures should be established to prevent attacks to remote-access 
systems.245 In password-based remote e-authentication, it is necessary that the system 
or network should be able to perform the e-authentication process. In the absence of 
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such ability, computer crackers could intercept the password and steal sensitive 
information. In authenticating a user, a remote system verifies and corroborates a 
password. Basically, a server searches a password from a password table (table that 
keeps or stores passwords). This searching is made with a view to establish whether a 
password matches that which is contained in a table or not.246  
Two categories of password-based remote e-authentication are identified.247 One uses 
a weak password, and the other relies on a strong password.248 Advantages and 
disadvantages are attached to both these categories. On the one hand, weak-
password authentication is easy to memorise, it is based on public-key cryptographic 
techniques and that remote systems do not have to keep a password table in order to 
authenticate user login details.249 Nevertheless, weak-password authentication is easy 
to guess, inconveniences the e-authentication process (because the password table 
must be impenetrable) and requires that additional work be done to secure the 
password against computer crackers. On the other hand, strong-password e-
authentication uses simple operations, for example a one-way hash function, easy to 
implement, and is less costly than weak-password authentication. However, a strong-
password authentication is difficult to memorise.250  
In addition, three phases are distinguished that characterises password-based remote 
e-authentication. These are a (i) registration phase; (ii) login phase, and (iii) 
authentication phase.251 Chang, Tsu and Chen refer to the first-mentioned phase 
(registration phase) as the Card Initiation Phase.252 This change in terminology does 
not alter the entire principles of password-based remote e-authentication. Conversely, 
the change emanates from the theory of quadratic residues which Chang, Tsu and 
                                               
246   For criticism of this method of e-authentication see Li LH, Lin IC and Hwang MS “A 
remote password authentication scheme for multiserver architecture using neural 
networks” 2001 (12) IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks 1498-1504 1498. 
247   Das LM, Saxena A and Gulati VP “A dynamic ID-based remote user authentication 
scheme” 2004 (50) IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics 629-631 629. 
248   Das, Saxena and Gulati 2004 IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics 629. 
249   Das, Saxena and Gulati 2004 IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics 629. 
250   Li, Lin and Hwang 2001 IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks 1498. 
251   Chen, Tsai and Horng 2006 International Journal of Information and Security 112-113 
and Li, Lin and Hwang 2001 IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks 1499-1500. 
252   Chang CC, Tsu SM and Chen CY “Remote scheme for password authentication based 
on theory of quadratic residues” 1995 (18) Computer Communications 936-942 937. 
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Chen propose. This theory contributes to the ideal to eliminate the chances that an 
eavesdropper or computer cracker may intercept a password.253 There are also others 
who propose an additional phase to a password-based remote e-authentication.254 
They refer to this as the Password Change Phase.255 
Despite these differences, the registration, login and authentication phases are 
discussed below. 
(a) Registration Phase 
In this phase U registers his or her information with S. This information can be in the 
form of an ID or a Pw. Chen, Tsai and Horng submit that only the hash value of an ID 
and Pw should be registered to S.256 The registration ought to be carried out through a 
secure channel or, otherwise, to be done in neutral networks.257 Neutral networks are 
referred to as the trained networks that facilitate a process of authenticating users 
online or remotely.258 For computational purpose a registration phase will appear as 
follows: 
Figure 6.8.2.9 
U ═ S → 
h(ID);h(Pw)259 
As soon as the registration is complete, S then computes ID and Pw and stores them 
remotely. 
(b) Login Phase 
                                               
253   Chang, Tsu and Chen 1995 Computer Communications 936. 
254   Wen F and Li X “An improved dynamic ID-based remote user authentication with key 
agreement” 2012 (38) Journal of Computers and Electrical Engineering 381-387 382-
383.  
255   Wen and Li 2012 Journal of Computers and Electrical Engineering 383.  
256   Chen, Tsai and Horng 2006 International Journal of Information and Security 114. 
257   Li, Lin and Hwang 2001 (12) IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks 1499-1500. 
258   Li, Lin and Hwang 2001 (12) IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks 1499. 
259   Chen, Tsai and Horng 2006 International Journal of Information and Security 114. 
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In this phase U makes an R. This basically happens when U enters an ID and Pw in 
the spaces that are allocated for this purpose in a system or network. R is automatically 
transmitted to S at time (T), that is, the current date and time. T signifies the ‘expected 
legal time interval for transmission delays between the login terminal and the system 
servers’.260 These times are clearly defined or determined. Therefore, it is inevitable 
that they will defer from one e-authentication system to the other. 
(c) Authentication Phase 
In this phase S receives an ID and Pw. In addition, it accepts T¹ and T². T¹ refers to a 
time when an R was made. T² denotes a time when the S received an R. As soon as 
this happens, S establishes the format of an ID and Pw.261 It also corroborates the time 
interval between T¹ and T².262 This is made in order to ensure that the times are within 
the authorized acceptable level.263 In other words, it is made with a view to guarantee 
that the delay in the times is not greater than is lawfully or reasonably expected to be. 
Accordingly, if T¹ is greater than T², S should reject R. Lastly, S should compute: 
Figure 6.8.2.10 
h(ID);h(Pw) ═  
T¹§T².264 
6.10.3 Smart Cards-Based265  
The idea of smart cards-based remote e-authentication is modelled from the 
approaches that Lamport used in one of his 1981 papers.266 He argued for a remote e-
                                               
260   Li, Lin and Hwang 2001 (12) IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks 1499. 
261   Chang, Tsu and Chen 1995 Computer Communications 937. 
262   Wen and Li 2012 Journal of Computers and Engineering 383. 
263   Chang, Tsu and Chen 1995 Computer Communications 937. 
264   Chen, Tsai and Horng 2006 International Journal of Information and Security 115-116. 
265   It is important to note the paper by Chang and Hwang which lists the manner of 
bypassing or attacking the e-authentication frameworks that are supported by the smart 
cards-based remote e-authentication. See Chang and Hwang 2003 Journal of 
Informatica 289-294. 
266   See in general Lamport L “Password authentication with insecure communication” 1981 
(24) Communications of the ACM 770-772. 
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authentication framework over insecure channels.267 Following this development, these 
channels have become known as smart cards.268 Smart cards-based remote e-
authentication is based on the idea that remote servers are or should not be the sole 
keepers of user information. Accordingly, smart cards can also keep and store 
information. A smart card chip (memory and processor chips) facilitates this keeping 
and storage.269  
Chen, Kuo and Wuu illustrate in what manner smart cards-based remote e-
authentication works.270 They say the following: 
In a smart-card-based (remote) authentication scheme, when (computer) 
users want to access resources on a secure sever, they insert their 
smart card into a card reader and then input a password for the card. 
The smart card takes the user’s password, generates the user’s login 
request, and sends the request to the secure server. Upon receiving the 
user’s request, the server verifies the validity of the request.271 
The use of smart cards in remote e-authentication schemes makes the keeping of a 
password table unnecessary.272 However, it is conceded that caution should generally 
be exercised whenever they are relied upon.273 For example, it should always be kept 
in mind that they do not possess the same memory or computational ability as remote 
servers. In particular, their memory is low as compared to that of remote servers.274 
Consequently, there is a danger that information may be lost or damaged due to this 
insignificant capacity.  
                                               
267   Lamport 1981 Communications of the ACM 770-771. 
268   Chang and 2006 International Journal of Information and Security 123. 
269   Pfau A “Smart card solutions” in Fumy E and Sauerbrey J (eds) Enterprise security: IT 
security solutions – concepts, practical experiences, technologies (Publicis Corporate 
Publishing Erlangen 2006) 57-69 59-61. 
270   See Chen BL, Kuo WC and Wuu LC “Robust smart-card-based remote user password 
authentication scheme” 2012 International Journal of Communication Systems 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/dac.2368/pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2013). 
271   Chen, Kuo and Wuu 2012 International Journal of Communication Systems. 
272   Sun HM “An efficient remote use of authentication scheme using smart cards” 2000 (46) 
IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics 958-961 958. 
273   Chang and Lee 2006 International Journal of Information and Security 123. 
274   Chang and Lee 2006 International Journal of Information and Security 123. 
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(a) Registration Phase 
In this phase, U submits his or her ID to the remote system or network. This relates to 
the ID that he or she chose himself or herself.275 The system computes a Pw for U.276 
The S stores an ID and subsequently issues a smart card through a secure channel to 
U. The smart card contains h. Consequently, the computation is as follows: 
Figure 6.8.2.11 
 Pw ═ h(ID,k)277 
(b) Login Phase 
This phase is used in cases when U wants to access the facilities that the remote 
system offers. These may be incidents wherein U wishes to make an electronic funds 
transfer (EFT) or buy property or goods online. Basically, U inserts the smart card into 
an allocated space on a system (input device). U will then be requested to enter his or 
her ID and Pw. Following this, the smart card will generate rn. Rn can only be used 
once. It also computes h and Pw. Thereafter, it sends a msg (M) which contains the ID 
and rn to the remote system (M ═ [ID, rn]). 
(c) Authentication Phase  
Immediately after receiving M, the system authenticates U. It verifies the validity of U’s 
ID. In cases where the format of the ID is incorrect, the remote system rejects the R. In 
addition, it corroborates the legitimacy of T¹ and T². If T¹ is greater than T², the system 
will reject R. Thereafter, the system computes Pw ═ h(ID, k) and M ═ h(T¹, Pw).278 
Accordingly, if M matches the M which was issued during the login phase the system 
                                               
275   Chang and Lee 2006 International Journal of Information and Security 126. 
276   It is important to note that there is nothing which prevents U from choosing an ID and 
PW.  
277   Sun 2000 IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics 959 and Chen, Kuo and Wuu 
2012 International Journal of Communication Systems. 
278   Sun 2000 IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics 959. 
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will accept the R.279 If the aforementioned does not ensue, the login request will be 
rejected.  
6.10.4 Biometrics-Based 
Biometrics-based e-authentication is generally one of the most secure ways of 
authenticating users. It specifically offers a cryptographically secure authentication of 
users.280 This security is linked to the fact that a biometrics-based e-authentication use 
features that are inherent to users. These features are unique to users in that users 
cannot change or alter them during their lifetime. Hribernig and Weinzierl best describe 
the individuality of biometric data. They argue that it is ‘singular within all humankind 
(past, present and future); stable from birth to dearth and independent of personal and 
environmental conditions’.281 The use of biometrics-based e-authentication also 
excludes the possibility that the authentication cryptograms may be lost or destroyed. 
Therefore, users do have to remember or store IDs and passwords in a safe or 
protected place. Despite these advantages, two shortcomings of biometrics-based e-
authentication are identified. Firstly, it is maintained that the distribution of the features 
is never identical or uniform. As a result, features that do not share particular 
resemblances may be used for e-authentication purposes. Secondly, it is often difficult 
to reproduce biometrics data.282 This complexity is associated with the irregular and 
unbalanced nature of biometrics data. 
In biometrics-based e-authentication schemes, four processes are distinguished. 
These are the capturing, encoding, storage and matching processes. Basically, a 
system captures biometric data. Usually, a sensor device is used for this purpose. 
Thereafter, a (raw) template of the data is produced which contains particulars, for 
example ID, username or password of a user.283 The template together with the 
                                               
279   Sun 2000 IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics 959. 
280   Boyen X et al “Secure remote authentication using biometrics” in Cramer R (ed) 
Advances in cryptology – Eurocrypt, lecture notes in computer science (Springer 
Heidelberg 2005) 147-163 147-148. 
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particulars is kept and stored in a system. Consequently, a user will have to possess 
the data and particulars that are similar or correspond with that which contained in the 
template.284 
6.10.5 Summary 
The manner in which the process of e-authentication operates is examined. This is 
made in order to ensure that the integrity and trust in information systems is preserved. 
With this in mind, various e-authentication theories are investigated. These are the trust 
theory, the strand spaces theory and the remote-e-authentication theory. The trust 
theory is founded on the idea to maintain trust in information systems. It relies on 
several trust models in order to achieve the aforementioned. Thus, the trust model and 
the trust or reputational systems are identified. The strand spaces theory is an addition 
to the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol approach. It models its e-
authentication structure from the workings of strands. It specifically argues that 
because strands are the key ingredients for the transmission and receiving of 
messages within a system, e-authentication processes should understand the workings 
and dynamics of strands. Remote e-authentication covers the identification of 
information using remote systems, for example a remote server. This e-authentication 
can be password-based, smart cards-based or biometrics-based.  
E-authentication theories have certain benefits and drawbacks. For example, in the 
case of passwords-based remote e-authentication a distinction is made between weak 
and strong passwords. Weak passwords are easy to memorise and it is not necessary 
to keep a password table. However, they are easy to guess and thus added security 
measures are required in order to supplement them. Strong passwords use a hash 
function (which is a simple operation) and are inexpensive than weak passwords. 
However, they are difficult to remember and it is required that a password table should 
be kept. Smart cards-based remote e-authentication seeks to relieve remote servers as 
the only keepers of e-authentication information. However, it is conceded that smart 
cards have lesser or little memory as compared to that of remote servers. 
Consequently, there is a risk that information may be lost or destroyed. Biometrics-
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based remote e-authentication is the most sheltered e-authentication framework. This 
is the case because it uses for e-authentication purposes features (or biometric data) 
that are unique and inherent to a user. However, the dissemination of biometric data is 
never uniform. This then exposes the whole e-authentication process to a danger that 
distinct features may be used to identify a user. In addition, a process to make a replica 
of (or to replicate) the features is mostly a cumbersome activity 
6.11 CONCLUSION 
This chapter continues from the viewpoint that it is possible to regulate ICTs and their 
ensuing challenges. It then identifies e-crimes as one of the ICT challenges. More 
specifically, e-crimes generate risks to regulators and the overall information society. 
Therefore, it is necessary that structures should be created in order to avert this 
occurrence. On the one hand, acts or conducts that are associated with e-crimes may 
be criminalised. On the other hand, measures to prevent e-crimes may be introduced. 
In this chapter the measures to prevent e-crimes are discussed. They are studied as 
part of the system or process of authentication.  
Authentication (and not authorisation) seeks to establish the credibility and 
dependability of a person or thing.285 With respect to a person, this is made by 
analysing, inspecting and corroborating a person’s face images, finger prints and 
signatures. In relation to a thing, the authentication and best evidence tests are 
commonly applied. The achievements of the system in offline frameworks have led to it 
being adopted in online environments. In online settings, the process is referred to as 
e-authentication. E-authentication uses certain electronic symbols (cryptograms) in 
order to provide security and trust in electronic systems. They are passwords or codes, 
pins, digital or e-signatures that use public key infrastructures, physical devises, for 
example smart cards, one-time-passwords, USB plug-in devices or biometric 
identification. The symbols are essential to the performing of the e-authentication 
pillars, for example evidence of knowledge; confirmation of possession, or proof by 
property.286 Ensuring the performance of the pillars generally forms part of a country’s 
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cyber-security paradigm. With this in mind, a selective study of the e-authentication 
measures in the United Kingdom, Canada and South Africa is made. It is found that 
these countries’ e-authentication measures differ. Some are elaborate whilst others are 
not. For information security purposes, the practical approach to the e-authentication is 
also discussed. It relies on certain e-authentication theories. These are the trust, strand 
spaces and remote e-authentication theories. The theories are modelled from 
mathematics. They mathematically illustrate the manner of sending and receiving 
(strands) msgs online, the criteria for trusted e-authentication systems and how the 
process of e-authentication is or should be conducted. 
Having examined the e-authentication measures, it becomes clear that the current e-
authentication processes are inadequate. In particular, they are not strong enough to 
reasonably withstand cracking attacks. The vulnerability of these measures is not only 
limited to the weaknesses of weak or strong passwords. It also extends to the flaws of 
the existing e-authentication tools. For example, it was established from the e-
authentication theories that e-authentication is usually carried out by a remote server 
(the S). In this instance, U submits an ID or Pw into an allocated space. The S verifies 
the ID or Pw. In the case of a smart cards-based remote e-authentication, a smart card 
which contains an h will generate an rn. It is submitted that this rn is analogous to an 
OTP. Thereafter, the S determines whether or not access should be accepted or 
denied to a user based on the information entered. Based on this, it is submitted that 
one of the purposes of e-authentication, that is, to prevent e-crimes cannot be 
achieved. By way of elaboration, chapter 4 revealed that computer crackers usually 
operate between computers. They target and attack computer (remote) servers and 
divert information stored in these servers into use other that intended by users. 
Accordingly, a use of servers (and in some cases smart cards) to authenticate users or 
their credentials online can be detrimental to users and the process of e-authentication 
as a whole. OTPs or rns cannot be expected to adequately prevent this damage. More 
specifically, cases have been reported in the past wherein the reliability or sufficiency 
of OTPs was questioned.287 In these cases, consultants who, at the time, worked for 
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certain cellular phone providers teamed up with criminals. This scheme was aimed at 
intercepting the OTPs before they reach the intended computer users. In each case, 
whenever a computer user requires the services of a particular service provider the 
consultants would open one sim-card for the computer user and a duplicate for 
themselves. For purposes of carrying out e-transactions, an OTP would be sent to a 
computer user’s cellular phone or electronic mail and the designated duplicate sim-
card. Consequently, the consultants would immediately use the OTP in order to access 
funds masquerading as users. Due to the fact that an OTP can only be used once, 
genuine users were prevented from accessing the funds or an account.  
Given the identified shortcomings, chapter 7 introduces an elaborate framework to e-
authentication. The framework is studied under the broad ambit of the Precautionary 
Principle. It does not necessarily segregate between the e-authentication theories. 
Simply, it argues that the e-authentication theories should be read together in order to 
establish appropriate e-authentication frameworks that responds to current and future 
e-crimes. This approach is part of customary international law,288 and deals with the 
governance or regulation of risks to a particular phenomenon.289 For e-authentication 
purposes, it contends that e-crimes pose grave risks to the sensitive information that 
belongs to computer users. Because of these risks, an ICT regulatory agenda should 
be a representation of the ICT and the risks that are posed to these recent forms of 
technologies.  
 
                                                                                                                                         
finance/banking/how-crooks-use-sim-swaps-to-rob-you-1.1507185 (Date of use: 28 
October 2013). 
288   McIntyre O and Mosedale T “The precautionary principle as a norm of customary 
international law” 1997 (9) Journal of Environmental Law 221-241 235. 
289   Sunstein CR “Beyond the precautionary principle” 2003 (151) University of 
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CHAPTER 7 
A PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH TO E-AUTHENTICATION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
It was indicated above that property rights vest in information. These rights arise 
because users of information expend time and effort in gathering information. 
Consequently, information has become an essential asset of an information society. 
Given this importance, a risk exists that information may be appropriated by criminals 
illegally. Given this risk, it is then determined whether information is capable of being 
stolen. Having considered the developments of the law of theft in Roman-Dutch, 
English and South African law, it was argued that information can be stolen. The 
techniques that are used in e-crimes are discussed in order to demonstrate how the 
theft of information actually occurs. Because e-crimes have become more pervasive, it 
is then submitted that they pose grave challenges to the information society. The most 
pertinent of these challenges relate to whether it is possible to regulate ICTs or not, 
and whether the law is or legal rules are sufficient to adequately address ICTs and the 
challenges that are generated by these contemporary technologies or not. It was found 
that ICTs are spheres where regulations apply. However, it was argued that regulations 
could provide assistance to the ICT regulatory agenda. Thus, the role of the law should 
be to channel the nature and structure ICT regulations. In doing this, the state should, 
in incepting legal rules, be guided by the ICT regulatory theories that are discussed in 
chapter 5 above. 
Having established that recent technologies can be regulated, ICT regulatory measures 
were examined in chapter 6. These measures were discussed as part of a broader 
System of Authentication. The discussion of the authentication measures was both 
theoretical and practical. The theoretical approach to authentication investigated the 
importance of authentication in offline settings. Accordingly, an overview of 
authentication and how it has come to be accepted as a model was illustrated. Given 
this acceptance, it was pointed out that the successes of offline authentication 
measures have led to these mechanisms being used in online environments, that is, 
the e-authentication process. Furthermore, it was stated that e-authentication does not 
necessarily mean the e-authorisation process. E-authentication has to do with the 
identification and verification of certain personal information online. However, e-
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authorisation follows e-authentication and deals with the validation of the information 
that was identified and verified during the process of e-authentication. Therefore, it 
assists in arriving at the decision regarding whether or not a person who has been 
subjected to the e-authentication process should access a particular system or 
network. The study of the practical approach to authentication relied on a number of 
mathematical sketches or graphs. These sketches were extracted from certain selected 
e-authentication theories. The aforementioned theories included the trust, strand 
spaces and remote e-authentication theories. The rationale for examining the sketches 
was to give meaning to the theoretical aspects of e-authentication.  
The study of the e-authentication measures in chapter 6 above revealed that the e-
authentication process is founded on legal rules. These rules do not seem to have 
been modelled from the ICT regulatory concepts and theories that are discussed in 
chapter 5. Because of this, the e-authentication agenda that can be drawn from these 
legal rules is not bound to the technology to be regulated and is not capable of evolving 
with it. Specifically, it discards the fundamentals of the Good Regulator Theorem. 
Consequently, an ICT regulatory approach which is abstracted from these legal rules is 
one that is susceptible to continuous changing in so long as technologies develops. 
Following these limitations, a complementary e-authentication framework is proposed 
in this chapter. It builds on the investigation of risk regulation that was illustrated in the 
United Kingdom and Canada approaches to e-authentication. In this research, the 
proposed e-authentication structure is called the Precautionary Approach to E-
Authentication or PAEA. It argues that the phenomena of risks should underpin every 
e-crimes controlling or regulatory exercise. For example, it regards e-crimes as one of 
the malicious threats that are generated by contemporary technologies. Because of 
this, PAEA supports the necessity to establish a risk or threat-based e-authentication 
framework. This framework responds or should respond to the existing uncertainties 
regarding how ICTs in general and e-crimes in particular should be regulated.  
Furthermore, PAEA recommends a move from a point where regulators merely dwell 
on the influence or impact of the damages that are caused by e-crimes to a stage 
where regulators accept that the insufficiency, absence or uncertainty of science or 
scientific knowledge about the scale or degree of e-crimes does or should not prevent 
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the taking of measures to deter e-crimes.1 This does not mean that science becomes 
insignificant to the study of risks to ICTs. Simply, the proposed move aims to 
demonstrate that a lack of certainty about the scale of the risks does or should not be 
taken to mean that risks do not exist.2 Accordingly, regulators still need to exhaustively 
evaluate the scientific information which is related to the risks that are posed to 
contemporary technologies.3  
The principle to exercise precaution or the so-called Precautionary Principle shapes the 
manner of studying PAEA. An examination of the precautionary principle is generally 
made in fields dealing with environmental studies. In this chapter these sources are 
then consulted in order to give meaning and substance to the precautionary approach 
to e-authentication. Thereafter, the manner in which PAEA operates or should operate 
for ICT regulatory purposes is demonstrated in chapter 8 below. 
7.2  OVERVIEW OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
7.2.1 Background 
A reference to the notion of precautionary principle was originally foreign in English 
literature. It is specifically a product of the events or debates that arose in the mid-
1970s regarding the necessity to prevent environmental degradation or damage. 
During this time, it came to be accepted as an English term after the German word 
Vorsorgeprinzip. The concept of Vorsorgeprinzip is founded on good household 
management and it means ‘to have foresight (Vorsorge) in planning’.4 It is equated with 
the need to exercise caution, that is, to be cautious.5 However, it is required that 
                                               
1   Atapattu SA Emerging principles of international environmental law (Transnational 
Publishers New York 2006) 203. 
2   Cox R Environmental communication and the public sphere 3rd ed (Sage Publications 
Los Angeles 2013) 324. 
3   Commission of the European Communities “Communication from the Commission on 
the precautionary principle” 2 February 2000 14. To be accessed at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf. 
4   Williams MJ NATO, Security, and risk management: from Kosovo to Kandahar 
(Routledge Abington 2009) 97. 
5   Holder J and Elworthy S “The BSE crisis – a study of the precautionary principle and 
the politics of science in law” in Reece H (ed) Law and science: current legal issues 
Volume 1 (Oxford University Press Oxford 1998) 129-152 131. 
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Vorsorge or prudence (foresight principle)6 should be at the centre of such an 
exercise.7 This entails the avoidance of damage or a risk by ‘careful forward planning, 
blocking the flow of potentially harmful activities’.8  
Despite the novelty of the term, the taking or the practice of taking precautionary 
measures is an old phenomenon. Notions such as better safe than sorry, look before 
you leap, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure9 or prevention is better than 
cure characterise the acceptance of the practice in society. In some quarters, society 
associates the plea for the exercise of caution with human awareness or rationality. For 
instance, it has become rational to wear seat belts and motorcycle helmets in 
anticipation of an unproven event (accident) and to insure a building or life even in 
circumstances where there is no certainty regarding the cause and time of the risk (fire, 
accident or death). This analogy also has relevance to this research. In particular, it 
has relation to what may be referred to, in technological terms, as the action handling. 
Action handling has everything to do with preparedness – that is, being prepared for an 
imminent or eventual threat. It requires that one should design measures in order to 
respond to attacks in the future. Within the context of this research, it implies the 
introduction of certain regulatory or pre-emptive measures in order to alleviate 
forthcoming risks.  
The origin and history of the precautionary principle is examined above. It is particularly 
illustrated that although the term precautionary principle is new in English literature, the 
practice of taking precautions or acting cautiously is an old phenomenon. Having 
studied the foundations of the precautionary principle, it becomes imperative to revise 
its meaning. The sections below therefore investigate this meaning. 
7.2.2 What is the Precautionary Principle? 
                                               
6   Resnik DB “Is the precautionary principle unscientific?” 2003 (34) Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 329-344 329. 
7   Holder and Elworthy Precautionary principle 131. 
8   Tickner J and Raffensperger C The Precautionary principle in action: a handbook 
(Science and Environmental Health Network Windsor 1991) 2. 
9   Bodansky D “Scientific uncertainty and the precautionary principle” 1991 (33) Law, 
Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 4-5 4. 
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There is no single description of the concept that exists in modern literature. In some 
cases, culture is used in order to give meaning to the precautionary principle. In other 
cases, the principle is affiliated with a particular discipline.10 The absence of a precise 
definition does not imply however that the principle fails to possess a conceptual 
core.11 Some argues that the principle conforms to the doctrine of in dubio pro natura.12 
This doctrine denotes that in cases where a doubt exists, natural surroundings or 
nature should be favoured.13 For ICT regulatory purposes, this doctrine could be 
interpreted to mean that in cases of uncertainty regarding the possibilities of risks to 
ICTs or their regulation, any decision must be in favour of ICT protection.14 Others 
state that the principle is necessary in dealing with or regulating modern setbacks to 
society.15 Accordingly, they equate the principle with the rules of natural justice.16 In 
this respect, it leads or can lead to the attainment of procedural fairness in decision-
making.17 
There are criticisms that may be levelled against the precautionary principle. On the 
one hand, there is the view that the principle is disjointed.18 More specifically, it attacks 
and condemns the regulatory norms and standards that it seeks to uphold.19 One of the 
most important of these norms goes something like: before regulations are 
commenced, steps should at least be taken in establishing the content and scale of the 
                                               
10   Martin PH “If you don’t know how to fix it, please stop breaking it! the precautionary 
principle and climate change” 1997 (2) Foundations of Science 263-292 266. 
11   Trouwborst A Precautionary rights and duties of states (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
Leiden 2006) 2. 
12   Trouwborst Precautionary 2. 
13   Boyd DR The environmental rights revolution: a global study of constitutions, human 
rights and the environment (UBC Press Vancouver 2012) 224. 
14   Boyd Revolution 224. 
15   Bridgetown Greenbushes Friends of the Forest Inc. v Executive Director of the 
Department of Conservation and Land Management 2000 SOL Case 673, 1 December 
2000 para 118. 
16   Bridgetown Greenbushes Friends of the Forest Inc. v Executive Director of the 
Department of Conservation and Land Management 2000 SOL Case 673, 1 December 
2000 para 118. 
17   Mohr v Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority [1998] AATA 805 para 124 
18  Sunstein 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1371&context=law_an
d_economics (Date of use: 18 January 2016). 
19  Sunstein 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1371&context=law_an
d_economics (Date of use: 18 January 2016). 
  
236 
 
risks. On the other hand, it is said that the precautionary principle does not centre on 
the needs of society. In South Africa, this necessity is termed Batho Pele. Batho Pele is 
a South African imperative which translates in English to people first. It guarantees the 
promotion and maintenance of high standards of professional ethics; provision of 
services impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias; utilisation of resources efficiently 
and effectively; responding to people's needs; participation of citizens in policy-making 
and rendering an accountable, transparent, and development-oriented public 
administration.20 With this in mind, it may be argued that a study of the precautionary 
principle should be made in consideration of the societal needs.  
In this research, the need to preserve the principles for Batho Pele is advocated. 
Accordingly, it is argued that a discussion of the precautionary principle does not 
necessarily hamper the achievement of these principles. Conversely, it is closely linked 
with the regulation of risks or what is known as the process of risk regulation. Given 
this, it has to be acknowledged that risk regulation is concerned with the protection of 
one particular phenomenon (society) from the risks that arise or are perceived to ensue 
by reason of engaging in other activities – for example air pollution.21  
Four elements or dimensions are identified within which the term precautionary 
principle is defined.22 These are categorised as the risk or threat element, the 
uncertainty element, the action element and the command element.23 These elements 
are in turn discussed in the sections below. 
(a) Risk Element 
In terms of the risk dimension, the principle is described by using phrases, for example 
a ‘potentially dangerous or irreversible threat or damage’. The example of this can be 
                                               
20   Independent Police Investigative Directorate of the Republic of South Africa 
http://www.ipid.gov.za/about%20us/batho_pele.asp (Date of use: 27 January 2014). 
21   Fisher E “Is the precautionary principle justiciable?” 2001 (13) Journal of Environmental 
Law 315-334 317. 
22   DeFur PL and Kaszuba M “Implementing the precautionary principle” 2002 (288) The 
Science of Total Environment 155-165 157 and Sandin P “Dimensions of the 
precautionary principle” 1999 (5) Human and Ecological Risk Assessment 889-907 890-
891. 
23   Sandin 1999 Human and Ecological Risk Assessment 890-891. 
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found in principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992).24 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states the following: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely used by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.25 
The Science and Environmental Health Network in its so-called Wingspread Statement 
on the Precautionary Principle (1998) follows this particular line of reasoning. It 
provides that the adoption of the precautionary principle is sometimes indispensable in 
cases where ‘an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment’.26  
The connotation of a risk for purposes of examining the risk dimension needs further 
scrutiny. From the passages above it appears that a risk is normally associated with 
danger.27 In other words, no distinction seems to be created or have been created 
between risks. Accordingly, a risk is regarded as a measure within which the likelihood 
or consequence of future events or damages is assessed.28 Sunstein provides a 
philosophical dimension to the overall study of risk. This can be drawn from two of his 
works the working paper entitled “The Laws of Fear”29 and the book which is titled 
Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle.30 In his working paper Sunstein 
identifies what he refers to as the hysteria and neglect. Hysteria or neglect is, 
                                               
24   Hereinafter referred to as the Rio Declaration. 
25   The Ministerial Declaration of the Third International Conference on the Protection of 
the North Sea, The Hague, 8th March 1990. To be accessed at http://www.seas-at-
risk.org/1mages/1990%20Hague%20Declaration.pdf. See also Santillo D et al “The 
precautionary principle – protecting against failures of scientific method and risk 
assessment” 1998 (36) Marine Pollution Bulletin 939-950 939-940. 
26   Science and Environmental Health Network http://www.sehn.org/state.html#w (Date of 
use: 19 November 2013). 
27   Van Asselt MBA Perspectives on uncertainty and risk: the PRIMA approach to decision 
support (Kluwer Academic Publishers Dordrecht 2000). 
28   COMEST “The precautionary principles” March 2005 28. See also Yoe C Principles of 
risk analysis: decision making under uncertainty (CRC Press Boca Raton 2012) 1.  
29   Sunstein CR “The laws of fear” 2001 (128) John M. Olin Law & Economics Working 
Paper 1-42. 
30   Sunstein CR Laws of fear: beyond the precautionary principle (Cambridge University 
Press Cambridge 2005). 
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according to Sunstein, commonly used as an indication that a risk exists.31 He alleges 
that some people resort to heuristics or mental shortcuts in order to establish whether 
or not risks exist.32 Sunstein therefore warns against the abovementioned and say the 
following: People (generally) dislike losses far more than they like corresponding 
gains…. (They) tend to focus on the losses that are associated with some activity or 
hazard and to disregard the gains that might be associated with that activity or 
hazard.33 The abovementioned arises because people focus on some risks because 
they are cognitively available.34 This then enable them to disregard certain risks 
despite the fact that these risks are favoured by statistics.  
Having examined the notion of risk, one thing becomes clear: the world (offline or 
online) is a very risky place.35 More specifically, risks always characterise or pose a 
challenge to human life and natural resources. Nonetheless, this does or should not be 
construed as a justification for the taking of irrational decisions under the pretext of 
responding to a perceived risky state of affairs.  
(b) Uncertainty Element 
The notion that where there is a risk, there is uncertainty seems to be the basis upon 
which the uncertainty dimension is founded.36 This viewpoint regards a risk as a 
chance of an uncertain outcome or situation. This chance can be precipitated by a 
suspicion of a dangerous situations37 or a long-term hazard which, if action is 
postponed, can lead to a large-scale disaster. Uncertainty evidences an absence of or 
incomplete knowledge about a particular adverse event. In one case, phrases such as 
a lack of full scientific certainty38 or ‘before a causal39 link has been established by 
                                               
31   Sunstein 2001 John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper 2. 
32   Sunstein 2001 John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper 3. See also Sutton IS 
Process reliability and risk management (Van Nostrand Reinhold New York 1992) 19. 
33   Sunstein 2003 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1008. See also Lofsterdt RE 
“The precautionary principle – risk, regulation and politics” 2003 (81) Trans IChemE 36-
43 39. 
34   Lofsterdt 2003 Trans IChemE 39. 
35   Wilson R “Analysing the daily risks of life” 1979 Technology Review 41-46 41. 
36   Bodansky 1991 Law, Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 4. 
37   Vercelli A “From soft uncertainty to hard environmental uncertainty” 1995 (48) 
Economie Appliquée 251-269. 
38   Art 3(3) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992. 
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absolute clear scientific certainty are mostly used to demonstrate the presence of 
uncertainty. In others, phrases like ‘pending further scientific information for a more 
comprehensive risk assessment’ are resorted to.40  
Two sets of uncertainties are distinguished. They are a macro-level uncertainty and 
micro-level uncertainty.41 Macro-level uncertainty is broader than micro-level 
uncertainty. It refers to doubts about the current structures, normative standards and 
the proper response(s) to be used to respond to the risks.42 Micro-level uncertainty is 
subject-specific. It discusses the context (knowledge, models or information) within 
which particular decisions are made or actions are taken.43 
(c) Element of Action  
Uncertainty generally necessitates that particular decisions should be taken.44 Loosely 
put, uncertainty justifies the taking of decisions to prevent a risk.45 Seemingly, the 
viewpoint that ‘decisions (or action) cannot wait until everything relevant is known’ is 
maintained.46 The decision or action to be taken in each case depends or should 
depend on the decision theory or theories that inform such an action. The theories 
respond to the dilemma which is associated with decision-making.47 They include the 
behavioural (normative or descriptive), managerial, statistical, economic, 
administrative, conflict-minimisation model and casual or non-casual. The impasse or 
                                                                                                                                         
39   Kant provides an illustrative philosophical argument about what is meant by the notion 
of ‘cause’ and its effect. See Kant I Critique of pure reason as translated by Müller FM 
Immanuel Kant’s critique of pure reason (The MacMillan Company London 1922) 122. 
40   Art 7 of Regulation EC/178/2002 (hereinafter referred to as the European Food 
Directive). 
41   Yoe Uncertainty 23. 
42   Yoe Uncertainty 23. 
43   Yoe Uncertainty 23. 
44   One of the refined definitions of the term ‘decision’ can be found in the book by Johnson 
Jr. and Kruse. They argue that a decision is a ‘conscious choice (which is) made 
between two or more competing alternatives. (And) decision-making is not a robotic 
affair’. See Johnson Jr. BL and Kruse SD Decision making for educational leaders: 
underexamined dimensions and issues (State University of New York Press New York 
2009) 13. 
45   Lofsterdt 2003 Trans IChemE 37. 
46   Corbett D Australian public sector management 2nd ed (Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd St. 
Leonards 1996) 62. 
47   Berger JO Statistical decision theory and the Bayesian analysis 2nd ed (Springer New 
York 1985) 1. 
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improbability in decision making may be illustrated by examining certain questions. 
These questions relate to what or which decision to take, who should take such a 
decision and under which conditions will a decision work?  
The element of action relates to the proper response to be applied to the looming 
risks.48 Phrases such as ‘cost effective measures to prevent….degradation, preventive 
measures or regulatory action are an expression of this element or dimension’.49 The 
use of these phrases can be abstracted from various international instruments. In one 
case, it is said that preventive measures or regulatory action ought to be resorted to in 
cases where its costs are reasonably low. In other words, the action should generally 
be ‘cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost’.50 In 
others, it is submitted that a lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as the 
basis for postponing the cost-effective actions.51 
However, it is conceded that an absence of the phrases as aforesaid above in any 
instrument supporting the precautionary principle does not imply that action is not 
encouraged. This is the case because a threat commonly necessitates that action 
should be taken. 
(d) Command Element 
The strength of the command element varies. There is a weak version and a strong 
version.52 The weak version is represented by words such as is justified or justifiable. 
Consequently, it may be said that ‘it is justified or justifiable to control or inhibit a 
possibly hazardous situation before scientific certainty is established’. The strong 
version can be extracted from terms, for example should or ought. For example, it may 
be stated that measures or action to prevent or regulate the risks should or ought to be 
adopted even in cases where scientific proof regarding their nature and severity is 
                                               
48   It is also acknowledged that not doing anything or non-action can, in certain limited 
circumstances, also amount to an action. See COMEST 2005 18. 
49   Sandin 1999 Human and Ecological Risk Assessment 894. 
50   Principle 3, Art 3 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
51   Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. 
52   Godard O “Social decision-making under scientific controversy, expertise, and the 
precautionary principle” in Joerges C, Ladeur KH and Vos E (eds) Integrating scientific 
expertise into regulatory decision-making: national experiences and European 
innovations (Nomos Baden-Baden 1997) 39-73 66-69. 
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lacking. Thus, a lack or insufficiency of science does not deter the taking of actions to 
prevent a risk or threat.53 
7.2.3 Summary 
It is stated above that society has reached a stage of development where a far-
reaching framework to e-authentication should be adopted. Within the context of this 
research, this framework is referred to as the precautionary approach to e-
authentication (or PAEA). The general ambit and scope of PAEA is drawn from the 
precautionary principle. The precautionary principle encourages regulators to exercise 
caution and foresight in regulatory planning (foresight principle).54 In particular, it 
encourages regulators to adopt and embrace measures that are designed to 
circumvent the damage or risks by anticipating and blocking the envisaged flow of 
harmful activities.55 The foresight principle does not imply that science is insignificant 
within a regulatory structure. Therefore, it is still necessary to conclusively demonstrate 
that risks exist or are imminent. However, the principle accepts that the uncertainty or 
lack of science does or should not be used as an excuse for inaction or a failure to 
commence regulations. For purposes of ICT regulation, this denotes that the existing 
(scientific) doubts regarding the scale of the measures to regulate ICTs and their 
associated challenges cannot or should not be a ground for postponing the application 
of PAEA. 
In the section below, an analysis of the meaning and significance of the precautionary 
principle in e-authentication settings are scrutinised. The aim is to attempt to stay true 
to the object of this research. This relates to the necessity to discard the practice of re-
inventing the ICT or technology regulatory wheel. Conversely, it supports the desire to 
(i) establish a suitable e-authentication regulatory framework which is (ii) attached or 
bound to the technology and is (iii) able to evolve with and respond to the 
developments in these technologies. 
7.3 PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN E-AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORKS 
                                               
53   DeFur and Kaszuba 2002 The Science of the Total Environment 157. 
54   Williams Risk management 97. 
55   Mohr v Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority [1998] AATA 805 para 124. 
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7.3.1 Background 
Prevention is one of the essential ingredients in any ICT regulatory agenda. For 
purposes of prevention, regulators are enjoined to establish measures that forestall a 
wrong.56 The mechanisms are aimed at preventing regulators from subsequently 
dealing with the adverse consequences (responsive measures) that are created by a 
wrong.57 In practice, these prevention measures are referred to as the computer or 
information security mechanism. The most common are the awareness creation, 
management of patches,58 installing antivirus software, configuring personal firewalls, 
using user account control (UAC), creating data backups and recovering from 
attacks.59 Despite this, it is submitted that prevention can generate a number of 
drawbacks. This does not only lie in the fact of it being misconstrued sometimes - for 
example it being interpreted to mean that it deters a total use and access to modern 
forms of technologies. But it also relates to the fact that regulators may not have all the 
indispensable facts and figures regarding the extent and scale of that which is to be 
regulated. The presence of these figures is important to the regulatory agenda. It 
enables regulators to design measures that fully address a wrong, for example e-
crimes. Specifically, it was submitted in the previous chapters that ICTs progress 
almost on a continuous basis. With these constant evolutions come the risks. Given 
this, regulators are or may be placed at a disadvantage if prevention is singularly used. 
This is the case because it is possible that other factors that are related to ICT 
regulation may be unknown or uncertain to regulators at the time that the prevention 
measures are devised. For example, regulators may not know the techniques that 
crackers are likely to use in the future, and they may not be able to identify with 
certainty the degree and scale of e-crimes and the technologies that may be exploited 
in order to commence e-crimes. Due to these uncertainties, it is almost guaranteed that 
                                               
56   Cane P The anatomy of tort law (Hart Publishing Oxford 1997) 100.  
57   Cane Anatomy 100.  
58  From this, it may be distinguished between a security patch – that is, software which 
cover and address the identified risks or threats in a system or network– and a service 
patch – that is, software which provides security updates and their accompanying 
features on a continuous basis. See Nicastro FM Curing the patch management 
headache (Auerbach Publications Florida 2005) 18-22 and Jang M Linux patch 
management: keeping Linux systems up to date (Pearson Education Inc. New Jersey 
2006) 9. 
59  Ciampa M Security awareness: applying practical security in your world 4th ed 
(Cengage Learning Boston 2014) 88-96. 
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regulators may subsequently pass regulations that merely deal with the previous and 
present risks to ICTs. Consequently, the regulations may not be able to deal with 
forthcoming or future risks to ICTs.  
In response to the identified inadequacy of prevention, an ICT regulatory framework  
which is referred to as PAEA is proposed. This structure accepts that e-authentication 
processes should generally lead the identity validation process. In other words, the 
process to verify the personal particulars of a user, for example ID, username and 
password or the user himself or herself should not be postponed until such a user 
registers or enters his or her identification particulars into a system. This does not entail 
a total exclusion of the identification particulars within the context of e-authentication. 
However, PAEA complements and promotes the need to amplify the current e-
authentication approach. This extension should be in line with the necessity to 
establish a decentring analysis regarding the control and management of ICTs and its 
associated threats. The latter relates to the use of different role-players, for example a 
government, individual firms and community in regulatory schemes.  
Furthermore, PAEA is suggested following the study of the regulatory theories in 
chapter 5. It accepts that ICTs produce their own languages. Sometimes, these 
languages develop separate or far apart from existing or foreseen legislations. 
Therefore, the whole or wholeness of these technologies ought to be studied before a 
regulatory structure which has relation to them is commenced. Consequently, this 
structure should be modelled on the technologies to be regulated and be a 
reproduction of it. The basis for this is that regulators should recognise that ICTs are a 
conglomeration of systems or networks many of which have sub-systems or sub-
networks. These networks or sub-networks share similar characteristics. These 
characteristics have similar structures or shapes and others do not. Therefore, ICT 
regulations ought to be developed that appreciate the functioning or non-functioning of 
the systems or networks. The AIS theory is also relevant in this regard. This is the case 
because ICTs evolves. With these developments new forms of risks emerge. 
Therefore, it may be necessary for ICT regulators to rely on or study the dynamic 
behaviours of online users on or before the personal particulars of a computer user are 
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entered into a system. This examination should amount to what is referred to within the 
context of this chapter as the behavioural biometric.60  
Behavioural biometric relies on the biometric data that are studied in chapter 6 above. 
It will be recalled that in chapter 6 the data was studied as one of the pillars (that is, 
proof by property) to e-authenticate a computer user or the particulars of a computer 
user. However, for purposes of PAEA the biometric data are examined in order to 
achieve a particular purpose. This is to support the view that an e-authentication 
framework which is modelled from the existing pillars of e-authentication is bound to 
fail. Accordingly, it is argued that e-authentication frameworks should be built on an ICT 
regulatory structure that accepts that ICTs evolve. Given this, it is necessary to rely on 
characters for e-authentication purposes that do not require to be changed following 
the developments in technologies. These characters should study the behaviour of a 
user online. They should exist even in cases where computer crackers devise 
techniques to intercept identifying information. Furthermore, they should amplify the 
already established incident-based forms of e-authentication. However, the 
effectiveness of behavioural characterisation must be tested against the convenience it 
affords to users. In other words, it has to be carried out in a manner that promotes the 
availability, accuracy, authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, utility and possession of 
information. 
Within the context of this research, various methods are identified that assist in 
studying behavioural biometrics. These methods mimic the biometric data which is 
studied in chapter 6. This data includes signature dynamics, voice verification and 
keystroke dynamics. It is argued that these identification methods are by no means 
exhaustive. This is the case because other methods can also be found, for example the 
manner in which a user moves a computer mouse (mouse movements) - where the 
manner and sequence of moving a computer mouse are detected.61 
                                               
60  See Whitman ME and Mattord HJ Principles of information security (Cengage Learning 
Australia 2012) 332-333. 
61   Zheng N, Paloski A and Wang H “An efficient user verification system via mouse 
movements” in Computer and communications security (Papers delivered at 18th ACM 
conference on Computer and communications security 17-21 October 2011 ACM New 
York) 139-150, Purasa M and Brodley CE “User re-authentication via mouse 
movements” in Visualization and Data Mining for Computer Security (Papers delivered 
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In summary, a separation exists between the proposed behavioural biometrics and the 
biometrics data which is studied in chapter 6 above. The question is: what is it that 
distinguishes the two? Biometrics identification is examined as part of the prevention 
process, in this case, e-authentication. It helps in making an informed decision 
regarding whether a person should be granted authority to access a system or not. It 
has already been stated in chapter 6 above that prevention does not always yield 
positive results. Within the context of regulating modern forms of technologies, this 
means that there may be cases where ICT regulators may not have all the relevant 
facts and figures in terms of which the prevention measures could be based. In these 
instances, the measures may prove to be insufficient for ICT regulatory purposes. This 
position does not appear to be adequately resolved by the ICT regulatory theories. It is 
important to revert back to the Danger theory for a moment. The theory has to do with 
the creation of a systematised immune system. This system helps in identifying and 
discriminating between self and non-self attacks. Self attacks refer to the known or 
probed attacks. Whereas non-self attacks amount to unknown attacks that arise in the 
future as a result of the system being exposed to danger. It is argued that the position 
regarding the control of self attacks is straightforward. The system could with the help 
of the immune system fight these attacks and consequently repel them. However, a 
difficulty arises when it comes to the regulation of the non-self attacks. The AIS theory 
requires that a process of immunisation should follow. In other words, the system 
should be injected with new or modern defence mechanisms that are able to control 
emerging risks. In relation to this, a question is asked regarding what happens or 
should happen during the period between the emergence of novel risks and the 
injecting of the system? Behavioural biometrics provides an answer to this question. It 
requires that a framework should be created which studies and anticipates the risks. 
The smart regulation process, which involves the different role-players in ICT 
regulation, can be followed. The latter is a collaborative practice. In this process, the 
current scheme to prevent e-crimes is examined against the backdrop that ICT 
                                                                                                                                         
at the 2004 ACM workshop on Visualization and Data Mining for Computer Security 29 
October 2004 IEEE New York) 1-8 2-3 and Hashia, Pollett and Stamp 
http://www.cs.sjsu.edu/faculty/pollett/masters/Semesters/Spring04/Shivani/shivanipaper
.pdf (Date of use: 13 November 2013).    
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evolves. With this development comes the danger that contemporary e-crimes will 
emerge. 
(a) Signature Recognition 
Studies that were aimed at addressing the issue of signature recognition initially came 
to the public domain during the 1960s.62 These writings only dealt with one aspect of 
signature recognition. They focused on the symmetrical characteristics of a signature 
as opposed to its dynamic characteristics. It was during the 1980s that attempts were 
made to establish systems that assisted in monitoring the dynamics of signatures. 
Plamondon and Lorette are some of the writers who recognised this need.63 They 
argued that users typically follow a particular pattern when writing their signatures.64 
This may relate to the appearance, shape, timing and pressure of writing.65 Therefore, 
it is necessary to, they also argued, create systems that are able to pick up the 
aforementioned trends. These systems should, according to Plamondon and Lorette, 
be equipped with a ‘digitiser or an instrument (or digitised) pen…and camera or 
scanner’.66 
It is noteworthy that a number of papers have since been reported that follow some of 
the observations that were primarily made by Plamondon and Lorette.67  For example, 
                                               
62   Mauceri AJ “Feasibility studies of personal identification by signature verification” 
(Report No: SID 65 24RADC TR65 33, Space and Information Division, North American 
Aviation Company Anaheim 1965).  
63   Plamondon R and Lorette G “Automatic signature verification and writer identification – 
the state of the art” 1989 (22) Pattern Recognition 107-131. 
64   Plamondon and Lorette 1989 Pattern Recognition 107-108. 
65   Bennet RF Electronic authentication and digital signature: hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Financial Services and Technology of the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs United States (US Government Printing Office Washington 
1998) 53. 
66   Plamondon and Lorette 1989 Pattern Recognition 108. 
67   See, for example Dereli T and Tucker RW “Signature dynamics in general relativity” 
1993 (10) Classical and Quantum Gravity 365-373, Yang L, Widjaja BK and Prasad R 
“Application of Hidden Markov Models for signature verification” 1995 (28) Pattern 
Recognition 161-170, Bajaj R and Chaudhury S “Signature verification using multiple 
neural classifiers” 1997 (30) Pattern Recognition 1-7, Huang K and Yan H “Off-line 
signature verification based on geometric feature extraction and neural network 
classification” 1997 (30) Pattern Recognition 9-17, Nelson W and Kishon E “Use of 
dynamic features for signature verification” in Systems, management, and cybernetics 
(Papers delivered at the IEEE International Conference on Systems, Management, and 
Cybernetics 17-20 October 1991 IEEE Le Touquet) 17-20 21-25. 
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Huang and Yan argue that calligraphic information or the geometric property of a 
signature is essential in identifying signature dynamics.68 It particularly demonstrates 
the local and structural features of a particular signature. This identification 
consequently eases the process of extracting the least adjustable features of a 
signature.69 The view by Huang and Yan seem to be followed by Bajaj and Chaudhury. 
According to Bajaj and Chaudhury, a signature entails a comprehensive carbon copy.70 
It is a representation of the different writing styles of users.71 These styles can be 
recognised and verified by reliable systems that are created for this purpose.72 These 
systems ought to be able to measure the outlook, form and compression of 
signatures.73 
(b) Voice Verification 
Preliminary attempts to establish a system for programmed voice verification can be 
traced to the 1970s. During that time the papers by Schafer and Rabiner,74 
Doddington75 and Lummis76 remained some of the reference point in this field. In the 
aforementioned papers it was accepted that the pitch of a voice (voice pitch) and its 
intensity (voice intensity) are some of the most significant features for voice verification.  
Despite these developments, it is argued that one of the major breakthroughs on voice 
verification was the article by Furui which was published in 1981.77 Firstly, Furui 
described voice (or speaker) verification as a process in terms of which the identity of a 
                                               
68   Huang and Yan 1997 Pattern Recognition 9. 
69   Huang and Yan 1997 Pattern Recognition 9-10. 
70   Bajaj and Chaudhury 1997 Pattern Recognition 1. 
71   Bajaj and Chaudhury 1997 Pattern Recognition 1. 
72   Bajaj and Chaudhury 1997 Pattern Recognition 1. 
73   Bennet Electronic Authentication 53. 
74   Schafer RW and Rabiner LR “System for automatic format analysis of voiced speech” 
1970 (47) The Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 634-648. 
75   Doddington GR “A method of speaker verification” 1971 (49) The Journal of the 
Acoustical Society of America 139. 
76   Lummis RC “Real-time technique for speaker verification by computer” 1971 (50) The 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 106 and Lummis RC “Implementation of an 
online speaker verification scheme” 1972 (52) The Journal of the Acoustical Society of 
America 181. 
77   Furui S “Cepstral analysis technique for automatic speaker verification” 1981 (29) IEEE 
Transactions on Accounts, Speech, and Signal Processing 254-272. 
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narrator is established.78 This identification is established or can be ascertained by 
calculating a narrator’s expressions.79 This calculation is intended to establish and 
identify a set of known voices or speakers.80 The latter is mostly achieved by 
undertaking different tests or experiments. The most notable are the YOHO Corpus 
test (which is a combination of different phrases), baseline speaker verification test and 
voice-altered imposter test.81 Secondly, Furui accepted that the pitch and intensity of a 
voice are essential in identifying a person using voice verification. However, he 
developed a (fresh) framework of voice verification which he called the identity claim 
and sample utterance.82  
(c) Keystroke Dynamics 
Keystroke dynamics became popular during the 1980s. The report that was prepared 
by Gaines, Lisowski, Press and Shapiro represent one of the early works which 
initiated a move to this form of biometric behaviour.83 Keystroke dynamic is a 
convoluted process. Being a process, it encompasses a number of activities. Firstly, 
the ways in which a computer user types on a computer keyboard, that is, the rhythm 
of his or her keystrokes are analysed. Secondly, the rhythm of the key-presses is 
identified by relying on the habitual pattern of the keystrokes. Therefore, it may be 
                                               
78   Furui 1981 IEEE Transactions on Accounts, Speech, and Signal Processing 254. 
79   Furui 1981 IEEE Transactions on Accounts, Speech, and Signal Processing 254. 
80   Reynolds DA “An overview of automatic speaker recognition technology” in Acoustics, 
speech, and signal processing (ICASSP) (Papers delivered at the IEEE International 
Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing (ICASSP) 13-17 May 2002 
IEEE Florida) IV-4072-IV-4075 IV-4072. See also, Kinnunen T and Li H “An overview of 
text-independent speaker recognition – from features to supervisors” 2010 (52) Speech 
Communication 12-40 12-13. 
81   Campbell JP “Testing with the YOHO CD-Rom voice verification corpus” in Acoustics, 
speech, and signal processing (Paper delivered at the International Conference on 
Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, 1995 9-12 May 1995 IEEE Detroit) 341-344 
341-343 and Pellom BL and Hansen JHL “An experimental study of speaker verification 
sensitivity to computer voice-altered imposters” in Acoustics, speech, and signal 
processing (Papers delivered at the IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, 
Speech, and Signal Processing, 1999 15-19 March 1999 IEEE Phoenix) 837-840 839-
840.    
82   See the discussion in Furui 1981 IEEE Transactions on Accounts, Speech, and Signal 
Processing 255-265. 
83   For a discussion of this principle see Gaines R et al “Authentication by keystroke timing 
– some preliminary results” May 1980 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2006/R2526.pdf (Date of use: 13 
March 2015). 
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argued that the principle that ‘it is not what you type which is important, but the manner 
in which you type it’ is upheld.84  
Keystroke dynamics is motivated by the view that each computer user of a system 
follows a characteristic trend or pattern when typing particulars on a computer 
keyboard.85 In other words, users’ keystrokes are distinct, consistent or indiscriminate, 
and they follow a particular timing.86 Therefore, these keystrokes can be used to 
identify a user online.  A number of factors are important to the making of this 
determination. These include the timing of the keystrokes, the intervals of the 
keystrokes, the placement of fingers on the keys, the pressure that is being applied to 
each key.87 Generally, a three-stage approach is commonly followed in order to 
establish a system to identify users using keystrokes dynamic. Firstly, keystroke data 
may be embedded into a system (data enrolment process). In this instance, the timing, 
pattern and consistency of the key-press are registered into a system. Secondly, a 
system to classify the keystrokes dynamics (classifier) is created. Thirdly, the captured 
data is extracted from a system and compared with other identifying information 
whenever the e-authentication process is possible. 
7.3.2 Summary 
Prevention is generally indispensable to an ICT regulatory agenda. It particularly deters 
and forestalls a wrong. However, it is argued that prevention may not fully address 
some of the challenges posed by ICTs in certain circumstances. More specifically, the 
                                               
84   Monrose F and Rubin AD “Keystroke dynamics as a biometric for authentication” 2000 
(16) Future Generation Computer Systems 351-359 353. See also, Shanmugapriya N 
and Padmavathi G “A survey of biometric keystroke dynamics – approaches, security 
and challenges” 2009 (5) International Journal of Computer Science and Information 
Security 115-119 116. 
85   Robinson JA et al “Computer user verification using login string keystroke dynamics” 
1998 (28) IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 236-241 236. 
86   Cho S and Hwang S “Artificial rhythms and cues for keystroke dynamics based 
authentication” in Zhang D and Jain AK (eds) International conference on biometrics, 
2006 (Springer Berlin 2005) 626-635 627-628 and Cho S et al “Web-based keystroke 
dynamics identity verification using neutral network” 2000 (10) Journal of Organisational 
Computing and Electronic Commerce 295-307 297-298. 
87   Saevanee H and Bhattarakosol P “Authenticating user using keystroke dynamics and 
finger pressure” in Consumer communications and networking (Papers delivered at the 
2009 6th IEEE consumer communications and networking conference 11-13 January 
2009 Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers New York 2009) 1-2 1-2. 
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measures may be designed in a manner that only addresses the existing threats to 
ICTs.  
Given the aforementioned, PAEA is recommended. It accepts that the starting point for 
e-authentication should not be at a stage when an identity of a user is validated. 
Systems should be created that help in identifying certain behaviours or characteristics 
of a user prior to the identifying information being entered into a system. For purposes 
of this chapter, this process is called behavioural biometric. It relies on a number of 
methods or techniques. These include the signature dynamics, voice verification and 
keystroke dynamics. 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter a precautionary approach to e-authentication is examined. This method 
is referred to PAEA. PAEA is founded on the principles that govern the exercise of 
precaution or what is termed the Precautionary Principle. Regulators are, according to 
the precautionary principle, required to take anticipatory action in order to prevent a risk 
to ICTs that will accrue in the future. It particularly warns against the postponement of 
action for reasons such as that the action is not supported by scientific evidence. 
Furthermore, the precautionary principle enjoins regulators to have prudence and 
foresight in the manner in which they plan and design regulations. This entails a 
management of past and present risks, and also breaking-down or blocking the flow of 
potential or future risks.88 It also accepts that prevention, although essential to a 
technology regulatory structure, may produce problems for purposes of managing 
ICTs. For instance, regulators may, due to developments in ICTs, not be able to know 
which risks are imminent and which ones are not. Consequently, they may implement 
regulatory frameworks that address or deal only with the past or present risks. The 
result of this can then be a constant or continuous creation of rules which seeks to 
repair the shortcomings of previous regulations. 
By reason of the above, PAEA is developed. It is based on the idea that a study of 
systems, the dynamics of systems and how systems are connected online is necessary 
for any technology regulation. In other words, technology regulations should be 
                                               
88   Tickner and Raffensperger Handbook 2. 
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designed in such a manner that they are bound to ICTs and are able to develop with it. 
In this chapter biometric dynamic is introduced as one of the means to respond to the 
aforementioned necessity. Biometrics dynamic requires an identification of certain user 
characteristics, for example signature recognition, voice verification, keystroke 
dynamics or computer mouse movements. The basis for introducing biometric dynamic 
is that a change or development in ICTs will almost always necessitate a relook of 
existing regulations that pertains to those technologies. In fact, it happens mostly that 
developments in ICTs also expose these technologies to harm or exploitation by 
criminals. An example of this is the combination or use of the Web and the Internet. 
However, it is argued that such a change does or will not require a modification of a 
user’s biometric characters.  
Given the need for PAEA, chapter 8 illustrates the general outlook of PAEA for 
regulatory purposes. It specifically exposes the fallacies in the current e-authentication 
approaches (United Kingdom, Canada and South Africa). Thereafter, it provides a 
framework within which e-authentication measures should be founded. 
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CHAPTER 8 
PAEA – THE PROPOSED E-AUTHENTICATION APPROACH 
8.1 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
In this research e-crimes are identified as one of the main barriers to the ICT regulatory 
agenda. Accordingly, a focus is made on e-crimes as a specific crime which is related 
to the traditional crimes of theft. Because e-crimes involve an appropriation of 
information, it is enquired whether information is property which is capable of being 
stolen. This then requires an investigation to be made of the law of property. The basis 
for this scrutiny is to establish if information is property for purposes of law. From this 
discussion, it is observed that the objects of rights do not always remain stationary. 
More specifically, rights in property vest in those things that a particular society during 
a specific period in the history of the law of property regards as worthy of being legally 
protected. This view was substantiated in chapter 2 above when a study of the Roman-
Dutch law of property was made. For example, old Roman law recognised that 
ownership in property was only vested in corporeals. The latter view was discarded in 
pre-classical Roman law. Specifically, it was argued that both corporeal and 
incorporeal things were the object of rights, but not ownership. This view seemed to 
have been followed and developed by the jurists of the Roman law of property. In 
particular, a distinction was made in Dutch law between private and public rights.1 
Private rights were said to be vested in property. These relates to the right to use and 
enjoy property.  
The notion of private rights forms the basis of the South African law of property. In 
South Africa, it is required that some form of legal relationship must exist between a 
person and a thing before an object can be regarded as property in law. This is to say 
that a person should, at least, have some form of a justified entitlement or interest (res 
in commercio) in the thing.2 Following this, a case is made that the emergence of an 
information society makes real rights in information possible. This is the case because 
information is one of the essential assets of an information society. The importance of 
                                               
1  Grotius H De Jure Belli ac Pacis (Clarendon Press London 1625) II.II.II.1. 
2  Van der Walt AJ and Pienaar GJ Introduction to the law of property 6th ed (Juta & Co 
Claremont 2009) 13. 
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information is drawn not only on the fact that it mimics real property, but also on that 
users of this information expend time, effort and money in gathering it. Consequently, a 
reasonable expectation ensues that this information is or should be property for legal 
purposes.  
Given the fact that property rights in information are possible, chapter 3 examined 
whether or not a contrectatio over information exist. In that chapter, the Roman-Dutch, 
English and South African law approaches to theft were examined. This examination 
revealed that the principles of theft are founded on a flexible system of legal rules. 
Society adapts and modifies these principles in such a manner that the current 
demands or challenges are met. For example, the Dutch law of theft deviated from the 
viewpoint that was held in classical and post-classical Roman law of theft that a 
physical contrectatio must result in a permanent deprivation of property. In particular, it 
was accepted in Dutch law that a temporary contrectatio is also possible. The latter 
view seems to have been followed in South Africa. In South Africa, the principles of 
theft have been modified. Specifically, it is contended that contrectatio is too rigid in 
dealing with the challenges that are inimical to a modern society. Accordingly, 
appropriation of property is accepted as the flexible alternative. Furthermore, it is 
acknowledged that theft does not always result in a permanent deprivation of property. 
There are incidents wherein the deprivation may be temporal or partial.  
The development of the principles of theft supports the view that appropriation does not 
necessarily have to result in the owner being permanently deprived of property, for 
example information. Consequently, theft could still arise in situations where an owner 
has, consequent to his or her computer being cracked, been deprived of the control, 
use and enjoyment of the rights to his or her information. For this reason, the fact that 
only a copy of the information is available to or has been appropriated by a computer 
cracker does or should not make a difference. 
Having accepted that information can be the object of theft, a study of the conventional 
risks that ICTs generate is made. Specifically, it is argued that there is a risk of ICTs 
being the object of e-crimes, in cases where a hardware or software is appropriated 
illegally, and there is a risk that ICTs may become a tool in order to appropriate 
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information unlawfully.3 Accordingly, it is that argued e-crimes are pervasive. The scale 
and impact of these crimes far exceeds those of the offline crimes, for example theft or 
fraud. Sometimes, computer crackers collaborate with criminals in remote jurisdictions 
in order to frustrate the detection of e-crimes. The pervasive nature of these risks lies in 
the fact that they extend beyond borders and their future and impact is difficult to 
reasonably predict. In chapter 5 it is submitted that the scale of e-crimes is bound to 
continue if the so-called button-pushers or computer morons are involved in the ICT 
regulatory agenda. Because of this, it is inquired whether ICTs can be regulated. If so, 
how should an ICT regulatory framework be structured? It is submitted that ICTs are 
spheres where regulations apply. However, better regulations are appropriate in 
dealing with the dynamics of the technologies. This means that the regulatory 
industries, for example the state, businesses and computer users should be particularly 
involved in establishing ICT regulations. These regulations should generally 
understand the existing e-authentication measures. Furthermore, they should be 
modelled from the regulatory theories that are discussed in chapter 6 above. The 
theories include the codes-based theory, systems theory, AIS theory and the Good 
regulator Theorem. The rationale for all this is to establish a holistic approach to e-
authentication. This approach has to be in keeping with the proposed Precautionary 
Approach to E-Authentication or PAEA. 
8.2 THE PROPOSED PAEA 
PAEA supplements the existing e-authentication measures. It uses the process of risk 
regulations as the yardstick upon which ICT regulations should be measured. It argues 
that because e-crimes generate risks to the information society regulators should then 
study these risks and design regulations that reasonably respond to these risks. In 
addition, ICT regulators should recognise that risks are uncertain and that their realm 
and latitude cannot be proved conclusively. Furthermore, ICT regulators should 
acknowledge that the existing e-authentication measures are not enough to alleviate 
the existing risks. This insufficiency exists whether or not biometric data is used as part 
of the e-authentication agenda. In one case, computer crackers can send emails to a 
                                               
3  Cassim F “Formulating specialised legislation to address the growing spectre of 
cybercrime – A comparative study” 2009 (12) PER 36-79 36. 
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number of targeted victims. These are emails which prompt or could prompt victims to 
follow a particular URL hyperlink. In those links victims may be requested to enter their 
e-authentication data or particulars (pins, username or password) in certain allocated 
spaces. As soon as they are entered, computer crackers will interrupt and block the 
online session, appropriate the particulars in order to use them for criminal purposes. In 
other cases, computer crackers can follow the steps that are shown in chapter 4, figure 
4.4 in order to crack a system and appropriate sensitive information. In this instance, a 
victim or user could be directed to a replica (dummy) website where he or she may be 
asked to enter his or her particulars. This entering of particulars and his or her 
biometric data could then be studied and retrieved from there. Thereafter, the recorded 
particulars and data could be used in order to circumvent the e-authentication process. 
In particular, they may serve as a key in order to unlock a system or network for 
purposes of gaining authority to access it.  
The manner in which regulators should apply PAEA is illustrated in the sections below. 
Firstly, the related aspects of the aforesaid approach are exemplified. These aspects 
are technology neutrality, good regulations, equity and the regulatory instruments. 
Secondly, the outlook of PAEA as a possible regulatory measure is discussed. This 
discussion continues from the premise that a framework to regulate ICTs and their 
associated risks should generally be risk-sensitive based. This process enjoins or 
should enjoin ICT regulators to examine the past and current forms of e-crimes while at 
the same forecasting the imminent trends that computer crackers are likely to follow in 
the future. Thirdly, a summary of the facts regarding the process of regulating by risk is 
made.  
8.3 ASPECTS OF PAEA 
8.3.1 Technology Neutrality 
PAEA is founded on a technology-neutral or technology-independent regulatory 
framework. Accordingly, this structure accepts that e-authentication processes should 
generally be commenced from the computer user to the machine (computer or system) 
interface. Furthermore, it recognises that technologies evolve and that this evolution of 
change necessitates the creation of innovative forms of regulatory tools and, in 
technological terms, technological toolkits.  
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8.3.2 Good Regulations 
The starting point towards the establishment of good or better regulatory frameworks is 
to accept that regulations as opposed to the law are better suited to regulate ICTs and 
the risks that ICTs generate. This does not then mean that the law becomes irrelevant 
for ICT regulatory purposes. More specifically, legal rules influence or may influence 
the structure of the good regulations. However, they do not determine the meaning and 
construction of good regulations.  
Consequently, a regulatory framework which is abstracted from good regulations 
entails a shift or move from fewer or no regulation. It ensures that regulations are both 
effective and efficient.  
8.3.3 Equity 
Equity is here used in order to denote the principles such as good governance, 
accountability, fairness, openness, suitable expertise and efficiency.4 This is the case 
because regulations or ICT regulatory frameworks should be appropriate and just. 
Accordingly, ICT regulators should adopt expediential ICT controlling measures. This 
has to be done in manner which recognises and is mindful of the exponential increases 
in the costs involved in regulating ICTs. Furthermore, it accepts that ICT regulations 
should general include a study of the technology and the systems or sub-systems that 
compose the technology. 
8.3.4 Regulatory Instruments 
PAEA accepts that different instruments are indispensable in order to commence a 
technology regulatory framework. They include legal rules, social norms, market and 
nature or architecture.5 These apparatus are equal or function on an equal basis. 
Accordingly, their meaning and significance for technology controlling purposes should 
be evaluated by examining the contribution or influence of the different role-players 
                                               
4   Baldwin R and Cave M Understanding regulation: theory, strategy, and practice (Oxford 
University Press Oxford 1999) 76. 
5    Lessig “The law of the horse – what cyberlaw might teach” 1999 (113) Harvard Law 
Review 501-549 507. 
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(that is, the state or government, the regulated industries or firms and society)6 in the 
overall regulatory agenda.  
8.3.5 Summary 
The aspects of PAEA are discussed above. The features serve as a guide to ICT 
regulators in establishing risk-sensitive based e-authentication measures. Accordingly, 
they are not intended to be exhaustive. Regulators may update or revises these 
aspects whenever possible. 
The sections below discuss the proposed fundamentals to a precautionary approach to 
e-authentication. These are behavioural characterisation, risk control, education or 
awareness, and monitoring and evaluation. In this chapter, the essentials are 
investigated following a wide-ranging scrutiny of a system or process of risk regulation. 
It will be established that the notion of risk or risks dominates the study of the aforesaid 
system. This dominance exists because e-crimes are generally construed as the threat 
to the overall security of information systems or networks. Therefore, it is argued that a 
meaningful way to address the scourge of e-crimes should generally be risk-sensitive 
based. 
8.4 PAEA REGULATORY OUTLOOK 
8.4.1 Background 
A process of risk regulation or regulation by risks is proposed a one of the measures to 
control ICTs and to curb e-crimes. In chapter 7 this process was discussed as part of 
the precautionary approach. It is conceded that an approach to regulation by risk is 
generally not foreign to South Africa. Ordinarily, it is accepted that circumstances may 
arise wherein it may be necessary to introduce regulations that manage a threat which 
may or is likely to occur in the future. These regulations are not necessarily founded on 
a clear scientific assurance that risks will ensue. However, they are based on the fact 
that under normal circumstances risks occur or ordinarily occur if regulations are 
withheld or suspended. The controlling exercise in terms of the Financial Intelligence 
                                               
6  Hereinafter referred to as the ‘regulatory industries’. 
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Centre Act7 can be used as an illustration for process of risk regulation. In terms of this 
Act, certain institutions, that is, accountable institutions,8 must perform certain 
functions.9 These tasks are enumerated in chapter 3 of FICA. They are: a duty to 
identify clients;10 duty to keep records;11 reporting duties and access to information;12 
measures to promote compliance by accountable institutions,13 and referral and 
supervision.14 For example, section 21 of FICA requires accountable institutions to 
identify and verify the personal particulars of a person.15 These persons are referred to 
as those who are about to establish or have established a business relationship16 or 
about to conclude or have concluded a single transaction17 with an accountable 
institution.18 Furthermore, the particulars to be identified and verified can be a person’s 
full names; date of birth; identity numbers; income tax registration numbers (if issued), 
and residential addresses.19 The functions as stated above are performed or they 
should be carried out in anticipation of an indeterminate threat or risk to an accountable 
                                               
7  See the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as FICA). 
8  Accountable institutions are the institutions that are listed in Schedule 1 of FICA. See, s 
1 of FICA. The list include, attorneys, board of executors, estate agents, financial 
instrument traders, management companies, persons who carry on the business of 
banks, mutual banks, persons who carry on long-term insurance businesses, persons 
who carry on business in respect of which gambling licences are required to be issued 
by a provincial licencing body, persons who carry on businesses of dealing in foreign 
exchange, persons who carry on the business of lending money against the security of 
securities, persons who carry on the businesses of rendering investment advices or 
investment broking services, persons who issue, sell or redeem travellers’ cheques, 
money orders or similar instruments, Postbanks, members of a stock exchange, the 
Ithala Development Finance Corporation Limited, persons who have been approved or 
fall within a category of persons approved by the Registrar of Stock Exchanges, 
persons who have been approved or fall within a category of persons approved by the 
Registrar of Financial Markets and persons who carry on business of a money remitter. 
See Schedule 1 of FICA. 
9  S 21 of FICA. 
10  Part 1 of Chapter 3 of FICA. 
11  Part 2 of Chapter 3 of FICA. 
12  Part 3 of Chapter 3 of FICA. 
13  Part 4 of Chapter 3 of FICA. 
14  Part 5 of Chapter 3 of FICA. 
15  S 21 of FICA. 
16  In terms of section 1 of FICA, a business relationship amounts to an arrangement 
between a client (person) and an accountable institution for the purpose of concluding 
transactions on a regular basis.  
17  A single transaction is a transaction other than a transaction which is concluded in the 
course of a business relationship. See s 1 of FICA. 
18  S 21(1) and (2) of FICA. 
19  Reg 3(1)(a)-(e) of the exemptions in terms of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 
2001 (GN R1596 GG 24176 of 20 December 2002).  
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institution’s integrity. Within the context of FICA, money laundering20 and terrorism are 
identified as some of these risks.21  
Having examined the structure to regulate ICTs in South Africa, it does not appear the 
essence of risk regulation is sufficiently captured. The ECT Act simply states that a 
method which is intended to regulate or control ICTs for example, the e-authentication 
process should be technologically neutral.22 It should be safe, secure and effective. 
Most importantly, it should be responsive to the needs of computer users. Following 
this, it is then postulated that the e-authentication structures that are modelled from 
sections 37 and 38 of the ECT Act fully respond and address this technology 
neutrality.23  
Given the above-mentioned, it is submitted that the structure to regulate ICTs in South 
Africa is only founded on an inflexible framework which promotes the re-invention of 
the ICT regulatory wheel. One of the examples of the re-invention of the ICT regulator 
wheel is demonstrated in the proposed Draft Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Bill of 
2015.24 The CaC Bill is an attempt to address some of the shortcomings of the ECT 
Act, especially those relating to e-crimes.25 By so doing, it lists a multitude of activities 
and defines these as e-crimes.26 The list of e-crimes in the CaC Bill is so long that it 
contributes to the danger that Von Bertalanffy warned ICT regulators that they should 
guard against.27 This is the danger of becoming a computer moron, button-pusher or 
learned idiot. The aforementioned danger manifests itself in situations where regulators 
simply concern themselves with the immediate or existing risks. In this respect, they fail 
                                               
20  For a definition of the crime of money laundering see s 1 of FICA. See also, Njotini M 
“The transaction or activity monitoring process: an analysis of the customer due 
diligence (CDD) systems of the United Kingdom and South Africa” 2010 (31) Obiter 
556-573 558-559. 
21  The crime of terrorism and related activities is defined in section 4 of the Protection of 
Constitutional Democracy against Terrorism and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004. See 
also Shaaban Bin Hussein v Chonk Fook Kam [1969] 3 All ER 1626 1631, Powell v van 
der Merwe [2005] 1 All SA 149 (SCA) 162 [37] and Proc R309 GG 30873 of 14 March 
2008. 
22  See 2(f) of the ECT Act. 
23  S 2(k) of the ECT Act. 
24  Hereinafter referred to as the CaC Bill.  
25  See Preamble to the CaC Bill. 
26  Chapter 2 of the CaC Bill. 
27  Von Bertalanffy L General system theory: foundations, development, applications 
(George Braziller Inc. New York 1968) 10. 
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to contribute anything to ICT regulation and the control of the imminent challenges that 
are posed by contemporary technologies.28 Instead, they adopt methods that are suited 
to regulate offline occurrences and hope that those methods will function well in 
controlling online phenomenon, for example e-crimes. Immediately when technologies 
innovate, these button-pushers re-thing their strategy and introduce legal rules that 
address existing challenges. 
8.4.2 Behavioural Characterisation 
It has already been illustrated in the previous chapters that behavioural 
characterisation supports a precautionary approach to e-authentication. The 
justification for this view was discussed in chapter 7 of this research. It was submitted 
that although PAEA relies on biometric data which is relevant to the e-authentication 
process, it differs from the latter in number of respects. For example, biometric data is 
used as part or as an aspect of the e-authentication process. In particular, it supports 
the third pillar of e-authentication, which is proof by property. From this, biometrics data 
is e-authentication itself. However, biometric characterisation follows or is modelled 
from risk control or analysis. It requires a scientific examination of the risks and the 
evaluation of the potential scale of the consequences of those risks. It accepts that 
because characters for example keystrokes or e-signatures are developed by or for 
ICTs, then they can assist in the e-authentication process. In cases where these 
characters are used in e-authentication frameworks, it does not, in turn, mean that the 
manner of operation of the technologies which developed these characters will have to 
be modified or altered. Simply put, the effectiveness of the characters in e-
authentication schemes is not affected by peripheral innovations in recent 
technologies. By the same token, a change or development in ICTs does or will not 
essentially imply a modification of the biometric characters. 
Having exemplified the above-mentioned, it may then be asked: what this means for 
ICT regulatory purposes? The answer to this is simple. Biometric characters do not 
replace the identification particulars. They merely supplement and amplify existing e-
authentication structures. Pins, usernames, passwords and even biometric data, are 
                                               
28   Von Bertalanffy Foundations 10.  
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still essential to the e-authentication agenda. Accordingly, ICT regulators should apply 
these characters in order to complement the authentication of computer users or the 
particulars of computer users online. For example, a scenario or situation should be 
created where a user (U) subjects or will present himself or herself to a system (Ts). 
The Ts should be equipped with a number of technological applications or devices. 
These may a digitiser which is able to transform physical gestures into digital signals, 
camera or scanner. These signals, camera and scanner should capture or ought to be 
capable of capturing the image of U. Furthermore, a digitiser could be any online 
monitoring device which identifies the patterns of U’s behaviour or activities online for 
example, keystrokes.  
In the case where signals, camera and scanner are used in e-authentication schemes, 
Ts should be able to identify U’s signature. The signature ought to then be changed 
into computer data and thereafter be securely stored in the computer server (S). 
Furthermore, in circumstances where a voice is e-authenticated, then the manner and 
sequence of the speech (Seq) can or should be detected. Seq¹, Seq², Seq³, etc. may 
consequently be used and computed in order to demonstrate the similarities or 
differences in the sound, loudness or a pitch of a voice. Lastly, in the case of 
keystrokes, the system should identify the timing of a keystroke (kst). These can be the 
key-presses and key-releases. The measurements that ought to be used include kst¹, 
kst², kst³, etc. The number of Es in or between every kst should also be recorded, if 
there are any. 
8.4.3 Risk Control 
Risk control was introduced in chapter 7 of this research. It was submitted that the 
control of risks, in this case, e-crimes, is essential to the idea of a precautionary 
approach to e-authentication. This introduction does not imply that PAEA is not without 
its own limitations.29 This view is based on the fact that only an all or nothing approach 
to regulation could generate absolute regulatory frameworks. Within the context of 
regulating ICTs, this could mean a scenario where ICTs are used only for the purpose 
                                               
29  See Jablonowski M Precautionary risk management: dealing with catastrophic loss 
potentials in business, the community and society (Palgrave Macmillan New York 2006) 
25. 
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for which they were designed (this then excludes them being exploited by computer 
crackers) or to, given the vastness and perverse nature of e-crimes, encourage the 
regulatory industries to discontinue the use of the recent forms of technologies.  
The object of risk control, and ultimately PAEA, is to establish a framework in terms of 
which a balance is struck or sought to be struck between the detriments that are 
created by e-crimes and the benefits that recent technologies generate. The latter 
amounts to a process and requires an identification of past, present and forthcoming 
risks. Risk control has to be carried out at a particular level.30 This is referred to as a 
level (which) is suitable for analysis. The ultimate goal thereof is to measure and 
moderate the risks. The success of the measuring and mitigating process depends on 
the complexity of the detail in identifying the risks. However, it should be remembered 
that certain risks are more perverse and complicated than others. This is especially so 
given the constant developments in modern technologies. Therefore, it may be difficult 
and, sometimes, impossible to forecast future or upcoming risks.  
8.4.4 Education or Awareness 
In this research the necessity for education or awareness was initially acknowledged in 
chapter 1. In that chapter it was argued that education and awareness are some of the 
indispensable measures to prevent e-crimes. The aforementioned importance was also 
reiterated in chapter 7 where an investigation of the precautionary principle was made. 
In this chapter education and awareness are examined as a precautionary measure 
against e-crimes. They are ordinarily carried out by instituting programs (awareness 
programs) that are aimed at informing, teaching or alerting the regulatory industries 
about certain uncertain or indeterminate risks. Information is consequently 
disseminated which identifies these potential threats. From this information, the 
industries remain acquainted and cautious of the possible threats to their sensitive 
information. They then establish programs (security education, training and awareness 
                                               
30  Hopkinson M The project risk maturity model: measuring and improving risk 
management capability (Gower Publishing Surrey 2011) 113. 
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programs) that are designed to enhance their existing ICT infrastructure.31 This can be 
done in the following manner:  
Improving awareness of the need to protect system resources, 
developing skills and knowledge so (that) computer users can 
perform their jobs more securely and building in-depth knowledge, as 
needed, to design, implement, or operate security programs for 
organisations and systems.32 
However, it is argued that foresight in identifying risks is not a factor in the current 
education and awareness programmes. Firstly, these programmes inform the public 
about the risks that have already been identified. By so doing, they ignore the fact that 
a change in ICTs usually translate to a change in the techniques that are used to 
commit e-crimes. Secondly, the programmes are meaningless if they are not acted 
upon. Ignorance and lack of practical skills to effect action can be identified as the 
factors that contribute to this insignificance. Therefore, PAEA argues that e-crimes 
(would) flourish in environments where both the institutions that are charged with or 
responsible for creating the awareness or education and the users who should act on it 
(awareness) fail to take measures to alleviate the risks of e-crimes. Therefore, it is 
necessary for the industries to take ownership and control of the structures that are 
designed for awareness and education.  
8.4.5 Monitoring and Evaluation 
Risk monitoring and evaluation has to be understood against the background of 
chapter 5 above. Chapter 5 promotes or seeks to promote a holistic approach to ICT 
regulation. It does not embody a top-down or aggregation valuation33 (where the state 
or government champions regulations) nor does this encourage a bottom-up or 
disaggregation approximation34 (where regulatory industries determine regulations) 
regulatory agenda. However, it is a structure which recognises that all the affected 
                                               
31 Whitman ME and Mattord HJ Principles of information security 4th ed (Cengage 
Learning Australia 2012) 203. 
32 Whitman and Mattord Principles of information security 203. 
33  Michaels JV Technical risk management (Prentice Hall New Jersey 1996) 287-288. 
34  Michaels Technical 289-292. 
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industries (the state, regulated industries and computer users) can produce better or 
good ICT regulations. This amounts to what is referred to as co-regulations. 
Furthermore, it ensures that the industries are continuously aware and remain vigilant 
over the state of the ICT environment.  
Risk monitoring and evaluation denotes risk analysis. Risk analysis encompasses three 
aspects. These are risk assessment, risk management and risk communication.35 
Thus, it requires a study to be made of the context of the risks, the source of the risks 
and the consequences that the risks may have to the affected industries. It does not 
necessarily amount to the control of all the risks. Generally, it has to be remembered 
that not all the risks are worthy of being controlled. Certain risks are so insignificant and 
meaningless that the taking of the measures to control and manage them would be a 
total waste of time and resources.36 Therefore, it has to be investigated whether a risk 
is acceptable or not,37 or is so unsafe that it merits some action.38 The de minimis non 
curat lex rule can be used as a guide when analysing the risks. This rule states that the 
law does not concern itself with trifles. What this entails for ICT regulatory purposes is 
that the risks and the degree of the risks should be segregated. Risk matrixes (or 
Probability-Impact-Matrix or PIM) could be used in order to assist in making this 
separation. Thereafter, the risks that can be established in real time (foreseen or 
foreseeable risks) may be separated from unforeseen or unforeseeable risks. This 
could be done by studying contemporary risks and thus observing their long-run 
comparative regularity or predictabilities. 
Because ICT regulations are a product of this proposed all-inclusive approach, the 
regulated or affected industries should assume the role of the enforcers of these 
regulations. Accordingly, they have to determine the future that ICTs have to the 
                                               
35  See Button C The power to protect: trade, health and uncertainty in the WTO (Hart 
Publishing Oxford 2004) 95. Fisher adds a fourth element to risk analysis. This, he 
says, is the ‘cost-effective analysis’. See Fisher RP Information systems security 
(Prentice-Hall New Jersey 1984) 80. 
36  See S v Kgogong 1980 (3) SA 600 (A), S v Nedzamba 1993 1 SACR 673 (V) and R v 
Dane 1957 2 SA 472 (N). 
37  See Douglas M Risk acceptability according to the social sciences (Routledge London 
1985). 
38  See Rayner S and Cantor R “How fair is safe enough? – the cultural approach to 
societal technology choice” 1987 (7) Risk Analysis 3-9. 
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information society; the effect that ICTs are likely to have to the information society; the 
structure to be followed in controlling that envisaged effect; and the consequences that 
a change in ICTs is likely have to the computer users, businesses and governments. 
Furthermore, the industries must effect a change in ICT regulations whenever possible. 
This means that they should seek to establish and maintain an effective ICT regulatory 
framework, and take measures to preserve and protect the integrity and stability of 
information systems in South Africa. 
8.4.6 Summary 
A structure to e-authenticate a computer user or the particulars of a computer user is 
not fully or sufficiently addressed in South Africa. Despite the acceptance of the 
precautionary measures in other cases (for example, those relating to anti-money 
laundering or anti-terrorism), the ECT Act seems to ignore the importance of risk 
regulations. Furthermore, it is not clear from the ECT Act whether or not the exercise of 
precaution in e-authentication schemes could be delegated to the proposed ICT 
regulatory industries. In this chapter, behavioural characterisation, risk control, 
education or awareness and monitoring and evaluation assists in rectifying the 
aforementioned vacuum in the ECT Act. Firstly, behavioural characterisation signifies a 
move beyond the use of biometric data. It accepts that identifying particulars and 
biometric data are essential to the e-authentication agenda. However, it recognises that 
the particulars and data can be or are more effective if they are used as part of PAEA 
as opposed to them as e-authentication themselves. Secondly, risk control does not 
imply an all or nothing ICT regulatory structure. It only necessitates that past, present 
and future risks should be identified. 
Thirdly, education or awareness are measures that are aimed at teaching and alerting 
the regulatory industries about e-crimes and the consequences that e-crimes have or 
can have to their information. Therefore, the regulatory industries ought to take 
ownership of the initiatives created for this purpose. Fourthly, monitoring and 
evaluation amount to risk analysis. It acknowledges that some risks of are perverse 
whereas others are not. Therefore, the nature, context and foreseen or foreseeable 
consequences of the risks should be examined. The basis for this is to enable the 
regulatory industries to separate significant from insignificant risks. Accordingly, they 
can use the de minimis non curat lex rule as a guide. 
  
267 
 
Figure 8.1 below contains a summary of the proposed precautionary approach to e-
authentication. This summary demonstrates the meaning of the aforementioned 
approach for ICT regulatory purposes. It also evidences the element and the 
effectiveness of PAEA. 
Proposed PAEA  
Meaning 
 
Essential Elements 
 
Effectiveness 
 
Behavioural 
Characterisation  
 
- Relates to the examination 
of the behavioural 
characters of user  - Relies on proof by property 
(biometric data) - Fosters existing e-
authentication measures - Biometric data supplements 
identifying particulars (ID, 
username and password) - Modelled from risk control 
 
- Biometric data  - Keystroke dynamics and e-
signatures - System and system dynamics - Technological applications or 
devices 
- Technologically neutral - Available to use - It is attached to the technology - It develops with innovations in 
ICTs - It not affected by external 
developments in technology - It can be operated at a user-to-
machine  
 
Risk Control 
 
- Relates to the management 
of risks - It seeks to balance the risks 
and the benefits - Recognises that risks should 
be segregated – certain 
risks are high as opposed to 
others. 
- Builds on behavioural 
characterisation - Supports precautionary 
approach to risk regulation - Good regulations 
- Technologically neutral - Founded on the principle for 
good regulations - Legal rules influence and not 
determine the structure of ICT 
regulations - Risk evaluation - ICT regulations to be 
commensurate to the risks 
 
Education or Awareness 
 
- Conducting awareness 
programmes - Disseminate information to 
designated groups / 
industries - Identify current and future 
risks  
- Foresight in risks identification - Ensure that there is response 
following the programmes - Devise measures to curtail 
current, future, certain and 
uncertain risks - Be responsive to the 
programmes 
- The programmes are fairly and 
equitable communicated to the 
identified industries - Records are kept and stored - Improve areas where risks are 
uncertain 
 
Monitoring and 
Evaluation 
 
- It involves risk analysis - The context of the risks is 
investigated - The source of the risks is 
determined - The potential consequences 
that the risks could cause to 
a system are analysed - No amount of work should 
be expended on insignificant 
risks - Resort to the creation of a 
risk matrix in order to 
determine the scale of the 
risk 
 
- Risk assessment - Risk management - Risk communication - Risk matrixes to be used 
 
- Holistic approach to risk 
identification - Promotes an all-inclusive ICT 
regulatory agenda  - It is referred to as co-regulation - Industries communicate and 
seek to find solutions  
Figure 8.1: Summary of the proposed precautionary approach to e-authentication 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter a precautionary approach to e-authentication is discussed. This method 
is referred to as PAEA. PAEA argues that a suitable method of regulating technologies 
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should not only be drawn from legal rules. Flexible regulations could provide a suitable 
framework within which ICTs and their accompanying risks are controlled. Furthermore, 
it accepts that the state is or ought not to be a single role-player in ICT regulations.39 
Social norms, market and nature or architecture are also important in this regard.40 A 
number of aspects are discussed which determine the meaning and structure of the 
proposed precautionary approach to e-authentication. These include technology 
neutrality or independence, good or better regulations, equity and a system of 
regulatory instruments.  
The effectiveness of PAEA is evaluated by examining the existing structures to e-
authentication. The United Kingdom, Canada and South African arrangements to e-
authentication provide a lead. It is established that the structure for risk regulation or 
regulation by risk is encouraged by the United Kingdom and Canada e-authentication 
measures. This structure is discussed fully and elaborated. However, South Africa 
omits to provide measures dealing with a precautionary approach to e-authentication. 
In particular, there is no mention being made of PAEA in sections 37 and 38 of the ECT 
Act. Although the Cybersecurity Policy refers to a process of risk management, it is 
argued that this process is not comparable to PAEA. Even if the opposite is true, the 
Cybersecurity Policy, in any event, fails to provide substance to the proposed risk 
management process. Consequently, the challenges that are created by e-crimes 
remain as they were despite the provisions of the Cybersecurity Policy. Lastly, it is 
argued that the outlook of PAEA for ICT regulatory purposes should be influenced by, 
at least, four fundamentals. These are behavioural characterisation, risk control, 
education or awareness and monitoring and evaluation.  
                                               
39    Lessig 1999 Harvard Law Review 507. 
40    Lessig 1999 Harvard Law Review 507. 
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